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Abstract 
This work is concerned with a pervasive problem in Cognitive Science which 
I have called the "stratificational" approach. I argue that the division into 
"levels of explanation" that runs as a constant theme through much work 
in Cognitive Science and in particular natural language semantics, is in di-
rect conflict with neuroscientific evidence. I claim it is also in conflict with 
a right understanding of the philosophical notion of "evidence". The neu-
roscientific work is linked with the philosophical problem to provide a cri-
tique of concrete cases of research within the natural language semantics 
community. More recent neuroscientifically aware research is examined 
and it is demonstrated that it suffers similar problems due to the same 
deep running assumptions as those which effect traditional formalist the-
ory. The contribution of this thesis is thought to be that of a demonstration 
of the essential nature and indeed the ubiquity of the basic assumptions in 
the field. Also, a new link is forged between the concerns of the formalists 
and certain seemingly more abstract philosophical work. This link enables 
us to see how much philosophical problems infect research into cognition 
and language. It is argued that practical research in Cognitive Science sim-
ply cannot be seen to be independent of the philosophical basis of the entire 
subject. The resulting picture of Cognitive Science and its place is outlined 
and explored with special emphasis on what I have called the "Principle 
of Semantic Indistinguishabliity" which says that the contribution of what 
can be broadly termed "environment" is epitemologically opaque to our cog-
nition. The importance of this principle is discussed. 
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The purpose of this work is to draw out a fundamental thread of reason-
ing and methodology that underlies most traditional work, and some not 
so traditional work, in Cognitive Science. It will be argued that this line 
of reasoning is at odds with the implications of modern neuroscience and 
cannot base a reasonable claim to "explain" human cognition. The picture 
I shall identify is that which I shall call "stratified". This, in general, is 
an attempt at explanation that divides into "levels of explanation", each 
with its own concepts that are said to be essential to the explanation of 
a phenomenon. There are specific and pragmatic manifestations of this, I 
discuss these in Chapter 3 and 7 in particular. There are also more ab-
stract expressions of the same tendency which I examine mainly in Chap-
ter 6. One of the principle tasks is to demonstrate the links between the 
assumptions of the more abstract formulations of this approach and th eir 
pragmatic instantiations in work in Cognitive Science. This allows it to be 
made clear that certain methodological problems are ubiquitous within the 
field and are not simply a result of the particular pragmatics of a particular 
research area. 
In Cognitive Science as a whole, it is generally appreciated today that 
there are problems to do with integration of traditional formal systems and 
the evolutionary and biological aspects of human cognition. One aim of 
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this work is exactly to give an argument, supported from work in the brain 
sciences, that a certain methodology - particularly that enshrined within 
formal systems in language semantics - is strongly denied its evidential 
basis as a result of certain empirical considerations. It is also denied much 
of its basis as a result of the incongruity between the original motivations 
of logical formalism and the use to which this formalism is put today. The 
conclusion of this is that Cognitive Science's role in certain areas is severely 
limited and it crucially relies on an amount of empirical brain research in 
places thought usually to be completely separate from the "low-level" evi-
dence from neuroscience. Part of my thesis is that stratified systems and 
particularly systems of formal logic within linguistics and semantics, can-
not possibly be independent in the way imagined. There is also exploration 
of a general point regarding the character of the relation between strata in 
a stratified theory. There is, I shall argue, an irresolvable tension between 
the desire to have separate strata which are both independent but related. 
We shall see this both in concrete terms in the discussion of Fodor and in 
the abstract in the discussion of McDowell. 
George Lakoffhas expressed agreement with this particular premise: 
" ... linguistic results ... indicate that human reason uses 
some of the same mechanisms involved in perception and ... hu-
man reason can be seen as growing out of perceptual and motor 
mechanisms."1 
If this is correct, then I think that there are enormous implications for 
Cognitive Science in its practise of semantics since the mechanisms of mo-
tor and perceptual systems impose radical constraints when applied in the 
area of semantics. 
Given this, my aim is to demonstrate that certain seemingly theory-
independent areas of research in Cognitive Science such as linguistics and 
natural language semantics are actually infected with damaging assump-
1(Lakoff 1988) p. 301 
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tions from certain misguided philosophical positions. The idea that we can 
simply model things in Cognitive Science and wait for someone else to sort 
out the theoretical structure into which all of the models will fit is not ten-
able. I shall demonstrate this in several concrete cases and couple this with 
a critique from neuroscience which is crucially related to a more philosoph-
ical critique of fundamental assumptions. The structure of the work is as 
follows. Firstly, I give an overview of foundational issues in Cognitive Sci-
ence by discussing central works. Then, I introduce the main problems in 
concrete form by way of an examination of certain approaches to inference 
in formal semantics. Chapter 4 expands on this in an analysis of the no-
tion of "compositionality" with reference to the "stratificational" approach 
I find apparent in traditional work in Cognitive Science and the assump-
tions it disguises. Chapter 5 introduces the themes from neuroscience and 
the relations they have to the philosophical critique in Chapter 6. In Chap-
ter 7, I demonstrate that the assumptions I have identified are present 
even in work motivated by a desire to leave behind the formalist program. 
I explain why this is the case and the implications this has for a correct 
view of "evidence" in Cognitive Science. At this point, I deal with pertinent 
objections to my view stemming from the parts of the discipline I have men-
tioned. Chapter 8 condenses the problem and shows the fundamentals of 
the whole problem in relief, suggesting what all of the preceding means for 
Cognitive Science. 
Chapter 2 
Placing the Approach to 
Cognitive Science 
It is as well to place the ensuing approach within the landscape of Cognitive 
Science as this reveals the fundamental assumptions that I make about the 
subject. These fundaments are important since the position I advocate is 
based heavily on rather critical foundational notions about the role of ex-
planation and evidence in Cognitive Science. In this section, I shall outline 
the relevant major assumptions in Cognitive Science and shall try to say 
where I find them lacking, why I do so and what general philosophical 
strategy I advocate. This will aid in setting the scene for the more detailed 
arguments to come. I refrain from providing a history of Cognitive Science 
and AI since this has been done many, many times before and I am more 
concerned with the conceptual issues here than the historical placement of 
ideas. One might consult (Dreyfus & Dreyfus 1988) for a clear history of the 
two main competing Cognitive Science programmes. (Nuallain 1995) has a 
very comprehensive history of most things relevant to the development of 
Cognitive Science. 
In recent years, few books have been more thorough in providing a 
highly detailed view of the practice of Cognitive Science than von Eckardt's 
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"What is Cognitive Science?"1. Not only does it attempt to outline the 
methodology in terms of aims, methods and approaches but also tries to 
point out philosophical assumptions and canonical examples of research. 
As an example of a recent survey of the foundational material of main-
stream Cognitive Science, it is a useful work to focus discussion around. 
By examining a wide variety of approaches to standard research in the 
field, von Eckardt promotes a position which aims to establish the valid-
ity of certain quite traditional assumptions about Cognitive Science. The 
point of the book is to defend Cognitive Science against the idea that the 
field is too loosely connected to constitute a real subject, in the sense of 
conforming to some respectable methodological criteria. The issue is con-
fused by von Eckardt freely (but explicitly, thankfully) mixing normative 
with descriptive criteria and so the picture that emerges is one which de-
scribes some combination of how Cognitive Science actually is with a little 
of how von Eckardt thinks it should be. This, as it happens, is useful since 
I shall highlight the central features of my normative claims by offsetting 
them against those that von Eckardt extracts from the major positions in 
the field. 
Cognitive Science has inherited many different concerns from many 
different fields. The interesting thing is that these concerns have largely 
been different ways of approaching similar things and thus a coalescence 
of aims has resulted in certain problems becoming paramount in Cogni-
tive Science. One of the first, coming out of Newell and Simon's "Physical 
Symbol System Hypothesis" in AI was an interest in the role of symbols as 
a medium for r epresentation of the world. An interest in how to develop 
systems of symbols in order to be able to economically and satisfactorily 
mirror relations in the world became a major research programme. This 
combined very early on with the linguistics community who were attempt-
ing to utilise tools from the practise of logic in order to provide models 
1(von Eckardt 1993) 
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of language. Chomsky and Montague were pioneers in this area and, in-
spired by influential psychologists working in the new "cognitive" paradigm 
on the relationship between language and thought2, came to be seen to be 
relevant not only to language but to the study of the whole structure of 
cognition. The most well-known modern inheritors of this tradition are 
Fodor and Pylyshyn who still defend a notion of symbolic representation. 
The computational thrust was provided partly by the advent of more pow-
erful computers and the initially impressive results in famously limited 
chess programs and "block-world" research. It was also partly fuelled by 
the functionalist philosophy of mind that arose at the time. Together, this 
computational element has bound Cognitive Science quite closely to com-
puter metaphor and simulation. 
The most significant division has been that between the traditional 
approach and the connectionist research that has spread since the "percep-
tron" work of McCulloch and Pitts. Still an essentially computationalist 
paradigm, the connectionists famously eschewed the symbolic and formal-
ist sides of the early Cognitive Science and advocated a more biologically 
realistic approach to understanding cognition. We shall r eturn to these 
themes later. 
2. 1 Cognitive Science as a Science 
It is quite common to defend the scientific status of a science by defending 
the nature of the basic assumptions. Popper's famous "falsificationist" ap-
proach was essentially this and Kuhn's paradign1atic model was a descrip-
tion of how this works. Now, it is very common for Cognitive Scientists to 
do the same, presumably to be in order with the rest of that which is called 
science. Marr's widely-known model of the visual system that prompted the 
most famous "levels of description" approach was exactly this : an attempt 
21 am thinking here particularly ofVygotsky, Sapir and Whorf and Skinner 
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to regiment the assumptions of a field. von Eckardt is very clear on this 
and argues that the "foundational consensus" that the field displays is a 
result of coherency of basic assumptions. It is this which firmly establishes 
Cognitive Science as a science3• It is not always like this, however. One 
of the figures central to significant sub-fields of Cognitive Science, Noam 
Chomsky, was quick to realise that what really matters in the status of 
a science is rather the data that it employs. Chomsky was very keen for 
his brand of linguistic theory to have a solid body of data as a result4 . In 
agreement with Chomsky, I think it is really the nature of the data that 
Cognitive Scientists of the traditional school appeal to that is responsible 
for any suspicions about the coherency of the field. As to whether these 
suspicions can be justified, I leave this question for the body of the work. 
Suffice to say that I think, by and large, they can. A concentration on 
the relationship between assumptions and practice allows one to say that 
something is a science by virtue of its connection with the world but to deny 
this in almost every concrete situation because one's data is of a sort that 
is really nothing like that of the natural sciences. This is exactly what von 
Eckardt allows: 
"In particular, one would expect that, ceteris paribus, if the 
foundational assumptions are wildly off base, the research pro-
gram will eventually fail no matter ingenious or strenuous the 
research effort."5 
The trouble is that the ceteris paribus clause can encompass as many 
assumption-denying implications as one likes as long as the data is flexible 
enough to allow an almost unlimited number of reinterpretations. This is 
a central part of my thesis and occupies a considerable part of the mate-
rial following. The very tentative way in which von Eckardt approaches 
the issue of the "domain of enquiry" (i.e. the data of the subject) makes 
3(von Eckardt 1993) p.4 
4This is explicit in Chomsky's earlier work 
5ibid p. 4 
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this clear. In a telling descriptive/normative shift, von Eckardt first says 
that the "low-level" assumptions of the field posit phenomena that "can be 
assumed" to exist. Then, immediately after this, von Eckardt says that it 
is "important to preserve" the low-level nature of these assumptions. This 
is a characteristic normative strategy in Cognitive Science and displays 
the wisdom of Chomsky's early attempts to secure some data for linguistic 
research6 . von Eckardt uses this normative requirement of "preservation 
of low-level data" to ensure that one can compare approaches to the same 
phenomena. Of course, this comparison does indeed require such preser-
vation but is certainly not a good argument, or indeed any argument at 
all th at there is such a secure domain of "low-level phenomena" data. It 
merely establishes a weaker, hypothetical claim that if there are not such 
things, then there are severe problems for comparison of approaches within 
Cognitive Science. Indeed, I would argue that a desire to m ake theoretical 
underdetermination more tractable does not provide evidence in any way 
for one's ontological assumptions, rather it completely depends on them. 
This is, I should hope, obvious. What is not obvious is that this mistake 
is consistently made in traditional Cognitive Science because of mistakes 
about the nature of the data. von Eckardt does allow that the ontologi-
cal assumptions of Cognitive Science can change as this is apparent as a 
feature of every mature science. This is not enough to establish anything 
however as the history of science also demonstrates that a field whose on-
tological assumptions change does not thereby have a claim to sciencehood. 
History is riddled with examples of change from one ontological fiction to 
another. 
An element of the contribution this thesis makes to the subject is to 
make clear a type of argument used to defend methodology in traditional 
Cognitive Science. It is a variation on a theme highlighted briefly above in 
the case of the avoidance of underdetermination. As a paradigm of foun-
6See Chapter 4 
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dational Cognitive Science research, von Eckardt displays this argument 
form clearly 
" ... it is far easier to adopt a "divide and conquer" strategy 
[to explaining human cognitive capacities]. And only [this strat-
egy], I submit, makes any methodological sense. Our capacities 
are difficult enough to explain one by one. If we are faced with 
the task of describing them in interaction at the outset, the job 
becomes completely daunting."7 
Again the pattern emerges that certain foundational decisions made 
by Cognitive Science are based not on anything as secure as is suggested, 
but rather on a hypothetical of the form "if not this assumption, then no 
Cognitive Science". A central aim of this thesis is to demonstrate that the 
antecedent of these conditionals, often rushed over hastily in introductions 
to Cognitive Science books and papers, can be seen to be satisfied in signif-
icant cases of Cognitive Science research. 
A general example of the problem with the data of the field is given 
by von Eckardt's "Domain Specifying Assumptions" for Cognitive Science. 
Take, for example: 
D2 (PROPERTY ASSUMPTION) Pretheoretically conceived, 
the human cognitive capacities have a number of important prop-
erties. I shall refer to these as the basic general properties of 
cognition 
(a) each capacity is intentional; that is, it involves states that 
have content or are "about" something. :8 
Given that there is much debate in Cognitive Science regarding what "in-
tentionality'' actually is and when it manifests, it cannot be reasonable for 
a science to include this as a "property assumption". In physics, for exam-
ple, it is not argued about whether something has the property of being 
"hot" or "cold" or "boiling" since these are exactly the sort of things that are 
7ibid p. 64 
8ibid p. 47 
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fit to play the part of such "property assumptions". "Being intentional" is 
not suitable since there is no accepted criteria of what counts as such. This 
is an important point and one which is addressed specifically in Chapter 4. 
It is a specific example of the nature of the data in Cognitive Science being 
so significantly different from that in the mature sciences that it threatens 
to enlarge the ceteris peribus clause mentioned above in order to ensure 
that no foundational questions arise. Ifwe hardly know what "being inten-
tional" means, we can reinterpret this in cases when our work contradicts 
what we currently think it means. In Chapter 4, I discuss this as the prob-
lem that Cognitive Science has little established dogma to "push against" 
in order to gain leverage on its problems. Indeed, I shall argue that the 
nature of the subject is in general, as traditionally conceived, conducive to 
making it almost impossible for it to have the leverage necessary to enable 
it to become a mature science. von Eckardt's first assumption reads: 
D1 (IDENTIFICATION ASSUMPTION) The domain of Adult 
Normal Typical Cognition consists of the human cognitive ca-
pacities. 
As a basic datum "cognitive capacity" is hardly illuminating since in a 
foundational enquiry, part of that in which we are interested at this junc-
ture is exactly to find out just what Cognitive Science is. I think we have 
little "pretheoretic" idea what "cognitive" is or exactly what is meant by a 
"capacity" here. In fact, telling us what these words mean seems to be a 
part of what Cognitive Science is trying to do. The situation with the physi-
cal sciences as examples of mature science is that although they eventually 
may alter and define what is designated as their domain, they famously 
start out by addressing properties and objects which we are pretheoreti-
cally happy with. This is exactly Quine's famous dictum that science is an 
extension of common sense. 
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2.2 Undermining the Foundation 
It is necessary, after these rather general points, to examine specifically 
some arguments regarding the foundations of Cognitive Science, particu-
larly those which I will have cause to question later on. I am specifically 
interested in those questions regarding the role of neuroscience since I will 
explicitly address these in the main body of the work. The bedrock of much 
Cognitive Science is formed of a belief that there is a certain "level of de-
scription" or "realm of explanation" that can be investigated essentially 
separately from the facts about its actual biological realisation. A weaker 
version of this attitude is that something can be learned about the subject 
matter by this assumption, leaving in question whether a realistic explana-
tion can completely assume this. My view is that we cannot even seriously 
hold this weaker position for reasons that will become apparent in Chap-
ters 5 and 6. 
Fodor has been a major proponent of a view concerning the founda-
tions of Cognitive Science which sees an explanatorially independent realm 
from the neurological. His argument is that the correlations between neu-
ral states and the cognitive phenomena that we are desirous to explain 
are too vague to really warrant the belief in any real constraint on Cog-
nitive Science by neuroscience. von Eckardt sees this as a version of the 
"multiple-realisability" argument that seeks to keep the explanations of 
Cognitive Science separate because the data involved could arise in many 
possibly ways; thus, this independence of any particular possible realisa-
tion of the subject seems to show that no particular constraint source is 
relevant. This is obviously a fallacy9 since we need not resort to modal ar-
guments in a case where we know what the source of realisation is. There 
may be many possible sources of a "cognitive" ability but we are presum-
ably really only concerned with one: the brain. So, given this, how could 
9von Eckardt too argues against this. Ibid pp. 322-327 
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neuroscience not be a constraint upon Cognitive Science as long as it is con-
cerned with human beings? Of course, von Eckardt's explicit formulation 
of the aims of Cognitive Science is to the study of"human cognitive capac-
ities" and so she is quite right and indeed compelled to reject the simple 
multiple-realisability argument. von Eckardt realises though that Fodor's 
argument is a little different but her reply is, I think not wholly satisfactory 
as evidenced by the position she adopts later on. This point is important 
to discuss as it makes clear where my position fits in with the foundational 
literature at a crucial point of division. 
So, Fodor's view challenges the non-modal correction of the situation 
above by arguing that there is still multiple-realisability in the actual sup-
posed substrate of cognition. That is, we have little or no evidence for 
specifi.c constraints on, say, semantic processing and thus no clear idea of 
constraints at all. At best, this is a merely epistemological point about lack 
of knowledge from which it is dangerous to draw philosophical conclusions. 
This is really as far as von Eckardt goes: 
"The fact that thus far only gross psycho-neural correlations 
have been discovered does not mean that there are no detailed 
correlations to be had."10 
I think we can do better than this as a rebuttal and I think we need to 
since this leads von Eckardt into error later on (see below). It is my belief 
that the kinds of specific "cognitive" functions that interest Fodor, however 
one models or characterises them, must depend on evolutionary pre-dating 
capacities such as core motor skills11 and that it is highly unlikely that 
these would have the sort of disparate neural realisation necessary to give 
Fodor's result. Nature can afford to experiment with relatively insignif-
icant (in terms of survival) filigree such as the niceties of semantics and 
language but this is simply not possible with skills central the survival 
10Ibid. p. 326 
11The detailed argument for this claim can be found in Chapter 4 
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of a certain species. This assumption is, in fact, central to the biological 
sciences since there it is never assumed that one person might coordinate 
vision with one neural story and another person with a different one. Even 
across species we find similar realisations of core skills; this is the basis of 
comparative anatomy. The reason that neuroscience appears so vague and 
non-specific in its constraints is that the implications of its more interest-
ing models have not been explored. It is exactly the examiniation of th is 
that constitutes part of the task of this thesis. 
Now, it is von Eckardt's weak reply to Fodor's argument that prompts a 
critical concession to the traditional conception of Cognitive Science. There 
are then, for von Eckardt three possibilities regarding the role of neuro-
science and the foundations of Cognitive Science.12 
• A "top-down" approach whereby Cognitive Science proceeds with psy-
chology and model building at the level of "cognitive capacities" and 
only later tries the resultant theories against the evidence from neu-
roscience. 
• A "bottom-up" strategy which attempts to work towards information 
processing models of such capacities from work in neuroscience. 
• The "co-evolutionary" method which allows research in both domains 
as seems "fruitful"13 and influence in both directions. 
Against the top-down idea, von Eckardt argues convincingly that there 
is no reason to wait until we have a completed information processing the-
ory before we can utilise the obviously relevant neuroscientific data from, 
for example, impairment studies. Against the bottom-up approach, it is 
merely stated that answers to basic questions about how people do certain 
(canonically "cognitive") things are dependent on an answer to the question 
12pp. 327-328 
13 A rather colourful and vague methodological dictate given von Eckardt's careful and 
lengthy opening theoretical characterisation of Cognitive Science methodology. 
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about their information-processing implementation. This is not so much an 
argument as a clear example of question begging I think but so as to be as 
constructive as possible, I shall instead turn to what I see to be the problem 
with von Eckardt's final choice: the "co-evolutionary" methodology. 
It is my view that a real appreciation of the perfectly good argument 
against the top-down approach conclusively legislates against the co- evo-
lutionary tactic too. That is not to say that I therefore have complete faith 
in the bottom-up method but more of this point later. Strangely, the very 
fact that the neuroscientific constraints are so general and vague means, 
contra Fodor, that they undermine the very fabric of basic assumptions 
that the major functionalist, information-processing, symbolic and formal 
approaches to Cognitive Science depend critically on. This is discussed at 
length through that which follows whilst here, I will make a more general 
point. The simple historical fact is that co-evolution of approaches did not 
occur and the disparity of theoretical evolution evident as a result of this 
means that co-evolution is too much to hope for in the future. The moti-
vations of the traditional approach to Cognitive Science that Fodor repre-
sents long predate the more modern science of the brain. The basis of logic 
and formal systems which forms the heart of the information-processing 
approach is comparatively mature compared with the burgeoning field of 
neuroscience14 . As a result, the criteria for a "good" theory are set by the 
pre-dating paradigm and we have the current situation where much of the 
neuroscientifically motivated research is trying to address problems that 
have been forced onto it by the established traditional approach. This point 
is addressed in detail later but it serves to show that a co-evolutionary 
approach is an ideal, the main premise of which cannot be satisfied. Co-
evolution requires a fairly equal start and I shall argue later that the re-
quirements for success had already become so ingrained by the time neuro-
14(Pellionisz 1984) makes the point clearly that neuroscience has no clear paradigm 
since it is so new. 
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science began to make inroads into Cognitive Science, that it was bound to 
"fail" according to the standards of the existing paradigm. So, von Eckardt's 
co-evolutionary strategy is, at best, a disguised top-down situation which 
is unsatisfactory for the same reasons. Essentially the problem is this -
and this is a major theme for this whole work: that co-evolution of areas 
with completely different notions as to what constitutes "evidence", "ex-
planation" and "good theory" is not possible. In trying to co-evolve with 
such underlying problems, one view always falls foul of the other's method-
ological criteria. Part of what I will say is that the neuroscientific view is 
prone to fall foul of the traditional cognitivist's methodological dictates and 
if there should be any falling foul, it should be in the other direction. 
Another full-scale attempt to outline the structure and direction of 
Cognitive Science is Sean O Nuallain's "The Search for Mind"15. The cen-
tral claim of this work is that language use consists of exactly this sort of 
co-evolution of different levels of description: 
". . . use of language involves exploitation of a formal sym-
bol system, interaction of this system with operational knowl-
edge, and intersubjective knowledge of oneself as an object in 
the world. Neuroscientific evidence currently exists for the first 
two points."16 
It is clear that O Nuallain is concerned with the contributions of these 
levels of knowledge rather than a co-evolution of methodology but the idea 
is clearly similar: the symbolic should be seen to be a partner in a Cogni-
tive Science that proposes to tackle the issue oflanguage. Now, 0 Nuallain 
is very much aware of the crucial importance of the notion of context. He is 
quite clear that its essentially non-linguistic and non-formal nature guar-
antees that a purely formal account oflanguage will fail17 . However, there 
seems to be a quiet acceptance of the fact that the formal description of 
15(Nuallain 1995) 
16Ibid p.175 
17See especially Ibid, Chapter 3 
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language is compatible with this non-formal notion of context. If formal 
linguistics fails to capture the non-formal aspect of context, then, as is the 
thrust of my arguments below, the attempt to make them co-operate in a 
"hybrid" or "co-evolutionary" manner will fail also. We return to this theme 
properly in Chapter 6 where we investigate the inherent trouble in trying 
to blend levels of explanation that are, by design, complementary. An obvi-
ous point to raise here is O Nuallain's claim that neuroscientific data exists 
supporting the idea that a formal system plays a part in language use. In-
terestingly, after a thorough survey of neuroscience and work in PDP, the 
only really supportive material that is discussed in not really neuroscience 
but work such as Smolensky's PDP systems18 which are explicitly designed 
to tackle the issue of a symbolic/non-symbolic interaction. So, no neurosci-
entific support is adduced as such and Smolensky is accurately reported 
as not allowing formal grammars any causal role anyway; something I 
wholeheartedly agree with and develop further below. At the very least, I 
note here that if one assigns no causal role to formal grammars, then one 
is not really seriously considering a hybrid explanation or methodological 
co-evolution at all. 
0 Nuallain is very concerned, unlike von Eckardt, to class as central 
the notions of "consciousness", "self' and "environment". I think this is a 
praiseworthy tendency indeed but I have severe reservations about Cogni-
tive Science being able to do this. While I do not address these issues ex-
plicitly, this thesis might be taken as an argument why this cannot happen. 
In respect of O Nuallain's wishes, I will note here a problem I find with his 
approach that is exactly the problem I argue later is central to this whole 
debate. On p. 23619 , 0 Nuallain outlines the detail of his approach towards 
including these famously omitted notions mentioned above. 
"Social factors can be handled by informational characterisa-
18Particularly (Smolen sky 1988) 
19Ibid 
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tion of subject-environment relations (as done in, for example, 
situation semantics), affect by studying its informational role, 
and consciousness by examining projection of informational dis-
tinctions." 
Firstly, I have little faith in situation semantics as being able to ad-
dress these issues as I describe in Chapter 4: I think the new generation of 
"informational" semantics theories have given us little more than a vocabu-
lary with which to fool ourselves that we really are incorporating "context" 
into our endeavours. In general, I think this quote depicts the mistake 
of trying to maintain a real difference between formalism and areas like 
"context" whilst also attempting to link them. McDowell's attempt at this 
is used as a descriptive case of this problem in Chapter 6. 0 Nuallain's 
approach is certainly a lot more mature and appealing than most in that 
he recognises the major omissions in Cognitive Science; the issue I take is 
with the means proposed to repair this and I think that these means are 
flawed in a way that runs as a common thread through attempts to provide 
a coherent subject matter and methodology for Cognitive Science and its 
attendant philosophy. The issue is illuminated when O Nuallain says: 
"The viewpoint of this book is that many of [the problematic 
semantic] arguments can be resolved with a clearer model of 
context."20 
I would agree with this if it were not for the fact that "a clearer model" 
is, I will argue, inevitably elaborated upon in terms which concede every-
thing to an essentially symbolic formalist picture which thereby contradicts 
the whole notion of a non-symbolic and pervasive idea of environmental 
con text. Crucially, 
" ... context relates to the interaction of the symbol system 
with other types of knowledge."21 
20Ibid p. 262 
21 Ibid p. 327 
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I would have no quarrel with this notion of context were it not for the 
fact that I find good reason to suggest that it is exactly this notion of "in-
teraction" that we fail to specify. We fail to do this not for any reasons to 
do with contingent lack of effort or ingenuity but rather because of how 
"context", "symbolic" and "formal" are defined in the first place. 
2.3 lneliminibility 
To return to von Eckardt's treatment, the conflict of explanatory interests 
revealed above is displayed further in her argument for the ineliminibility 
of the information-processing level of description. She argues that in order 
to see this, one needs to see that the level of neural realisation cannot help 
in explaining that which Cognitive Science seeks to explain. The argument 
for this is simply one by definition: 
"How is this possible given that I have barred representa-
tions per se from the neural level?"22 
Of course, the methodological demands of the cognitive information 
processing view require representations on von Eckardt's approach and so 
the neural level could not possibly meet this objection. The interesting 
thing that seems to have been missed though is the consequences of this 
rather extreme position. If the neural level is barred in principle, indeed 
by definition, from contributing towards that which is necessary for a good 
explanation in Cognitive Science, then what can really be said, except in 
the rather vague and hopeful current idiom of "interdisciplinary research", 
about the future of a "co-evolutionary" strategy? This is exactly the same 
problem as faces MacDowell that I discuss later in which he tries to keep 
approaches far enough apart to be still distinguishable but close enough 
22Ibid p. 333 
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together to be intercommunicable. The tension is, I shall argue, too much 
for the subject to bear. 
In general, we have a common situation in much foundational work 
in Cognitive Science and AI. With the early interest in, for example, chess 
playing programs, it was decided first what constituted the essence of the 
explanatory domain under question, and then research was encouraged un-
der that methodological umbrella. von Eckardt is no different in that she 
has decided what is wanted from Cognitive Science in terms of explanation 
and then proceeds to judge the approaches on that basis. However, as the 
history of science shows, one does not always get what one wants in terms 
of explanation. Part of the enterprise of science is exactly to find out what 
sorts of explanation are appropriate rather than to explore amongst ideas 
for ones which fit the preconceived idea of relevance. No-one would sup-
pose that the history of science is a paradigmatically rational enterprise 
in which there were no biases regarding explanatory relevance but Cogni-
tive Science is in an unusually tender situation, being so young, where any 
crystallisation of explanatory desiderata could be quite fatal for a healthy 
growth of the subject. Once thing we should learn from science is that the 
form of an explanation need not be, and often is not, obviously related to the 
terms in which the phenomena under investigation are described. In this 
case, so-called "cognitive capacities" need not have an explanation that in-
vokes a cognitive or information processing level of description. Of course, 
they might have to invoke such things but in order to do so, one needs a 
better argument than that which merely states that other possibilities are 
ruled out since they do not happen to use the right vocabulary. Who would, 
for example, have thought that heat would be explained by mean aggregate 
velocity of molecules or similar since the vocabulary is so different to that 
which is used to describe temperature! 
What happens, I think, when one allows a diversity of explanational 
possibilities is not that the answers are necessarily more diverse but that 
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the questions are. Here is a crucial example that von Eckardt gives to 
elucidate her conclusion that "explaining intentionality exclusively at the 
neural level is a hopeless enterprise. "23 . von Eckardt imagines asking an 
imaginary neuroscientist who claims a solution to neuroscientific explana-
tion in Cognitive Science 
"Tell me, Professor X, when your subject Joe images a small 
pine tree at an angle in the centre of his imagistic 'field', what 
is going on at the neural level that explains the intentionality of 
Joe's imaging?"24 
Not surprisingly, the answer about movement from neural state N624 
to N1009 is derided. If one asks a question about intentionality then, by 
definition on von Eckardt's account, there is no neural answer and so this 
example is really a peculiar exercise in setting up straw men that one has 
decided cannot exist by definition. The desirable explanatory categories of 
one research program are being used to ask questions of another which is 
at the very least, startlingly unfair. If one really had developed a neurosci-
entific answer as Professor X is supposed to have done, then the question 
asked would need to be different as "intentionality" is the central fulcrum 
of a completely different research program. One cannot move between rad-
ically different research programs without bringing along their method-
ological concerns25 too and this is a radically underappreciated fact in Cog-
nitive Science and one which lies in the way of all interdisciplinary and 
co-evolutionary approaches. Kuhn recognised this in his insightful obser-
vation that science, for progress by any realistic criteria, needs dogma. It 
needs to fundamentally restrict questions about, crucially, methodology.26 . 
If the neural level contributes nothing to an explanation of intention-
ality, then what use is it even in tandem with something (information pro-
23Ibid p. 335 
24Ibid p.335 
25and vocabulary 
26A classic statement of this is (Kuhn 1963) 
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cessing research etc.) that can? That is, if the neural level is so useless 
in this respect, what is the point of urging co-evolution? At the same time 
as the fear that, let in at all, the neural level would change the questions 
involved (which of course it would), the prevailing psycho-physical monism 
requires that lip-service be paid to physical and empirical research. Again, 
this is a manifestation of the irresolvable tension within the subject which 
forms the focus of this thesis. 
Now, I might be criticised at this point for being unduly negative: I 
have outlined many problems without really suggesting what might help 
in fixing them. As O Nuallain says of philosophers of mind: 
"If they criticise a research program, they should propose a 
substitute one as rich in its place."27 
In many cases, this is indeed true but, as a general principle and in 
the case of Cognitive Science, I must disagree. If one criticises a research 
program on foundational issues, it may well be that one's argument is that, 
even conceived broadly, the subject has boundaries that it cannot cross -
limits that it cannot transcend. This is close to my view of Cognitive Sci-
ence and I demand the right to not put anything "as rich" in its place if 
the meaning of "as rich" is largely dictated by the very subject I find fault 
with. Indeed, I think that this has a lot to do with the problem in Cognitive 
Science: the methodological dictates have dictated so successfully that one 
can hardly propose anything else without being accused of having missed 
out a lot of data i .e. one is accused of not being "rich" enough. This thesis is 
really about the very concept of "rich" and why requests to supply "rich" re-
placements and theories cannot and should not- on the criteria demanded 
by the subject - be fulfilled . 
27 Ibid p.32 
Chapter 3 
A Central Problem for Formal 
Semantics 
The aim of this chapter is to outline, discuss and attack what I consider 
to be a central problem for the logico-formalist programme in natural lan-
guage semantics. It is intended as a concrete introduction to the typical 
problems of what I will call a "stratified" theory. This requires an exami-
nation of the notions of meaning postulates and lexical decomposition: core 
features of formal natural language semantics. I shall argue that these two 
elements of formal semantics are the primary stumbling blocks to a plau-
sible account of natural language and will go on to suggest why this is the 
case. 
Formal semantics of natural language reached an impasse, familiar 
since Carnap, with the realisation that purely formal accounts were inade-
quate in dealing with certain constructions that seem to rely on the mean-
ing oflexical items. For example, the most oft-quoted case is of analytic but 
not logically true statements such as 
"All bachelors are unmarried" 
As an analytic sentence, we would like it to be true by necessity, true in all 
possible worlds. However, its logical form dictates that, if it is true at all, its 
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truth is at least a formal contingency i.e. it just so happens that the exten-
sion of"bachelor" is a subset of the extension of"unmarried". Any necessity 
of truth is such by virtue of extra-syntactic factors. Further, this is not just 
a problem for traditionally analytic sentences. It is a general problem for 
any formal approach that posits lexical atomic constituents. For example, 
we cannot determine, by logical form, that "if you know something, then 
you believe it" is a good inference on formal grounds. We need something 
like a classical epistemology - knowledge is "justified, true belief" - to give 
us the necessary premise. The problem reaches its sharpest when you are 
forced to deal with inference that rests on properties of actions and objects: 
"If you are hit on the head with a hammer, you will be in pain". The gen-
eral difficulty is that the atomic predicates and objects are represented by 
arbitrary and logically simple symbols, concealing the rich set of associa-
tions that seemingly allow us to perform these inferences. "All bachelors 
are unmarried" looks like "VxF x --+ Gx" and that is not a logical truth. 
It is clear that this is a very important problem. It amounts to the 
inability to capture practically the entire semantic aspect of human lan-
guages. The relationships between concepts, the inferences based on these 
relationships and the knowledge we derive in virtue of said relationships 
constitute an almost all-engulfing lacuna in the formalist programme if 
there is no way to deal with this problem in a manner true to formalist 
principles given that their whole motivation is to account for human infor-
mation processing as syntactic manipulation. 
3.1 The Forma list Solutions 
It is generally thought that Carnap was the first to worry about this sort of 
problem, although in a different context. He proposed what has become one 
of the standard methods of dealing with this difficulty: meaning postulates. 
These are formal constraints on the class of models that can be invoked to 
» 28 « 
account for certain constructions. For example, we might have a meaning 
postulate like the following to constrain our models to ones in which "All 
bachelors are unmarried" is necessarily true: 
[bachelor] ~ [ unmarried] 
That is, a meta-theoretical constraint on the models we are allowed to use 
to account for the data. In more familiar terms, it narrows the range of 
possible worlds down to those obeying the criteria embodied in the meaning 
postulate. 
An alternative approach that has received wide support within linguis-
tics and formal semantics is the method of lexical decomposition. Here, 
instead of giving constraints on the possible models, one supposes that the 
lexical items one is dealing with are actually not atomic but rather com-
plexes that disguise lower level internal structure which renders trouble-
some inferences formally valid. For example, a solution along these lines 
to the "All bachelors are married" problem might suppose that "bachelor" is 
decomposable into "unmarried man" and thus the sentence really says "All 
unmarried men are unmarried". This is fine as it is logically true and thus 
an account of understanding the analyticity of the sentence can be given 
along purely formal lines. 
I now turn to an exposition of the supposed merits/demerits of these 
two opposing methods of dealing with this crucial problem, with specific 
attention to drawing out their common assumptions. These will form the 
basis of the criticisms to come in section 3.2. 
Later on, I shall examine the techniques employed by an example of the 
more recent "information theoretic" approaches - Situation Theory-which 
claims to have overcome many of the limitations of classical approaches. It 
will be evident that the underlying stratified approach, even here, renders 
this new type of semantic theory ineffectual in tackling the shortcomings 
of its implicit assumptions. 
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3.1. l Lexical Decomposition 
Lexical decomposition tactics are motivated by a desire to directly bring 
aberrant data under the formalist's wing. If a particular construction is 
not formally treatable lexical decomposition provides a way to analyse it 
further until it is. Katz1 explicitly likens the method of lexical decomposi-
tion to a finer level of granularity of analysis. The general idea is that, in 
terms of granularity, a decompositional approach stands to predicate logic 
as predicate logic stands to propositional logic2 • This is an intriguing idea 
that derives much of its appeal from analogy with the manifest advantages 
of predicate over propositional logic. Unfortunately, it must be noted that 
Katz is glossing over an essen t ial difference between the two relationships 
he wishes to draw analogies between. Predicates are part of sentences in 
a fairly straightforward way. They are syntactic components of sentences 
that have a number of independent motivations e.g. an account of proper-
ties or a way of speaking about classes. The components of a decomposition 
however, are semantic components: their role is to give us semantic links 
with other decomposed lexical items. "Unmarried" is not syntactically to-
kened within "bachelor". This makes the step from lexical items to their 
decompositions crucially unlike the step from sentences to predicates. We 
do not have a clear notion of what counts as a "correct" decomposition as 
we do not have a syntactic tokening to guide us. So, the discontinuity in the 
case of decomposition is a problem due to an absence of any motivation for 
considering decompositional elements as "parts" of a lexical item in a sense 
that the traditional structural relationship between predicate and sentence 
would support. The move from propositional to predicate logic is a kind of 
"decomposition" of propositions but is quite a harmless sort as we have 
many independent arguments in favour of the sub-propositional elements. 
The motivation for lexical decomposition is purely teleological: we need it 
1(Katz 1972) 
2(Katz 1972) p. 185 
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in order to be able to do certain things. The decomposition of lexical items 
is a decomposition of meaning which is altogether a more slippery th ing to 
have to dissect. It is one thing to look at the parts of a formal complex but 
it is entirely another to look at the parts of a complex of meanings. 
Nevertheless, the supporters of lexical decomposition may be justified 
in some way in their endeavours quite independently of scruples against 
justifying the approach by analogy with the well-accepted syntactic decom-
position strategies in formal logic. The idea persists that a finer level of 
analysis of the data - another 'strata' in their explanation - will reveal the 
logical structure sufficient to render the problem inferences valid and the 
problem sentences intelligible. Lakoff's influential paper3 "Linguistics and 
Natural Logic" embodies a detailed advocacy of the decompositional over 
the meaning postulate approach. As in most decompositional treatments, 
he begins by arguing that meaning postulates are ad hoe. We shall return 
to this point later. There are two main areas in which Lakoff thinks that 
meaning postulates are sorely lacking. The first is their seeming inability 
to capture some linguistic regularities that one would like to demand of 
one's models. For example, it is suggested that linguistic forms involving 
the lexical item "come" are related to the item "bring" along with a verb of 
causation in a fairly regular manner. For example: 
1. bring = cause to come 
2. bring about= cause to come about 
3. bring up= cause to come up 
Lakoff argues that you would need separate meaning postulates to cover 
each of the separate "come" constructions in 1- 3 above and this would gloss 
over the regularity made apparent by the common containment of the el-
ement "bring". The source of this trouble, for Lakoff, is that meaning pos-
3(Lakoff 1972) 
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tulates contain logical forms that "do not contain phonological shapes"4 • 
Here we have, I think, a misunderstanding as to the nature of the solu-
tions that are being proposed. Whether or not meaning postulates are sen-
sitive to phonological regularity is hardly a principled objection. Meaning-
postulates are created exactly to fit the troublesome data and so there is 
nothing in principle stopping us from continuing this for phonological reg-
ularity. In effect, we should just allow the logically atomic predicates in a 
postulate to be decomposable, thus exposing the regularity we need in order 
to effect treatment exactly in the way that Lakoff lauds the lexical decom-
position approach for doing. One may object that this is rather perverse as 
it makes the meaning postulates dependent on a lexical decomposition but 
this is beside the point. Lakoff is mistaken that meaning postulates cannot 
account for the regularity. 
This confusion about the status of the constructs designed to solve the 
problems is apparent in another of his arguments for the decompositional 
approach. Lakoff argues that only a decompositional picture can account 
for a principled ban on bizarre constructions that we would not want to 
license. As an example, he supposes there is a verb "accusate" where "x 
accusated y that Si'' is subject to the decomposition 
"x said that S1 and that y was guilty". 
It can be demonstrated that a decompositional account of this can employ 
various coordinate structure constraints to ensure that "accusate" is not 
an allowable verb. Again, Lakoff argues that meaning postulates cannot 
do this as one could easily have a meaning postulate like 
accusate(x, y, S1) = say(x, and(innocent(x)) , guilty(y)) 
There are no restrictions and so constructions of this sort are not disal-
lowed under the meaning postulate treatment. However, even Lakoff notes 
that 
4(Lakoff 1972) p. 610 
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"The only way to keep the meaning postulate hypothesis from 
permitting such possible lexical items would be to impose some-
thing corresponding to Ross's coordinate structure constraint on 
meaning postulates."5 
The appropriate response here is, I think, "why not?". After all, one h as 
imposed such a constraint on the decomposition and not been tempted to 
use this fact as a rejection of that approach. No, the unstated source of 
Lakoff's worry here is a tacit acceptance of the division of the task into the-
oretical and meta-theoretical parts; a stratification of explanation. Lakoff 
believes that a decomposition takes advantage of the theoretical machin-
ery oflinguistics quite naturally whilst a meaning postulate would need to 
have such machinery translated into the meta-theory to take effect: mean-
ing postulates are meta-theoretical constraints on possible models. This is 
an important point and, strangely, one which meaning postulate advocates 
have regimented to defend their position too. It will be addressed more 
fully below. 
3.1 .2 Meaning-Postulates 
The motivation behind a meaning postulate view is that the way to capture 
relationships in lexical meaning is to restrict the class of possible models 
to those which respect our intuitions about such relationships. The propo-
nents of this view regard lexical decomposition as ad hoe as it must posit 
a non-decomposable base at some point and the point at which this occurs 
is arbitrary. In addition, it is argued that we soon reach an analysis that 
is far from complete yet has no obvious decomposition to take it further. 
For example, a stock example of decomposition is that "kill" is defined as 
"cause to die". This does not help much as to analyse "Peter killed Paul 
---+ Paul died" as "Peter caused Paul to die ---+ Paul died" does not render 
the former as a logical truth. It is not obvious at all how to proceed with 
5(Lakoff 1972) p. 614 
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a decomposition of "cause" that would render the inference formally valid. 
Here, the meaning postulate account seems to offer an advantage in that 
a meaning postulate need not pretend to be a decomposition into the "un-
derlying meaning" of a lexical item: a practice that is dubious from the 
start. However, accompanying this is often a feeling that meaning postu-
lates overcome the requirement that revealing logical form is all that is 
necessary to render certain inferences valid. A representative example of 
this is (Fodor, Garrett, Walker & Parkes 1980)6 where it is argued that a 
decompositional approach is basically the assumption that logical form is 
all there is to validity - the suggestion being that a meaning postulate ap-
proach is not so limited. For example, it is said that a principle that would 
allow us the inference from "cause to die x" to "die x" 
"would have to be sensitive to the meaning of 'cause' ... and 
would thus have precisely the character of a meaning postu-
late."7 
It is not clear to me here in what way a meaning postulate can be sensi-
tive to a "meaning" where a decomposition cannot. A meaning postulate 
can put a restriction on a class of models and this seems to avoid the prob-
lem of having to posit an underlying "real" meaning. The argument runs: 
after decomposition, there are certain "residual inferences" that depend 
on meaning that are still unresolved. So, the decomposition of "kill" into 
"cause to die" leaves the inference from "cause to die" to "die" unresolved. 
The way that we choose to resolve this must be "sensitive" to the meaning 
of "cause" as it must be able to discriminate it from, for example, the in-
ference from "wish to die" to "die". The mistake lies in talking of the end 
"after" decomposition. The motivation for a decomposition is the desire to 
render inferences formally valid; so, one which does not is simply not a 
complete decomposition. If you end up with "cause to die" as an analysis of 
6p. 271 
7(Fodor, Fodor & Garrett 1975) p. 526 
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"kill" and this is not enough to render you an inference to "die", then what 
is to prevent you from analysing "cause" in such a way as to guarantee 
the inference? Fodor et al assume that there is no "plausible" analysis of 
"cause" that would help. But as plausibility is secondary here to adequacy, 
I do not see this as a relevant objection. This is all inextricably bound up 
with methodological problems with the programme underlying both the de-
compositional and meaning postulate approaches and will be taken up in 
section 3.3.2. 
There are still other reasons why we might be suspicious of the claims 
to "sensitivity" by proponents of the meaning postulate approach. We are 
aiming to give an account of the meaning relations between lexical items. 
This is the root of the whole problem as initially defined. Now, as noted 
above, the sort of relations we are interested in are not simply the relations 
between analytic definiens and definiendum. Take the following sentence: 
Because the sun was blazing, Peter was hot. 
A meaning postulate to deal with this would simply tell us about what mod-
els we can develop given that they contain "blazing" and "hot". It would tell 
us, for example, that everything is hot when the sun is blazing or similar. 
However, this is a very impoverished notion of the semantic link between 
"blazing" and "hot". There is an element of metaphor here: an "internal" 
link one might say, as opposed to the the purely "external" link that mean-
ing postulates grant us in terms of coincidence of extensions in models. So, 
to say that meaning postulates are more "sensitive" to meanings is at the 
very least over-stating the case. Take the example 
Because the sun was blazing, Peter was inside. 
The connection between "blazing" and "inside" seems to be less metaphor-
ical, less ''internal" than the above. Perhaps one could plausibly have a 
meaning postulate to deal with this (although, really, I think not; see be-
low) as the metaphorical relationship does not appear as strong in this 
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case. Anyway, whether deep, metaphorical, contingent or analytic; mean-
ing postulates treat all meaning relations the same way. 
Addressing the battle between decomposition and meaning postulates, 
(Fodor et al. 1975) raise the question of sentence comprehension and the 
startling speed with which it occurs. They seem to think that the mere 
fact that we manage to perform this task so rapidly, legislates against a 
view that divorces "semantic representation" from surface structure. The 
assumption is that such a divide would require more time than empirical 
results demonstrate is feasible. Lexical decomposition does indeed imply 
that the semantic representation of a sentence is something that a com-
plete decomposition of any pseudo-lexical terms delivers as output. There-
fore, a sort of "decoding" must take place before inference rules can begin 
to play a part. This rests on the assumption that all inference is, at base, 
purely formal. Fodor et al argue that we should prefer to keep the differ-
ence between the surface and semantic forms as small as possible so that 
we "reduce the load on processes that must be assumed to be performed 
on-line"8 . I think this is a very much mistaken attitude, fundamentally the 
same underneath but superficially the opposite of Lakoff's view regarding 
the advantages of lexical decomposition. I shall expand on this point as I 
now turn to an examination of the commonalities that exist between the 
two approaches now outlined. 
3.2 Common Assumptions a nd Problems 
The central thing to note with respect to these two attacks on the problem 
of lexical meaning, is that they both argue for a level at which the 'real' 
work is done. Decompositional approaches posit a sub-lexical stratum con-
taining the elements of meaning underlying the lexical items. Meaning-
postulates suppose a rich meta-theoretical level of constraints that provide 
8 Ibid p. 526 
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restrictions on the allowable models of the lexicon. Broadly, the benefits 
are as follows: a decompositional approach can exploit syntactic structure 
constraints as it allows the breaking of the lexical items to occur at the 
same level as the operation of said constraints. A meaning postulate tack 
minimises the amount of time taken to process as it keeps the solution 
at the level of unanalysed sentence structure. If we envision the "levels of 
processing" picture that both of these models encourage, then we might say 
that they consider it an advantage to localise processing. By this, is meant 
the desire to keep the levels of representation one has to proceed through to 
a minimum. Ifwe imagine that the model-theoretic constraints are "above" 
the lower level lexical decompositions in terms of depth of processing9 , then 
it is reasonably clear how the two approaches differ: one localises process-
ing at the "top" end of the model and the other at the ''bottom" end. Both, 
I think are mistaken. 
The problem lies in the reification of the explanatory levels that the 
traditional accounts posit. There seems to be an assumption that the dif-
ferent levels of processing are independent and disjoint, thus you can gain 
real advantages by attending to the level at which you perform most of 
the processing. It is surely an appropriate attitude to be amazed at the 
speed of sentence comprehension but this needs to be informed by a re-
alisation of the real-world embodiment of such comprehension. We are, I 
take it, supposing that the brain performs the necessary processing. Let 
us consider the argument that meaning postulates are more plausible as 
they prevent us from h aving to perform time-expensive decomposition "on-
line". The solution is to capture the effect of a decomposition in the "in-
ference module" by employing model constraints. If we reflect th at we are, 
after all, assuming that the brain performs all of the functions necessary 
to implement this picture, we can see that this is simply an example of the 
inappropriateness of the model-theoretic approach. The choice is between 
9See e.g. (Fodor et al. 1980) p. 273 
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decomp9sition - a process that manipulates forms of the object language 
and meaning postulates - a mechanism that guarantees the inference in 
the meta-language. However, as the brain must implement all of the oper-
ations we posit, there simply is no time-saving to be made by pushing the 
processing into the meta-language. There is simply no "off-line" to be taken 
advantage of We are used to thinking this way because this is exactly we 
what we can do with formal languages: we can easily reduce complexity in 
the object language ifwe are happy about making the meta-language more 
complex. Notice, though, this division is not something that transfers well 
to real-world systems. A computer programmed to perform inference has 
no processor independent meta-language governing its operation: it must 
perform "meta" operations too. When it comes to implementation, a meta-
theory necessarily comes part and parcel of a theory; thus, it is misleading 
to suggest that time savings are to be made by reducing the operations in 
the object-language. The real system must implement the meta-language 
too and thus pay all time costs. Take, for example, the following inference: 
P/\QrR/\T 
Suppose that a decomposition reveals that Q has the internal structure 
P -, S. Suppose further that S has internal structure R I\ T . These two 
decompositions were required before it became obvious that the inference 
was valid. To "save time" we might like to say that, instead, we had the 
following inferential rules: 
Q r P-,S 
S r- R AT 
In this case, do we not manage the inference in two less steps as we miss 
out the "on-line decomposition"? The answer must surely be negative. 
Given that the inference rules are implemented by the same system that 
implements the steps mediated by such rules, you gain in one area and 
lose in another. You gain time leaving out the explicit decomposition yet 
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lose it in having to search through more rules to find one to apply. Not only 
this, by pushing the processing into the rules, you very quickly develop 
very strange logics with many, many rules. Imagine this machine imple-
mented. The search time and the handling of the model-theory to deal with 
a logic with so many non-standard rules would equal the time "saved" in 
performing less inference steps. 
This, I think, is a simple consequence of deductive equivalence. This 
ensures that there is a link between P f- Q and f- ( P ~ Q). When the model 
of deduction and the deduction itself inhabits the same physical system, the 
link is, I think, also one of processing speed. Given the deductive equiva-
lence, there can be no relative time savings, for the human conceived as 
logic processor, between any formalist theories. If you do not have to pass 
through as many inferential steps, you have to pass through more meaning 
postulates. Fodor et al seem to recognise this fundamental link but fail to 
grasp its significance. They say that changing the notion of the lexical form 
reqmres 
" . . . compensating adjustments of the inferential system . .. "10 
The essential problem with this is that the "compensating adjustments" 
are enough to make no difference overall for a real, embodied system. The 
brain does not care at what abstract "level" one might care to think of it 
operating at, it still has to do everything. We should still find the speed 
of sentence comprehension surprising and thus we still need a theory to 
address this. 
A further objection to this traditional formalist enterprise is that it 
gets the whole problem of meaning backwards. Both decomposition and 
meaning postulates get their motivation from particular problematic infer-
ential relationships. They are a tactic we may use when we encounter a 
troublesome case. This assumes that the picture we converge upon will be 
10(Fodor et al. 1975) p. 525 
derivable from the inferential relations our surface language sanctions: it 
is these that throw up the problems we create decompositions and postu-
lates to solve. We have no reason whatever to suppose such a picture is so 
derivable however. Indeed, we have a good deal of evidence to suppose that 
such a picture is not derivable in any way that depends on taking intuition 
and language as its evidence. As Dreyfus11 and Winograd have previously 
urged, this was exactly the program undertaken by Husserl and Hegel: 
which they both declared to be intractable after many years of detailed 
study. The attempt to specify meaning relationships by either a decom-
position or a restricting postulate is precisely the attempt to specify the 
relations between every concept we employ in an explicit manner: by enu-
merating all of the links by either embodying them all in postulates or in-
structions to decompose. The set of meaning postulates or decompositions 
will be a specification of all meaning relationships. So, we are considering 
something of the size of the cartesian product of the set of possible concepts. 
In traditional formal approaches, we have to do this in order to allow the 
logical paradigm to continue: if we do not specify what relations a lexical 
item bears to others in some way appropriate to logic, we cannot proceed 
formally. It seems very unlikely that something as large as the cartesian 
product of the set of concepts we employ is a realistic thing to suppose 
the brain en tertains. The reason for the enormity of information is that 
traditional formalism requires that this information be explicit in either 
a translation into simpler terms or as a rule restricting inference, both of 
which are something the brain has to do. It will be objected that there will 
actually be a significant reduction in complexity as we come to determine 
the underlying features of our concepts. It is thought indeed that we will 
be able to determine common elements, as in the case of"bring" above (sec-
tion 3 .1.1), that will reduce the complexity of meaning interrelationships 
to some plausible level. This hope is, in fact, a central aspiration for tra-
11 For example, see (Dreyfus & Dreyfus 1988) 
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ditional formal semantics. At the very least, it requires that we show why 
early phenomenological programmes failed to accomplish this. I think it an 
unsatisfactory approach, nevertheless, to develop a notion of the underly-
ing meaning relationships out of solutions to many isolated and technical 
problems for reasons to be addressed in section 3.3.2. 
3.3 " Information" Based Approac hes: Situation 
Theory 
The early 80s saw the emergence of "Situation Theory" amidst a desire 
for generalising linguistic semantics to incorporate much of the significant 
work done by analytic philosophers such as Searle and Austin. Situation 
Theory, given its first substantial exposition in (Barwise & Perry 1983), 
was an attempt to incorporate notions of partiality and perspective into se-
mantics. It was an attempt to realise the importance of context in a formal 
setting. As such, it was an attempt to circumscribe semantic relevance in 
things called "situations" and thus to elucidate meaning relations. It is 
crucial to consider then, how the Situation Theoretic approach fails to deal 
with the problem outlined above. I think it falls foul of the same unjustified 
assumptions regarding implementation-level independence that besets the 
other views so far presented. 
The basic elements in a Situation Theoretic approach are "situations". 
They are that which delineates the sphere of the epistemically relevant for 
a given semantic task. This is a modern version of the well-known AI tactic 
of model circumscription and restricted quantification. It is a little unclear 
what a situation actually is however. A definition of situation would be a 
start in helping to make a classical treatment of inference manageable by 
restricting the domain. Traditional ways of doing this are troubled by the 
problem of having to a priori determine the domain restrictions and end 
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up doing it in such a way as to guarantee the inferences required. For ex-
ample, in the sentence "It was a sunny day and Jane thought everything 
looked beautiful", the quantification is obviously not over everything in the 
world but only a small section. The problem is to say what. It is not merely 
things within J ane's view since buses and drains may well be part of the 
scene but Jane is not really saying anything about them. The sentence has 
overtones of speaking about biota but how does one know this? "Context" 
is the usual answer but, as we have seen, it is unclear how to express this 
"context" as it is not clear what should be in it or, far more importantly, 
how to conveniently and preferably algorithmically specify what is in it at 
a given time. Specifying the context a priori is about all we can do in the 
face of this. We say certain facts, usually those that will help as premises 
in inferences we are interested in, are "part of the context" and thus need 
not actually take part in the inference as such. Situations are meant to 
limit the domain to manageable sets we can quantify over and to allow us 
a method of expressing "presupposed" context. This is the implementation-
level confusion. So what is a situation? Cooper tells us that "Situations 
are thought of as situation-theoretic objects ... "12 which strikes at first 
blush as being a mite circular. More promisingly, we find that "It is stan-
dardly assumed that situations are identified by the infons they support 
... " 13 . However, given that infons are a superset of "facts": the "possible 
facts"14, then we are perplexed to learn that "Facts can .. . be thought of as 
invariants across situations"15 and we are back where we started. Infons 
are "basic units of information"16 but are composed of a relation, an argu-
ment list and a polarity. Relations are famously taken as basic in Situation 
Theory and so this does not give us much of a clue as to what an infon is. 
12(Cooper 1988) p. 50 
~(Cooper1991) p. 13 
14(Cooper 1991) p. 9, (Barwise 1989) ps. 205,264 
15(Cooper 1988) p. 56 
16(Cooper 1991) p. 9, (Barwise 1989) p. 205 
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Leaving these basic definitional problems aside, what are the supposed 
roles of the Situation Theoretic posits? Situations are partial models. They 
settle only a fraction of the semantic questions about the world. This is how 
they delimit the domain of enquiry. They are motivated by a purposefully 
nai'.ve realism derived from Austin and Gibson which I reconstruct in the 
following way. Possible word semantics provided a spur to Situation The-
ory to move away from the "unanalysed blobs"17 posited by said theory. It 
was felt that they settled too much for a given agent: a world was a model 
of all the facts it contained. This was essentially a crisis of epistemology 
with Situation Theory declaring an omission of fallibilism in semantics. A 
cenlral feature was held to be the partiality of semantic context: the se-
mantic model an agent uses (for Situation Theory is still model-theoretic) 
was felt to settle only a narrow range of facts and not all of them, as pos-
sible worlds demand. Hence the terminology "situation" was adopted to 
indicate that the size of the model was considerably smaller than a typical 
possible worlds model. Great pains were taken to distance this view from 
one which simply rendered situations as "small worlds"18. Now, this par-
tiality was partiality in the situations themselves and not in the perception 
an agent might have of a situation. The latter view is something possi-
ble world semantics has to employ to model fallibilism given the nature of 
such a model. So here is the glue that binds the disparate assumptions 
of Situation Theory together . . . in order to accommodate nai'.ve realism 
and fallibilism, the objects perceived have to be partial. The situations 
are themselves partial. One nai'.vely perceives partial things rather than 
partially perceives all-encompassing objects. Indeed, Barwise and Perry19 
tell us that "Reality consists of situations, individuals having properties 
and standing in relations at various spatio-temporal locations". This is a 
17(Cooper 1988) p. 54 
18(Barwise 1989) p. 79 
19(Barwise & Perry 1983) 
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move to be appreciated for its technical leverage rather than its philosoph-
ical motivations20, since it merely stipulates as basic certain things which 
would be problematic. The more you assume, the more you can use your 
assumptions to do but then the entirety of your system is subject to doubt 
when the assumptions come to look suspicious. 
The overall effect of this approach is to push epistemology out of the 
account by postulating simple access between meaning and reality. The 
fallibilism that proved the undoing of classical AI in the 60s and 7Os is 
accounted for by partiality in reality. This neglect of epistemics is, I think, 
a serious flaw in the Situation Theoretic approach. Since Kant there has 
been a growing realisation that concepts central to semantics may well 
be more determined by our internal structure than the real world. More 
recently, neuroscience has been demonstrating how the kinds of categories 
posited by Kant could arise in the neural circuitry of the brain. A na'ive 
realism is, I take it, not something that a serious account of semantics can 
abide if it is to be philosophically or empirically adequate. Neither can 
it claim to have relevance to an explanation of the semantics of human 
communication. See Chapter 5 for a discussion of this point. 
3.3.1 Reappearance of the Central Problem 
In Situation Theory, relations are taken as basic. This concurs with the re-
alism of the theory but allows the central problem for traditional semantic 
theory, discussed above, to manifest. As relations are basic, meaning rela-
tions between them must be established in an extensional manner. Lexical 
decomposition is forbidden as relations are, ex hypothesi, basic. The connec-
tions are accomplished by what are termed in the literature "constraints". 
These are conditionals that hold between types of situation. So one might 
h ave something like "If F holds in a situation of type T then F' holds in a 
20Terry Winograd also makes this point well in (Winograd 1985) 
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situation of type T'". In concrete examples, these constraints look familiar 
"If X is an unmarried man in a situation of type T then T' is a type of situa-
tion in which X is a bachelor". Given suitable anchoring of parameters, sit-
uation types of type T are usually said to contain those of type T'. It should 
be clear that these constraints are meaning postulates under a different 
name. They ensure a link between basic relations in the same manner as 
meaning postulates do for relations and predicates of traditional logic and 
thus fall foul of the same objections. Inference in Situation Theory takes 
place by means of constraints but proponents of the view are keen to point 
out that the type of inference is not merely "formal" in the sense that has 
been seem to damn traditional logics. Barwise argues that the "situated 
inference" espoused by Situation Theory is not purely "formal" in that it al-
lows a dependency on "embedding circumstances"21 . That is, he thinks it is 
contextually sensitive. If this were so, things would be rosier for Situation 
Theory as it could exploit context to avoid having to make explicit deduc-
tive inferences (whether supposedly in the meta-language or not). How-
ever, this "context sensitivity" is delivered in the usual ways by "exploiting 
environmental constants" or "making implicit parameters explicit". Natu-
rally, this involves , in practise, a priori specification of parameters, tacit 
constants etc. thus reducing "situated inference" to traditional formal in-
ference with a few more a priori specified premises. Context sensitivity 
turns out to be a chimera within all logico-formal approaches to semantics 
as the only way to achieve it is to explicitly and formally specify the context 
and that is a task that is implausible as an element of theory realistic to 
human information processing. Certainly, if you can specify context, then 
you can have clean formal inference. However, the antecedent of this condi-
tional is the crux of the whole of Cognitive Science to some extent. It is the 
old problem of AI under yet another different guise. In recent years, Situ-
ation Theory has developed a notion of "presupposition" which is meant to 
21(Barwise 1989) p. 146 
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do justice to the promises of "situated inference". In the current graphical 




where the material to the right of the double vertical lines is said to be "pre-
supposed" as part of the context. Usually, anything that would guarantee 
an inference you would like to make is put here. Context sensitivity is re-
duced to putting more formal sentences to the right of two vertical lines in 
the belief that this renders them part of the "context". Presumably, part of 
the desire to do so is that elements of the "context" are not really "there" 
and thus explicit inferential steps are not needed to accommodate their 
import in a particular case. This, again, is exactly the mistake that Fodor 
makes with respect to meaning postulates. The suggestions of "different 
levels" of information and therefore processing are quite strong in graphi-
cal notations such as the above but are none the better off implementation-
wise. Simply put, you might call a formal sentence anything you like -
"context" is a favourite. However, if it plays a role in determining the out-
come of an inference, the steps which use it must be traversed and thus 
time spent. As a result of these observations regarding Situation Theory, 
I am forced to view it as varying little from the basic assumptions of tra-
ditional symbolic formal approaches to semantics, thus it suffers the same 
problems. 
3.3.2 Methodological Concerns 
The idea that traditional formalist approaches to the problems ofmeaning-
relation and inference constitute an explanation of human semantic depen-
dencies seems strange as they are motivated by a desire to accommodate 
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surface manifestations of such dependencies. It is assumed that the way 
we speak about inference gives us real evidence for the way we actually 
do it. As a result one ought to be concerned about the methodological as-
pects of the traditional approach. In an area that aspires to explanation, 
we must aim to say how things are in a way that does not merely describe 
the surface effects. To say that we are allowed the inference from "bache-
lor" to "unmarried" because we have a decomposition of"bachelor" seems to 
be little more than a redescription of the fact that we accept the inference 
because we can always generate a decomposition for every case. We may 
argue about which is the simplest decomposition etc. but we can never fail. 
In general, if you have a inference you would like to capture from P to Q 
but which is not logically valid, simply provide a decomposition by stating 
P in terms of Q. How could we ever fail to do this? Similarly, there are no 
real constraints on the generation of meaning postulates. If we need one 
to secure an inference, we simply make one. The trouble at the root of this 
is that formal considerations alone (consistency, completeness etc.) are not 
restrictive enough on model-generation in the traditional programme. As 
Richard Gregory puts it "[But] it is all too easy to postulate things hav-
ing just the right properties"22 . The explanation we are afforded as to why 
there is a semantic link between two lexical items and why we permit an 
inference between them is that they are linked in a certain way (postulate 
or decomposition) and this guarantees the inference. However one does 
not explain an event by simply incorporating a prediction of it into ones 
theory. Whatever explanation is, it requires something a little deeper than 
the regimenting of an event into current knowledge. Enterprises that can 
never fail are worrisome because they make us suspicious that they are 
irrelevant to the real world: reality has no bearing on them. 
Decomposition and meaning postulates are designed to cover the data. 
They work by regimenting an anomaly into the class of accounted-for cases. 
22(Gregory 1966) p. 10 
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Thus, to borrow a distinction from Quine23 , these approaches are designed 
to flt the behaviour of human speakers. There is, however, no reason to sup-
pose that, even if we could have a model that fitted the totality of meaning 
relationships in a natural language, that this would be an explanation of 
what guides humans in their linguistic habits. As Quine says, "Fitting is a 
matter of true description; guiding is a matter of cause and effect."24 . De-
composition and meaning postulates are designed to render an iteratively 
more accurate description of the class of allowable inferences and mean-
ing relations. That the formal outcome is a model of what causes us to 
infer as we do is neither a logical nor plausible consequence of its descrip-
tive adequacy. How do we infer and impute meaning relationships between 
supposedly lexical items? Because there are rules/decompositions that li-
cense this. How do we know there are such rules? Because these rules can 
account for the data. Of course, many sets of rules can account for the data 
so how to choose between them? We ask people what they consider the 
correct decomposition/constraint is. Here, as Quine notes for linguistics in 
general, we have argued in a full circle. We start by asking why people e.g. 
allow an inference from "bachelor" to "unmarried" and end by concluding 
that the reason is that they consider it reasonable to do so, which is just to 
say that they do it. 
The weak link in the chain is the traditional linguistic notion of "ev-
idence". Unlike evidence in the natural sciences, the sort of thing taken 
in linguistics contains an essentially modal ingredient. We ask native 
speakers, in effect, "Can you possibly make sense of this utterance?" or 
"Could you make out three scopal readings for this particular quantified 
sentence?". A supposedly empirical basis that has a modal aspect is worry-
ing because it stands or falls with the susceptibility of the evidence to the 
ravages of personal, cultural and temporal idiosyncrasy. In short, it is evi-
23(Quine 1972) 
24(Quine 1972) p. 442 
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dence shot through with a relativism that severely damages its evidential 
import. 
What is required is a general mechanism that can serve as an expla-
nation of the tendency towards lexical meaning relationships in natural 
languages. One that does not simply translate the relationships into the 
logical machinery and thereby claim to have accounted for the phenomenon 
in general. This might also save us from the embarrassment of having to 
decide between extensionally equivalent sets of decompositions/postulates 
by begging the question from the population whose behaviour we are trying 
to explain. 
3.4 Themes to be Addressed 
There are, then, two sorts of objections to the leading theories of lexical 
meaning. The first is an objection in practice: the logical apparatus mis-
leads us into solutions that are heavily dependent on assumptions concern-
ing orthogonality of processing tasks between the logical and meta-logical 
machinery. This is, as I shall demonstrate, the essence of the stratifica-
tion problem. These assumptions are unfounded when implemented in a 
single, real system. The second objection is a scruple against the defin-
ing of the notion of meaning relationship in a piecemeal fashion by taking 
the superset of all specific solutions to individual problems oflexical mean-
ing relation. Given that meaning relationships between lexical items are 
ubiquitous, the following idea suggests itself It has been very fruitful in 
the past to incorporate ubiquity of effect into a structural treatment of the 
effect. For example, the ubiquity of gravity in its interactions with all ob-
jects motivated Einstein to reduce gravity to a warping in the structure 
of spacetime. This is in direct contrast to the old models that treat grav-
ity as a force acting within spacetime: a separate thing to be described 
by separate laws. The beauty of this is twofold; it simplifies and satisfies 
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our desire for explanations that do not simply collect all specific solutions 
together and it provides a way to address worries about real world imple-
mentation and processing speed. This seems to me to be exactly what we 
require in our present case. I propose that we should treat meaning rela-
tionships as features of the structure of a semantic space, thereby reducing 
them to an analogical status as that of gravity in general relativity. This 
prevents us from worry about the speed of sentence comprehension and in-
ference as the relations we would otherwise need explicit logical steps for 
become structural features which do not need explicitly inferring. A model 
of this sort also provides a general underlying account of meaning rela-
tionship that seems to fit our expectations of what an "explanation" should 
look like. This is further explained in Chapter 5 and is fundamental to all 
that is to follow. As an example of what is intended, if we have some eggs 
in a box with the lid closed, we can say little about the relations between 
their positions ... the space they inhabit is fairly orthogonal25 However, 
put them in an egg-box and the situation is very different. We know auto-
matically from the structure of the space they now inhabit certain things 
about them. For example, we know that none of them lie on their sides. 
We know that the distance relations between eggs obey transitivity as egg-
boxes are made to be all alike (so they stack well) and this defines a metric 
on the "egg-box space". None of these "facts" have been derived by any 
sort of inference: they are products of the structure of the space the eggs 
now inhabit. So it is, I think, with concepts. Our concepts inhabit a highly 
structured and, up to a point, malleable semantic space that defines how 
we see relations between lexical items. Just as the egg-box defines how we 
see the relationship between egg positions. Malleable "up to a point" as an 
arbitrarily malleable semantic space would contradict the differences be-
tween species. Having certain constraints on the limits of ones conceptual 
malleability is a defining feature of what it is to see the world from the per-
25That is, movement in one direction does not entail movement in another. 
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spective of a certain type of creature. This sort of view removes emphasis 
from the individual meaning relationships between lexical items and such 
and puts semantic significance squarely in the lap of the semantic space 
that embodies the relationships. 
There are some rather radical consequences of this position which I 
shall mention in later chapters. It embodies a move towards a Cognitive 
Science more concerned with neuroscience as the only hope of providing in-
formation regarding the point where we are now led to believe the crux of 
the matter lies. Now let us look in more detail at an instance of a more ab-
stract example of the stratification methodology. After this, we shall build 
up to Chapter 6 after we have undertaken an examination of some crucially 
relevant recent considerations arising from neuroscience. In Chapter 6, we 
shall encounter a very general account of the stratification viewpoint and 
this will enable us to see the issues stripped to the bone and apparent in 
their identity with the problems in formal natural language semantics and 
Cognitive Science. 
Chapter4 
Compositionality and Inference 
Compositionality is very much a central feature of much work in natural 
language semantics. Its inception was famously occasioned when Frege 
wished to reduce the truth-values of linguistic units to functions of the 
truth-value of their parts. Explicitly a normative expedient historically de-
veloped along with certain formal languages, those wishing to investigate 
the semantics of natural languages adopted it along with the rest of the 
formal tools; true indeed that: 
"In fact compositionality is so basic a starting point for the 
logical way of doing semantics that in logic proper it almost al-
ways goes unnoticed."1 
It is useful, then, to cast an eye back over the history of semantics in or-
der to determine the intentions of the originators of such a "basic starting 
point". It may seem obvious to the current generation of formalists that 
such tools were intended for the use to which they are now put but a look 
at history does not bear this out. Frege, the most abused progenitor in 
this respect with talk of modern "Fregean compositionality" and the like as 
applied to natural language, believed that: 
"Language is not governed by logical laws in such a way that 
1(Gamut 1991) 
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mere adherence to grammar would guarantee the formal cor-
rectness of thought processes."2 
This is largely in direct contrast to the Montagovian tradition that suppos-
edly followed directly from many of Frege's principles. Frege intended his 
formalism and the semantics thereof to be characteristic of the thoughts 
underlying language and not oflanguage itself Indeed, he explicitly states 
that language gets in the way of semantics. 
"I am not in the happy position here of a mineralogist who 
shows his hearers a mountain crystal. I cannot put a thought 
in the hands of my readers with the request that they should 
minutely examine it from all sides. I have to content myself 
with presenting the reader with a thought, in itself immaterial, 
dressed up in sensible linguistic form. The metaphorical aspect 
oflanguage presents difficulties. The sensible always breaks in 
and makes expression metaphorical and so improper. So a battle 
with language takes place and I am compelled to occupy myself 
with language although it is not my proper concern here."3 
Another rather historically maligned character is Tarski. He was explicit 
in his rejection of the application of his theories to natural languages. This 
does not, however, prevent much talk of"Tarskian" model theory in seman-
tics today. 
"At the present time the only languages with a specified struc-
ture are the formalised languages of various systems of deduc-
tive logic, possibly enriched by the introduction of certain non-
logical terms. However, the field of application of these lan-
guages is rather comprehensive; we are able, theoretically, to 
develop in them various branches of science, for instance, math-
ematics and theoretical physics."4 
This looks quite optimistic about the role logic can play, but only as far 
as modelling already very formal languages within the logic. It does not 
extend as far as using them as models of any natural language. Indeed, he 
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"The problem of the definition of truth obtains a precise mean-
ing and can be solved in a rigorous way only for those languages 
whose structure has been exactly specified. For other languages 
- thus, for all natural, "spoken" languages - the meaning of 
the problem is more or less vague, and it's solution can only have 
an approximate character."5 
Tarski was an advocate of replacing natural language by approximate for-
mal languages rather than extending the formal towards the natural: 
"Whoever wishes, in spite of all difficulties, to pursue the 
semantics of colloquial language with the help of exact meth-
ods will be driven first to undertake the thankless task of a re-
form of this language ... It may however be doubted whether 
the language of everyday life, after being 'rationalised' in this 
way, would still preserve its naturalness and whether it would 
not rather take on the characteristic features of the formalised 
languages."6 
Forgetting this leads to problems: 
" ... the concept of truth (as well as other semantical con-
cepts) when applied to colloquial language in conjunction with 
the normal laws of logic leads inevitably to confusions and con-
tradictions."7 
Thus, difficulties in applying certain formal theories to natural lan-
guages are hardly something we might encounter without, as it were, warn-
ing. As regards the concept of compositionality, this "Frege's principle" 
has a somewhat murky history. It is not terribly clear that we can derive 
the principle from Frege without some distortion8 and the clues that are 
present (particularly in (Frege 1892)) are more concerned with creating 
new, canonical languages rather than fitting old, natural ones. 
One might be tempted to say that such historical evidence is of sec-
ondary importance to the use to which the concept is put today; the inven-
tors of the idea might have been wrong about the scope of its application. 
5 (Tarski 1956) 
6 (Tarski 1931) in (Tarski 1956) 
7(Tarski 1931) in (Tarski 1956) 
8(Janssen 1983) 
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This seems to be the sort of line that Davidson takes in his classic (David-
son 1967). This is a reasonable point but the lesson of the above is merely 
to prevent us from using arguments from intellectual authority in justi-
fying a principle as "Fregean" or "Tarskian" etc. One finds cold comfort 
there. More important certainly are arguments that seek to show inade-
quacies and confusions in the use of the concepts today. It is to this that 
we turn after a brieflook at some considerations to do with the application 
of prescriptive formalism to natural languages arising from the comments 
above. 
4. 1 Prescription and Description 
The basics of the formal logics that are employed even today and which are 
said to be radically new approaches9 are fundamentally derived in spirit 
from the work of the aforementioned pioneers. These systems, designed 
using concepts desirable in a canonical language, have come to be applied 
to a natural one. The result is that the formal systems are capable of mod-
ification and extension in various ways, constrained only by specific things 
such as consistency and certain meta-logical properties such as complete-
ness. These sorts of considerations are, however, not severe enough when 
attempting to explain a natural language. They allow for an almost unlim-
ited variety in and unprincipled extension of a given formalism. The goal 
for formal semantics and linguistics is to cover natural constructions with 
the formal system. I argued in Chapter 3 that we can never fail to do this 
when the constraints on our formal systems are meant to be constraints on 
the interrelation of the concepts of the system and not constraints on how 
well they apply to their ostensible subject matter. Matters of consistency 
are not enough to ensure that the formal approach is doing anything at 
all. The only factors involved in accounting for a certain natural language 
9See for an example, the discussion of Situation Theory in Chapter 3. 
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construction are whether one can find a formal construction to do the work 
- this is always possible as there is simply nothing to stop us inventing 
something with exactly the right properties - whether it coheres formally 
with the rest of our system - again, we can simply modify everything so 
that this is the case since our formalisms were designed to be flexible -
and whether we find the solution "plausible". This latter is such a weak 
requirement as to be of no use at all. Plausibility in formal semantics is 
closely linked to being simply able to do something in a formalism and this 
turns on the too liberal constraints of formal systems in general. For ex-
ample, a common criticism of Montague semantics was that it all became 
horribly complicated as if this were a reason, on its own, to doubt any-
thing. So, this, I think, is a very important and often overlooked point. 
A normative formalism is designed to force data to behave itself This is 
all very well but one cannot then find well-behaved patterns in data pre-
sented from within a formal model and claim that these patterns indicate 
something about the causes of the patterns; the nature of our cognition, 
language and thought. I shall turn, later on, to a more basic and impor-
tant reason why the patterns in our manifest outputs are not a good guide 
for theorising in Cognitive Science. This consideration under examination 
presently is more to do with systems that put a heavy emphasis on the ac-
tual formalism used rather then the subject matter itself. There are vary-
ing degrees of emphasis in Cognitive Science on the nature of the evidence 
and the identification of systems to present the evidence. For some, the 
systems that present the evidence, particularly in the case of linguistics, 
are so tied up with the notion of evidence itself that the contribution of the 
formal systems to the notion of the evidence is severely blurred and misun-
derstood. It is exactly in this sort of case that the problem described above 
occurs. If one is dependent- as seems inevitable in some degree - on acer-
tain formal system to even begin to describe the patterns in the evidential 
data, then one had better be sure that the patterns are not a result of the 
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formalism. One had also better be sure that the formalism does not have 
certain prescriptions about data regularity built into it due to its original 
intended use as this will almost certainly lead to spurious patterns and the 
impossibility of ever appearing to be mistaken about whether or not one 
should be taking a formal approach in the first place. A good example of 
this is the lambda calculus. Designed as an abstract method of function 
specification, it was adopted by many semanticists as a device for dealing 
with problems of well-formedness during the composition of complex sen-
tences in formal natural language analysis. This helps us to be able to give 
a completely compositional treatment of, for example, sentences containing 
definite articles like "the". We stipulate that a certain lambda expression 
binds otherwise unbound variables that would render any representation 
for such a word as ill-formed. This is, I think, a purely formal expedient; we 
do it because we can and because it makes the formalism work. However, 
this gives us a certain pattern in our formalisms: they are more composi-
tional and thus we reify this and come to see language as compositional as 
a result. The formalism, motivated by orthogonal concerns, has "given" us 
a pattern. It has given us a something we may be fooled into thinking indi-
cates something essential about our cognition. Thus are the consequences 
of the liberal constraints on formal theories. 
4.2 Contemporary Compositionality 
Compositionality has severe pragmatic implications. If one is to make a 
property of a construction dependent on properties of its constitutive parts, 
then any use of the construction in a computational role - inference, com-
prehension or whatever - requires a decomposition into those parts to 
obtain the necessary data. In model theory, the truth of a sentence re-
quires an examination of smaller and smaller units of the sentence until 
the "atomic" properties are reached and certain meta-relations are estab-
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lished between them. This is a central feature of all model theory, the 
mechanical aspect of this process being part of its appeal. However, this 
puts a heavy burden on the pragmatics of such theories when we consider 
the amount of computation involved. The clarity and formal attractiveness 
of compositionality derives largely from the simplicity of its formal instan-
tiation; coupled with recursion, the power of this simple idea is obvious. 
The basic formal process of composition is simple but as a result, one has 
to do a lot of it to complete the task. Recursive theories are often like this; 
they will scale to more complex data but at the cost of much computation. 
The simplicity of the operation also requires well-defined ingredients. One 
must specify domains, extensions, sets and the like in advance and these 
must be adequate to the task in hand. Famously in the history of Artificial 
Intelligence, the computational explosion resulting in the searching nec-
essary and the size of the sets of atoms for such operations demonstrate 
the computational problems involved and point to deeper problems with 
the conception of the basic operations. It is, however, rather another factor 
that seems to cast doubt on the traditionally supposed ubiquity of compo-
sitionality and its role in non-formal languages that we take up. 
Natural spoken language is littered- smothered rather- in platitudes, 
cliches and banalities. Much of everyday vocal intercourse is glued together 
by such ejaculations. There are certain phrases that are so common or col-
loquial that they are hardly regarded by speakers as part of the essential 
meaning or import of their speech. "How are you?", "Very sensible", "Never 
in a month of Sundays" are all phrases suggesting a certain tone or general 
opinion but not at all determined by the particularities of the words that 
comprise them. We know rather what is meant by them rather than what 
they mean. There are also phrases in which component words have very 
different meanings compared to those found in more "ordinary" usage. The 
word "away" in "put it away" has a rather strange sense. "Get out of here" 
has "get" in a role incongruous with much of its more obvious uses. These 
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sorts of phenomena - and it should not be underestimated just how preva-
lent they are - are not something that sits well with compositionality. The 
problem is that one must have separate and rather different atomic defi-
nitions of the features of most words in order to accommodate their roles 
in these constructions. This adds even more overhead to the pragmatic is-
sue of computation in real time. The common response to this is simply 
that it is indeed true that much oflanguage is idiomatic and we would not 
hope for a theory without exceptions. This depends on the point of view we 
take. The classical post-Chomskian theorist sees rules with exceptions or 
rules with extra clauses. The post-Husserlian theorist sees a theoretically 
heterogeneous mass with some vague regularities. Compositionality is a 
result of a logical model that was designed to have certain features and it 
is not easy to see how it can be divorced from those features, the most obvi-
ous of which is regularity of form. Formal logic is, eponymously, concerned 
with form; compositionality as an idea and formal process was designed 
hand in hand with this and thus it is not easy to see how one can maintain 
that merely some of human natural language and thought is compositional. 
Thus the sorts of non-technical cases mentioned above which do not seem 
to fit such a picture result in two difficulties. Firstly, divorcing composition-
ality from formal regularity of the data is theoretically objectionable and 
secondly, attempting to maintain the regularity of data requires multiple 
definitions of the "atoms" of the compositional framework and thus much 
more computation. For example, to maintain the semantic outline of the 
verb "get" in a formal system would generally require multiple definitions 
in order to accommodate cases like "get out of here". The semantics of this 
special form of "get" would need to, for instance, be something like the se-
mantics for "move". This sort of duplication of semantics for lexical entries 
is the sort thing that one must do if engaged in a formalist program since 
the different uses of the word are associated with different types of other 
words and it is these patterns of relations that define the semantics of a 
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word in an extensional system. Thus one needs as many different specifi-
cations of semantics for a word as it has different combinations with other 
types of words in the language. This means more searching for possible 
lexical entries to take part in inference. Which "get" does one need in a 
given situation? 
The second problem has been addressed considerably before, notably 
in terms of the "Frame Problem" and the explicit phenomenology needed 
to accommodate such a picture10 The theoretical problem is less considered 
and is of importance in forcing modern day formalists into the position 
where arguments like Dreyfus' take effect. A formal theory which had a 
piecemeal approach to compositionality would be strange simply because it 
would be, in effect, holding that a formally defined quality X is a function 
of elements, some of which were not addressed by the formalism and this 
is to say that X is not defined by the formalism either. So a formal theory 
of X that aims to define X without being thoroughly compositional is not 
a formal theory of X. Thus, one wants to be thoroughly compositional and 
this leads into the sorts of problems with computational complexity that 
have been famously intractable in the history of semantics and Artificial 
Intelligence. 
We are able to understand everyday, colloquial and casual language 
very rapidly. Technical discussions and complex prose require more time, 
rereadings and going back over sentences. If one were decomposing in real 
time; if compositionality governed our actual practise with language, why 
would this be? It is not simply a factor of length and complexity; that 
possible reply is insufficient as if the words are unfamiliar but the sen-
tence no more complex, we still take longer to reason with, understand and 
compare. Familiarity and ubiquity of a phrase are far more important in 
our ease and speed of use; those who use technical and complex language 
enough learn to attenuate the initial difficulties. The question arises, then, 
10(Dreyfus 1992) is the updated version of one of the classic works in this area. 
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what is it that allows a seeming bypass of decomposition? 
There are analogies - perhaps more than mere analogies given the 
propensity of evolution to reuse existing structures - for exactly this pat-
tern. Physical skills "crystallise" when practised enough. A good sports-
man will come to perform "automatically". A feature of this is that the 
movements that are performed in the practise of the sport are done so in 
a different way that a similar movement might be done outside the con-
text of the sport. The movements are "isolated" in the context which gave 
rise to their isolation. The stroke of a tennis player or the pull of an oars-
man are movements which have little in common with either the type or 
manner of execution of movements outside this specialised context. This 
is what makes the sportsman a sportsman; there are movements which 
are excelled at and which are noted for their difference. This is a stark 
phenomenon as sports and the general blur of normal actions are often 
sharply separated by conventions. We "do" sports at certain t imes and 
places, wearing special clothes and often on certain occasions. Thus the 
disparity between th e use of the body in "normal" life and during sports is 
quite apparent. The history of AI has given us a superb example of this 
same phenomenon in the form of computer chess research. It became ap-
parent that expert chess players soon dropped explicit rules in favour of 
heuristics and intuitive "feels" once their playing had reached a certain 
level. Moves are no longer explicitly licensed by rules or strategies explic-
itly composed from moves. Certain moves become "strategically isola ted" 
in the sense that they play roles quite different to the roles the ordinary 
and non-expert rules allow. This feature of isolation is, I think, an impor-
tant concept in the understanding of the way in which real-time action can 
occur. 
In language use, we might say that certain parts of constructions be-
come "semantically isolated" from much of the rest of language in the way 
that the action in expert sport is "physically isolated" from much of the 
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body's normal movement. Evolution provides further support for this. Na-
ture tends, as is well known, to reuse existing structures for new purposes 
in the process of adapting to environments. Given the plausible assump-
tion that physical skills preceded linguistic skills, we would not be sur-
prised to see similar patterns in evidence. We think it obvious that certain 
attainments are only possible when particular skills have become "second 
nature". Now, "second nature" here implies at least that the skills so called 
are not decomposed in a manner common to less specialised action. The de-
composition would be anathema to something being "second nature" at all. 
Every teacher of any skill knows that we learn by rules but excel by leav-
ing them behind. In terms of a compositional approach, how would this be? 
The steps are rigidly defined and so how could proficiency increase? One 
possibility is that we could simply put this down to hardware. Our brains 
simply find more economical ways to do the same things, if we repeat them 
enough. However, the steps in a compositional model are all necessary; 
that is the nature of recursion. So what would "more economical way" 
mean here? We might simply say that the brain gets faster at doing com-
mon things without stipulating that the way that common operations are 
performed actually changes; the steps are simply performed more quickly 
in expert action. It is, however, as mentioned above, not simply speed that 
differentiates second nature from inchoate action and so this reply will not 
do. Compositionality is rigid in its operation, this being a desirable fea-
ture for formal reasons. Its rigidity comprises an explicit demarcation of 
operation at every stage and this is not a feature of expert skills or second 
nature. Further, there is more to being an expert than simply doing things 
faster th an usual. If language and thought are second nature to us and 
second nature is not simply a matter of doing things faster then we would 
not expect compositionality to be a central feature of any plausible theory. 
The "isolation" of common strategies regarded as second nature is a 
recurring pattern in organisms that are required to adapt to complex en-
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vironments. Now, with language and the use of words, the boundaries of 
isolation between colloquial and creative usage - between second nature 
and new skills - is hardly so delimited. Colloquial language constructions 
might be said to be "crystallised" and thus semantically isolated in the way 
that expert physical skills are but they enter into the stream of linguistic 
practise so seamlessly that the special role of their components goes un-
noticed. This is quite important as the isolation involved in language is 
therefore less obvious. There are indeed technical and specialised forums 
that are conventionally distinct from normal usage and these are distin-
guished by recognition of their quite different language uses. Weddings, 
speeches, funerals all have certain language use quite isolated from the 
rest of the language. The latter moves on but they remain the same. How-
ever, this "semantic isolation" is ubiquitous, the lurid conventional barri-
ers of specialist discourse being special cases of a general crystallisation 
of common usage. This is one of the reasons that one might be tempted 
to apply a theory of compositionality across natural language; the barriers 
that would make such an endeavour seem misconceived in the case of, say, 
giving a model of the components of all physical movements across spe-
cialised and everyday cases, are not apparent. The barriers of semantic 
isolation appear, slowly, as the language changes around such phrases. We 
are then left with phrases whose component words have little in common 
with contemporary usage. The jargon of subcultures is an instance of this. 
Words come to have very idiosyncratic connotations for groups who use 
them in certain ways. Expletives are another good example. In such cases, 
the "meaning" of constituent terms is opaque; the phrases themselves are 
effectively, in the model-theoretic idiom, "atomic" just as certain physical 
skills become an irreducible part of the expert's movements. 
The implication of this is that treating natural language in a compo-
sitional manner is a mistake made possible due to the barriers of seman-
tic isolation being invisible in the stream of ordinary discourse. Common 
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phrases are rather like ice fragments in a stream; in the rush of the wa-
ter, everything seems to be homogeneous. I think this way of treating the 
phenomenon of semantic isolation is justified further by an analogy with 
Kant's treatment of categories as all-pervasive. We could simply say - this 
is analogous to the traditional idiom of formal semantics - that perceptual 
illusions are exceptions to normal perception; when the mind interferes. 
Or we could say, following Kant, that the mind interferes constantly; ev-
erything is, to a na'ive realist view, an "exception". Now, it may be that 
there is a certain amount of compositionality involved in the learning of a 
skill; we are taught by building up in layers and practising smaller com-
ponents, combining them into larger. However, the argument above is in-
tended to show that this is simply not efficient enough to apply in expert 
performance. Thus we need to realise a division between learning and ap-
plication; compositionality is, at best, relevant to the former. We compose 
new phrases based on the "meaning" of atoms during the process of learn-
ing which crystallise during practise into isolated units we rapidly use in 
application and which sometimes are left behind to become fossils of lan-
guage. We might account for the theories which depend upon universal lin-
guistic rules and the like by noting that analysis of language is a relatively 
new task and, like all new tasks, it is approached with a desire to learn. 
A desire to learn will be a desire to compose new skills and thus it is not 
surprising that we impose a compositional structure on language when we 
come to examine it. It seems reasonable to say that the deconstructive and 
compositional approach to learning and formulating knowledge is some-
thing that the human brain has evolved as a useful technique. Of course, 
that does not imply in any way that the subjects and tasks thereby learned 
are in themselves compositional. It merely implies that this is the best way 
to get to grips with certain aspects of them. We can understand the role of 
compositionality in formal logic as making explicit this process of analysis 
of new information. There is no implication by this that the information is 
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of an area that has a combinatorial treatment as a causal element. Com-
positional conceptions of a subject area are powerful and can be applied 
to most tasks, given ingenuity. This is because we tend to learn tasks in 
this manner and thus have little difficulty in applying the concepts; we 
might have an (evolution-based) propensity to view all subjects and tasks 
- including language and thought- in a certain way but this is quite inde-
pendent of the question of how we do them. Indeed the way we examine 
things might positively mislead us in our explanations of how we do them. 
This notion of crystallisation of language and thought has a basis in mod-
ern neuroscience. The work of Pellionisz and Llinas described in Chapter 5 
shows that the output of systems in the brain governed by empirically im-
plied geometrical models becomes isolated from the units that comprise it 
due to particular independencies between these units. Semantic isolation 
is, in my view, a manifestation of the isolation we find between output and 
its causes when we base our models only on the patterns displayed in that 
output. 
There are two famous objections which apply to this picture; those of 
productivity and systematicity. Language and thought, it is suggested, 
have as central feature a productive nature which allows the construction 
of an infinity of novel utterances and thoughts. That only a combinato-
rial semantics can account for this is a central tenent of the traditional 
formalist picture. This has never been a particularly strong argument for 
compositional formalism however 11. Given suitably fast mechanisms in 
the brain, a simple finitely bounded iterative account rather than an in-
finitely productive one will do. Infinite productivity is rather beyond what 
is required even if it does happen to comfortably fit with the recursive na-
ture of compositionality. Systematicity is a more important objection. This 
requires that a theory be able to account for systematic regularities such 
as understanding or uttering "Bill kicks John" being, in some way related 
11(Fodor 1987) p. 294 (page number r efers to Blackwells r eprint) 
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to also understanding or uttering "John kicks Bill". It would be peculiar, it 
is argued, to be able to understand or utter one without being similarly ca-
pable of understanding or uttering the other. It is thought that the relation 
is intrinsic in a sense that only a combinatorial semantics could deal with. 
Thus, it will be objected, how can a view which denies the use of formal-
ist concepts - indeed one like that suggested above which renders phrases 
largely opaque to the rest oflanguage - during actual language use account 
for the recognised systematicities? One would not want to deny that lan-
guage seems to display systematic features: understanding and being able 
to utter "Bill hit Bob" seems to be related in some way to understanding and 
being able to utter "Bob hit Bill". However, there are certain biases that 
might lead us to believe that systematic features can only be explained in 
certain ways. The common approach is to characterise the systematic fea-
tures in terms of the explanation "level" that one then proposes to account 
for them. Pylyshyn's famous argument is a good example of this 12 . If we 
have a model E using concepts that are insufficient to constrain the model 
to reality, then we require another "level" of explanation E' in order to pro-
vide the necessary constraints. The problems come when ones "constraints" 
are formulated in terms of the the "higher level" model E'; the necessity of 
E' becomes a simple consequence of definition rather than real explanatory 
need. If we require compositionality as a constraint on models, then obvi-
ously a model that enshrines compositionality satisfies the constraint. The 
quote opening this chapter is evidence that this sort of trickery would go 
unnoticed given the largely unquestioned merits of compositionality. Of-
ten, the desire for systematicity is just the desire for compositionality and 
so it is not difficult to see how the desire for the former could be satisfied 
by the latter. Fodor: 
"[Systematicity] ... depends on the idea, more or less stan-
dard in the field since Frege, that the sentences of a natural 
12(Pylyshyn 1984) 
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language have a combinatorial semantics.13 
Having one's cake, in this case, is eating it. 
The task is to indicate how we might have some form of systematicity 
without compositionality; a task which, if arguments like Fodor's are con-
vincing, is traditionally like trying to disprove a logical truth. A common 
tack, following Pylyshyn, has been to show the former as a consequence of 
a certain level of explanation; the semantically combinatorial sort of the 
traditional formalism programme. It is quite important at this point to 
examine briefly the source of the explanational biases of formal seman-
tics. Given the accepted ubiquity of compositionality in work in the area, 
we might well expect that the type of explanations acceptable there would 
mirror aspects of this principle. Compositionality is a method that makes 
clear how something is built out of smaller units, these smaller units gen-
erally being built in the same way and frequently being tokens of the same 
type; propositions are often parts of propositions etc. This pattern allows 
us to see exactly how a construction is built, the general principle being 
the same at all stages. In terms of general preferences for types of expla-
nation formalists tend to favour those where the principle of explanation is 
the same at all stages; it is obvious how something is explained and that 
the way in which it is so is the same at all stages of the total explana-
tion. A good example is the strategy of the Language of Thought model 
where the parts involved in the explanation of, say, intending a complex 
proposition are tokens of the same type as the proposition itself i.e. other 
propositions. So, it could be maintained, I th ink, that it is not simply that 
compositionality is desirable to formalists as it satisfies certain criteria of 
good explanation, but rather that its ubiquity in the field actively creates 
the desire for certain styles of explanation. The form of the strategy of com-
positionality is the form of the explanational schema that it is designed to 
13(Fodor 1987) 
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satisfy14. 
4.3 The Language of Thought and Explanation 
Jerry Fodor has held a considerably more sophisticated view of the matter 
which needs to be examined. In an effort to vindicate the syntactic na-
ture of the Language of Thought, Fodor attempts to banish the influence of 
intentional properties when explaining mental causation. That is, the con-
tents of thought are not themselves deterministic of their causal roles. This 
is important as it puts the work oflanguage and semantics firmly in the re-
mit of syntax and structured, systematic formalism. This, naturally, puts 
a heavy emphasis on compositionality since the form of thoughts is now 
of supreme importance in determining causal roles. Fodor's argument for 
this is mainly that identical (propositional) contents do not imply identical 
causal roles - the content P and the content ,,p need not have identical 
causal roles. 
The emphasis on pure form and hence on compositionality that this ar-
gument aims to establish is avoided simply by saying that the causal role 
is not solely established by intentional properties. The gap in discrimina-
tion between causal properties and intentional properties is bridged by the 
influence of some other factor. There seems to me to be no reason to sup-
pose that we must have only one source of the causal powers of thoughts. 
It is simply an aspect of the desire, noted above, for explanations whose 
elements are all tokens of similar types. It is premature to argue from the 
observation of a disparity between causal role and intentional properties, 
when we assume that the latter is the sole determinant of the former, to the 
conclusion that intentional properties have no part in the explanation of 
causal roles. I think this is evidence of the influence of the general pattern 
of explanation engendered by the form of the accepted notion of composi-
14See (Kime 1996) for further exposition of this point. 
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tionality. The recursive nature of this suggests that we employ concepts of 
a similar nature at all levels of explanation; this is exactly the topology of 
recursion. So, it would be very hard for Fodor to allow a more moderate 
position where intentional properties determine some of the causal role as 
this would be to allow in a very different element of explanation. It would, 
in effect, break the recursive nature of the explanation and thus break the 
link with compositionality. 
Interestingly, Fodor anticipates part of the argument used above which 
questions the need for a certain sort of explanation of systematicity. It is 
argued that even though "psychological laws" are formulated in terms of 
intentional content, the explanation of these laws need have no reference 
to this content. The aim of this argument is to show that the prevalence of 
intentional content in talking about language and thought implies nothing 
about how it is to be explained, thus leaving the way open for an account-
the Language of Thought hypothesis - that leaves intentional content com-
pletely out of the picture. This is a perfectly reasonable tactic, as Fodor sug-
gests, the pattern is common throughout the physical sciences; that which 
is explained takes no part in the explanation. What is puzzling is why 
Fodor does not allow this to apply to the systematicity that rival theories 
are said to lack. The only explanation possible, it is held, of systematicity is 
to have a compositional formalism of language and thought. Given that it 
was argued above that systematicity is compositionality in many respects, 
then Fodor is, here, requiring that that which is explained takes the main 
part in the explanation. This is completely contrary to the strategy with 
which he aimed to establish that a certain formalism was alone sufficient 
to account for causal roles. This is not, I think, a conscious use of ex-
planatory level distinctions to insidiously serve polemic ends. Rather it is 
a consequence of the ubiquity of compositionality as an element of formal-
ist thought which renders some oblivious to the enormous petitio principii 
which results. 
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Fodor has some interesting things to say regarding the sort of argu-
ment proposed above concerning "isolation" of behaviours. In (Fodor 1987) 
we have the following argument: 
Suppose there is a kind of event cl or which the normal effect 
is a kind of event el; and a kind of event c2 of which the normal 
effect is a kind of event e2; and a kind of event c3 which is the 
normal effect is a complex event el & e2. Viz.: 
cl --+ el 
c2 --+ e2 
c3 --+ el & e2 
Then, ceteris paribus, it is reasonable to infer that c3 is a com-
plex event whose constituents include cl and c2. 
Fodor thinks that anyone who denies the above, which is clearly a con-
sequence of a certain attitude to compositional formalism, is ignoring the 
"untendentious" principle that says one should "minimise accidents". For, 
if we denied the conclusion of the above argument, we would be forced to 
say that c3 was a unique event whose similarity to the coincidence of cl 
and c2 was, in effect, an "accident". This is, I think, entirely unreasonable 
as a methodology for a science that claims to be concerned with human 
beings. It would require us to ignore evolution which is possibly the most 
messy and "accidental" account of capacities there is. Fodor even takes this 
to extremes in arguing that this applies to behaviour. That actions, when 
performed as complexes, are tokened in the same way as when they are 
performed singly. To deny this - as was explicitly done above - is, again, 
to maximise "accidents" and to ignore the "elegant" syntactic theories that 
result otherwise. We are not in the business, I take it, of elegantly recon-
structing the inelegant, opportunistic and messy proclivities of evolution 
however. Fodor is quite acidic regarding those who posit "Unknown Neuro-
logical Mechanisms", charging them with preferring no theory to a compu-
tational theory such as his. This, I think, is hardly a charge worth avoiding 
since the implications of a computational theory employing certain tools 
is that restrictions are thereby set on what might count as a possible ex-
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planation of phenomenon whose relevance is dependent on the use of these 
tools. At least "no theory" would leave the area a little more open to diverse 
investigation. 
The concept of "accident" here is rather tendentious. An accident is 
only such compared to a certain way of looking at things. If one believes 
that logical rules causally govern language and thought then features that 
are not accountable in a model with such assumptions are naturally seen 
as accidents. In the above example, calling the case where c3 ➔ el & e2 did 
not imply that c3 internally tokened cl and c2 an accident, requires certain 
conditions. It is only possible when there is a body of theory that supports 
claims such as: 
• Uniqueness (in some manner) of events of type en 
• Events of type en are decomposable 
• Events of type en can combine in ways that produce effects recognis-
ably the combination of separate events 
and so on. Without this sort of background, it is not reasonable to suppose 
that the simple explanatory structure elucidated by Fodor in his example 
is one that necessitates a compositional approach. In the case of formalist 
theory, the necessary types of background claims needed are enshrined ex-
actly in the theory the argument is designed to vindicate and thus embody 
a circular argument. This point is extremely important and is discussed in 
more detail below. 
The best defence I think one can give for Fodor here is a pragmatic 
one. Surely, one might say, without a recursive, compositional syntactic 
theory, the number of "accidents" would be such that we could not possibly 
suppose that this could be implemented in real t ime by real humans? If c3 
in the above example were a sui generis event, then this implies that all 
events would be unique; all sentences would be "isolated" in the previously 
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expounded sense and thus there would be no regularity that would facili-
tate real-time processing. This point is well taken and the preliminary to 
meeting it is to note an implication of the preceding discussion. Regularity 
need not be explained in terms common at the level at which it is mani-
fest. Isolated events may only be isolated for a certain way of looking at 
things. Ice cream sales and stickiness of road tarmac would seem to be 
isolated phenomena until one realises that outside temperature connects 
the two. The formalists mistake is simply an aspect of the correlation fal-
lacy; it is assumed that correlations between structures must be explained 
in a manner that allows for - often obvious - causal roles. Every budding 
statistician knows that correlation implies nothing about causality. This 
is the general case of thinking that the systematicity of language must be 
explained by a language; if not, compositionality is unnecessary. This com-
mon pattern - the belief in the necessity of features of a certain type of 
explanation is a feature of the general stratificational view - will be ex-
plored more deeply later. 
4.4 A Disanalogy with the Natural Sciences 
A very common feature of the formalist approach is to draw seemingly ap-
pealing and intuitive parallels with the natural sciences. This is sometimes 
done in retaliation to the question "what evidence do we have for the atoms 
of composition; what does combinatorial semantics combine?". The tack is 
to justify certain ontological commitments by appeal to standards which 
detractors should deem desirable. 
One strategy, mentioned above, is to appeal to parsimony; combinato-
rial formalism is simpler, in terms of its ineliminable ontology, than any 
rival. Fodor, for example, is happy to quantify over parse trees. This is it-
self a misleading criterion which fails to appreciate the differences between 
laws and systems governed by them. We, might have, for example, reason 
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to expect the basic "laws of nature" to be simple but not their manifesta-
tions. Chaotic deterministic systems are "simple" in one sense but their 
manifestations are not. It seems to be that formalists often mistake the 
ontological parsimony recommended by post-Duhemian science for a par-
simony of the manifestations of ones ontological commitments. The funda-
mental laws governing the brain might well be "simple" - we might expect 
this from analogy with the accepted simplicity of related laws in physics 
and chemistry - but this does not mean that any model of semantics must 
be. 
It is clear from physics that the constraints on the laws of matter are 
quiLe severe given the necessary conditions for stability thereof Given this, 
we might expect laws to be quite rigid, simple and clear. However, the 
brain is a biological phenomenon, which sorts of things are governed more 
in their style of operation by evolution. This is constrained by the environ-
ment. The environment is not particularly rigid in the space of possible 
adaptations it allows, evidenced by the huge numbers of species and more 
particularly, their variation. Thus, it is a mistake to suppose that sim-
plicity is a good methodological guide in all areas of science. Sometimes 
we have good reasons for supposing the laws to be simple, sometimes the 
constraints are such that we have no reason to suppose either way. Now, it 
may still be true that as a pragmatic guide, simplicity may be all we have to 
guide theory choice, even in an area where there is no reason to suppose it 
is a good guide. However, there is still a difference between the cases where 
simplicity is a theoretically justified guide and those where it is a wholly 
pragmatic expedient. We should suspect the latter sort of more errors when 
it comes to explaining. Formalists tend to gloss over this important point 
in attempt to forge links with paradigms of good methodology; a strategy 
that draws heavily from Chomsky's earlier work. 
Chomsky was eager to point out that claims to the "psychological real-
ity" of certain linguistic rules are exactly the same as in the case of claims 
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to "physical reality" in the natural sciences. Famously, giving a model of an 
abstract principle that covers some data in linguistics is logically the same 
as proposing a theoretical structure for data regarding, for example, heat 
emissions of black bodies. This is really the heart of the analogy that has 
been used since to justify the whole formalist enterprise in linguistics. It is 
quite clear, however, that the analogy is a bad one. There is a distinction, 
made quite clear by Quine, between fitting data and explaining it. We may 
be able to account for the regularity in some data by a model that posits 
an underlying mechanism but this is not the same as giving an explana-
tion of the causes of the regularity. The difference is in the way in which 
the claim is related to other more or less fixed points of accepted theory. We 
can, to examine a model of ion exchange, look through electron microscopes 
and thus tie in with other areas of knowledge. If the areas we tie into are 
firmly held, we may say we have "established" the new theory. In linguis-
tics, there is simply not the body of related theory that would provide any 
leverage for claims to explanation over and above mere models of data. 
This is not to say that there is an obvious distinction between fitting data 
to models and "really explaining"; merely that the latter, if used sincerely 
at all, is the result of a relation to a large body of firmly held theory. This 
is a relation that formal semantics does not have to anything. The more 
modern concern over how to link formal theories up to lower-level neurol-
ogy or neural net research is exactly an attempt to provide such leverage. 
In a dialogue concerning his views on Language and Thought, Chomsky 
commented that to reject formalist theories as merely fitting data rather 
than explaining is like saying to a physicist: 
"''your evidence about the sun only has to do with light be-
ing emitted from the solar periphery, and I don't call that evi-
dence about 'reality'. For me, evidence about 'reality' is limited 
to experiments in a laboratory placed inside the sun where you 
actually observe hydrogen becoming helium, and so on."" 
This, for Chomsky, is "obviously absurd". In saying this, he is quite right 
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but the analogy he wishes to the case of formal linguistics is not appropri-
ate. The attitude in the above quote is not appropriate to the case as this 
would render incomprehensible many other branches of theory to which 
solar physics is related. Formal semantics has no such detailed and rich 
links which could prevent exactly the response above. The "crisis" in ad-
dressing the problem of its biological plausibility that was brought on with 
the advent of connectionism is exactly a manifestation of this. A new area 
of research is rightly criticised for a too distanced relation with its funda-
mental subjects when it has little other supporting and related theory that 
could aid in a justification of its proximal theorising. 
Up to now, formal semantics has been in the position of attempting to 
provide leverage for its "explanations" by pushing against itself One jus-
tifies ones theory by pointing to another formal theory that says similar 
things. However, when the assumptions are the same, this is simply not 
good practice. One cannot claim that formal semantics and linguistics are 
comparatively new subjects - a common line in defence to criticisms oflack 
of progress - and also maintain that it is has the necessary embedding in 
general theoretical history to support, say, its quantifications over ques-
tionable entities as an exercise in something more than mere modelling. 
A further point against the analogy with the natural sciences is the 
rather specious argument regarding the support given by evidence. This is 
the classic view of the superiority of the natural sciences among disciplines 
concerned with knowledge: that it has a bedrock of "evidence". Chomsky 
has always been keen to cleave to natural science methodology and this 
aspect is obviously attractive. The practice of formal syntax and seman-
tics has been concerned with using grammatical judgements and native 
speaker intuitions as the foundations of evidence for the resulting theories. 
Thus, the claim is that there is abundant "evidence" for the formalist ap-
proach, again utilising an analogy with the natural sciences. Again though, 
this is misleading. An obvious difference is that this "evidence" for formal-
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ist enterprises fails to have one of the central features of evidence in the 
natural sciences: stability. Observations carried out in natural sciences 
tend to be stable. They tend not to change much when you alter certain 
things within quite wide limits. Iron here weighs much the same as iron 
in the next room. Native speaker intuitions famously vary considerably 
and it is often hard to have any intuitions regarding some of the contrived 
sentences used to attempt to provide "evidence" for particular theories of, 
for example, pronoun resolution. 
It is lucky for natural sciences that there are reasonable mechanisms 
in place that help prevent the dictates of theory colour the evidence that 
supports them. Nobody, since the time of Mary Hesse's famous paper on 
the observation/theory language distinction 15, would want to suggest that 
theory and observation are independent but re-testing, blind testing and 
measuring tools all aid in attempting to keep clear the goal from the route 
to it. Intuitions about grammar and semantics are often, as anyone who 
has done enough work on a particular theory will know, eventually coloured 
by theory. It is reasonably common to have seasoned semanticists with lit-
tle or no intuitions left regarding certain constructions, so battered have 
these been by the onslaught of theory. In this case, there simply is nothing 
to help us sort out the "real" evidence form the spurious "damaged" cases 
where the theory has influenced the data. Intuitions are simply not the 
sort of thing one can be justified in or have "better" reasons for. One might 
convince a scientist whose theory predicted red litmus paper that it was 
not red by spectrally analysing the paper. What does one do in the case of 
a formal semanticist whose theory predicts cross-discourse anaphora and 
who says he can, as partial evidence, intuitively see such? The point is that 
in the case of formal semantics, there is a particularly incestuous relation-
ship between theory and evidence that destroys the analogy many wish to 
u se in support of its theories. 
15(Hesse 1970) 
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4.5 An Alternative to Compositionality? 
The preceding argument has been set to establish the following: that there 
is no good reason to suppose that there is a case for holding composition-
ality and thereby systematicity as central features to be upheld by a cog-
nitive theory. Further to the aims of this work, this is a concrete example 
of how the stratificational view causes problems for traditional semantics. 
There are two main reasons why the error has been maintained: firstly, by 
a historical influence of technical ideas from the logical pioneers explicitly 
regarded by them as unsuitable for the task of natural language analysis 
- the use of such technical tools has significant non-technical manifesta-
tions in biases in the general type of explanation that is acceptable to the 
current paradigm; secondly by a misleading analogy with the methodology 
and results of the natural sciences. 
As noted above, one of the main objections to compositionality as a re-
alistic explanation of semantics is that its recursive nature means that one 
must decompose down to basic level elements every time an act of infer-
ence or understanding occurs. This sort of model provides for an enormous 
amount of computation in real time and depends on the assumption that 
the only possible account must involve a small number of very productive, 
systematically related rules. If we accept the picture presented earlier in 
this chapter; that of "semantically isolated" units, then we do not have the 
basic atoms with which to compose and nothing like composition can take 
place. 
In terms of the geometrical picture sketched previously, we can de-
scribe "semantic isolation" thus: A is semantically isolated from B if it 
typically inhabits a geometrically different space. Thus, analogously with 
physical activities, we might use a different space to describe the degrees of 
freedom employed in an arm movement that was part of a game of tennis 
as opposed to an identical movement employed in waving to a departing 
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train. There are very different criteria for use and muscle deployment, 
even though the actual movement through the air might be the same. If 
we regard conceptions as features of geometrical spaces, then isolated con-
ceptions are geometrically isolated in this sense. This is a simple idea but 
is important for the following reason. A compositional model is, essentially 
linear, each step requiring the completion of the previous before it may oc-
cur. Thus, the amount of parallelism required for pragmatic plausibility is 
absent. This is rather like having one enormous geometrical space with di-
mensions enough to accommodate every possible combination of predicates 
as these are defined in terms of the same domain. Thus, as mentioned in 
chapter 3, something the size of the cartesian product of the set of possi-
ble predicates would need to be computed in real time. Imagine a space 
with one axis for every predicate; every conception being, say, a point in 
this space. This is simply a geometrical picture of the kind of impossible 
situation realised by Dreyfus. To determine the coordinates along every 
axis is exactly the same as having the combinatorial explosion involved in 
explicitly describing the conceptual dependencies of any real situation in 
a logical formalism. It is the relations between concepts that provides for 
problems as this grows faster than the number of available concepts. Re-
lations between concepts are handled normally by the notion of inference 
or set-theoretical operations that can be exploited in a compositional treat-
ment. One has rules that say "All x s are ys" or "if P then Q" which are steps 
in the decomposition of thoughts and utterances. Here is the implementa-
tional crux of the systematicity requirement; explicit delineation of rules 
and relations that embody explicit steps in formal methods, procured to ac-
count for some of the regularities of language and thought. Fodor takes it 
as given that systematicity is explained only by combinatorial semantics: 
" .. . that [the] systematicity of cognitive capacities implies 
the combinatorial structure of thoughts . . . I get ... for free for 
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want of an alternative account."16 
Thus a rejection of compositionality requires an account of what might al-
low conceptual relations and inferences; what allows the manifest regular-
ities. 
4.5. l The Importance of Analyticity 
Analytic statements are, in a sense, degenerate forms of inference. If "All 
objects A have property P" is analytic, then an inference from being A to 
having property P is trivial. Since Quine's "Two Dogmas" it has been ar-
gued by many that analyticity is not something fixed and stable; what is 
counted as analytic changes as the theory in which such statements are 
embedded changes. This provides for a dynamism of analyticity and ne-
cessitates the famous Neurath metaphor concerning at-sea boat r epairs; 
stability is now provided, not by immutable certainties of definition, but by 
dogmatism in acting as if there were such things. Epistemologically, there 
is no difference. Since, when we consider the brain in a modern monistic 
fashion, we are essentially following Kant and are, as argued earlier, lim-
ited to epistemology, we are in the same position as regards the nature of 
analyticity. That which our brain renders as analytic because of the struc-
ture that is imposed on perceptions is indistinguishable from that which 
we might regard as "really" analytic. The difference is utterly inscrutable 
since the conditions th at we might use to distinguish between these two 
cases are the conditions that ensure that an epistemological difference can 
never be found. 
I suggest, then that analyticity is exactly the mechanism by which we 
perform what we now call "inference" and that no "real" inference in this 
sense ever takes place, it actually being a simple matter of analytic defi-
nition. This would seem to suggest that we could never change our minds 
16(Fodor 1987) 
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about certain inferences or relations between thoughts or that we would 
all agree on certain things. The freedom to deny this is afforded us by the 
picture given by Quine. That which is analytic changes depending on the 
theory changes around it. These sorts of theory changes are slow and grad-
ual as they require re-workings of ontological commitments and sometimes 
fundamental metaphysics. The brain is more temporally dynamic in this 
respect; changes in chemical balance are frequent and sometimes quite dis-
crete. I propose that these changes facilitate a rapid change of geometry of 
"conceptual spaces" such that putative inferences and conceptual relations 
are rendered possible at great speed in a particular manner. 
Suppose that the chemical and structural elements in a part of the 
brain embody a network that defines a space in which a certain activation 
in turn embodies a manifestation of the thought that the people walking 
past the window are wearing heavy coats. Classically, we would need to 
do something like provide a rather implausible meaning postulate in or-
der to syntactically achieve the link necessary to obtain the inference that 
it was cold outside. Even then, there would be a significant amount of 
processing in order to obtain the result. On the present theory, what hap-
pens rather is that the embodied network, in which activation manifests 
as the first thought, has a geometry whose axes are interdependent in a 
manner that makes likely activation manifested as the second thought. 
This is a result of the structure of the space and thereby is analytic by, on 
Quine's terms, the only standards available. The structure of the concep-
tual spaces involved creates analyticity in various places just as the struc-
ture of the network of theory does so in Quine's view. The difference lies in 
the fact that the structure of the embedding network in the brain is rapidly 
changing due to constant chemical and physical perturbations; experience 
is a constant flow. Thus, what is "analytic" for certain conceptual spaces 
changes constantly. This implies that "inference" as classically conceived, 
need never happen. 
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A point of clarification is needed here. It is not being suggested that 
the concept of "inference" is empty. Inference in terms of the traditional 
rules such as Modus Ponens certainly exists as a reconstructive, normative 
science. The introspective arguments designed to show that such rules of 
inference play a part in our actual cognition are misconceived exactly in 
that they confuse being an approximate model with causing. The history of 
the Philosophy of Logic demonstrates the complications and confusions one 
finds when attempting to fit normatively conceived models to "real infer-
ence"; nobody believes in the adequacy of the simple material conditional 
anymore; simple quantification is often deemed inadequate; two truth val-
ues do not seem to be enough etc. and there is little sign of this continual 
tweaking of logical inferential patterns reaching an end. This is, I think, 
simply because it has nothing to do with actual human cognition in which 
"inference", as commonly conceived, is a myth. 
A reconstruction of an "inference" is a process of giving a synthetic de-
scription of an analytic connection. The reasons for this are as above in 
Fodor's bias in giving a certain sort of "level of explanation" for systematic-
ity; a synthetic description describes at the level at which the results of 
a putative ''inference" become manifest. If an "inference" links linguistic 
element A with linguistic element B then our bias is in favour of an ex-
planation of the link that employs nothing but other linguistic elements. 
Again, the tack is to "minimise the accidents" that we have, as argued 
above, no good methodological reasons to avoid . Also, analyticity is com-
monly defined in terms of linguistics units. A statement is analytic if, for 
example, one can count the subject as part of the predicate or the truth 
of the statement is a matter of "definition of words". It is clear that even 
though we might be able to state analyticity as matters of definitions of 
words, this need not necessitate the phenomenon also being a consequence 
of them. Again, this is the modelling/causing confusion. Wittgenstein had 
exactly this trouble in attempting to show that "object .4 is red and green 
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all over at the same time" is a logical contradiction. Whereas the problem is 
manifest in language, its cause is not simply a matter of words (see Chap-
ter 7). It is clear, however, that something might be analytic as a result 
of sub-linguistic informational dependencies in the brain. The activation 
of certain networks manifesting as the thought that A might be intrinsi-
cally related - due to the geometry of the spaces involved - to activations 
manifesting the thought that B. If analyticity is simply a sharing of infor-
mational ingredients in this way, then the linguistic version with which we 
are most familiar turns out to be an aspect of sub-linguistic r elations and 
thus any talk of compositional models causing and thereby really explain-
ing language and thought becomes redundant. 
George Lakoff seems to have adapted his view as to the fundamental 
appropriate ways of talking about semantics. In 1972, he was concerned 
with extending the notion of generative grammars17 while more recently, 
he has turned his attention to a "Cognitive Linguistics"18 This is akin to 
Gardenfors' approach (see Chapter 7) in that it emphasises a more prox-
imal vision of the data to be accounted for. The evidence is now largely 
cognitive rather than concerned with words; Gardenfors expresses this as 
explicitly as "Meanings are in the head"19. Lakoff notes that metaphor in-
dicates close connections between ostensibly different areas of language 
and thought. In particular, he notes an interesting regularity between 
terms used to express personal relationship problems and those used to 
express journeys20 Lakoff accounts for this by talking of "cognitive topol-
ogy". There is a commonality in structure between different domains of 
discourse that allows the metaphorical relationship. He characterises this 
in terms of more and more abstract mappings. For example, in the journey 
metaphor embodied in phrases such as "We're drifting apart" and "We'll 
17(Lakoff 1972) 
18His main statement of this is to be found in (Lakoff 1987). 
19(Gardenfors 1993a) 
20(Lakoff 1988) p. 302 
I 
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have to go our separate ways", he identifies the mapping "TRAVELLERS 
correspond to LOVERS" and "PHYSICAL CLOSENESS corresponds to IN-
TIMACY"21 . There are, he thinks, more general such mappings such as the 
"event structure metaphor" where "LOCATIONS correspond to STATES" 
and "MOVEMENTS TO NEW LOCATIONS correspond to CHANGES TO 
NEW STATES". The crucial thing for Lakoff is that metaphors can map 
from spatial to non-spatial domains. This is useful as non-spatial domains 
have what he terms "container-schemas"; areas of distinct categories that 
are amenable to logic since the boundaries of categories define rigid units. 
So far, this account is almost identical to that given by Gardenfors and 
detailed in Chapter 7 but of importance here is the following conclusion. 
Lakoff argues that metaphors can map into schemas with built-in topol-
ogy and thus can have virtual logical relations for free. This is exactly as 
I have described in the example of the egg-box in Chapter 3. In Lakoff's 
account, inference in the sense of deductive formal manipulation of sym-
bols need never happen; one merely employs a metaphor that maps into a 
scheme that has the topology that makes the conclusions of inferences "ob-
vious". This is all rather vague and Lakoff talks of merely having to "shift 
focus" from one domain to another. This is, I think, a result of Lakoff's 
assumption that this model can be supported by an account located in the 
conceptual level of explanation. He asks for a reason why the mapping 
from visual scenes to concepts displays a tendency to lump certain regions 
of the continuous data together: 
"What kind of concepts permit such an infinite categorisation 
of visual scenes?" 
This is an interesting question but contains an assumption to the effect 
that concepts are responsible for this phenomenon. If the phenomenon of 
categorisation is explicable in terms of properties of the concepts so cate-
gorised, this conflicts with Lakoff's model of metaphor in the following way. 
21(Lakoff 1988) p. 303 
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The structure of a concept is, on Lakoff's view, responsible for the categori-
sation of the continuous data of experience. Now, the essence of metaphor 
is to relate conceptual schemes to others and thus reflect the structure of 
one scheme in another. Now, if concepts are the originators of structure, the 
real work in this account is done by the notion of "metaphor" as it is this 
that relates conceptual schemes to others. If a conceptual scheme has acer-
tain type of structure A and certain metaphors require this structure being 
embedded in another conceptual scheme, metaphor is that which performs 
this task. But since this whole account was, in part, intended to explain 
the notion of metaphor, it has, it appears, ended up relying on it for the 
lion's share of the explanation. Essentially, in what does this "relating" 
or "mapping" of conceptual schemes consist? A mapping or relating at the 
explanatory level of concepts is constrained by the sorts of operations avail-
able at that level. These are formal relations since concepts are supposed 
to be, on Lakoff's model, emergent from low-level brain processes and de-
scribable in the usual linguistic terms. Thus, this later phase of Lakoff's 
thinking is effected to the same degree as his earlier work as detailed in 
Chapter 3; there is no benefit in having concepts determine the patterns 
we see in language as this leaves us having to explain how the patterns in-
terrelate at the conceptual level. This does not sit well with his notion that 
no deductive inference is necessary on his model. The relating of concep-
tual schemes at the conceptual level requires relations between concepts 
and these relations require formal systems of some variety. The problem is 
that Lakoff wants to retain the importance of the usual linguistic concerns 
and patterns, while showing that there is a basis for these in low-level 
brain function, more specifically, through connectionism. Others have also 
desired to do this22 . This is an attempt to present a stratified model in 
which the "higher" level of explanation provides evidence to be accounted 
for by characterisation in, in this case, neural nets. Lakoff says that 
22Notably (Gardenfors 1993b) 
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"Such an explicit mapping would also provide characterisa-
tions of such notions as "basic-level concept" ... '23 
This is a top-down approach where we take the evidence from our man-
ifest language and thought patterns and hope to "ground" them in the neu-
ral substrate. However, the manifest patterns, such as "basic-level concept" 
are output patterns. They are what we see as results after input has taken 
place and after the brain has processed this input and combined informa-
tion into output. We cannot ground manifest patterns in a neural substrate 
unless we are sure that these patterns have any meaning or applicability at 
that level. It would be like trying to model water movement by "mapping" 
the phenomena of waves onto molecule interaction. At that level, the con-
cept of"wave" means nothing. It is merely something applicable as a rough 
description when talking of large collections of water molecules. Lakoff's 
problem is something we see time and time again in Cognitive Science. It 
is what I have called the "stratification" problem and its causes are to do 
with the methodological issues involved in attempting to relate, yet keep 
separate, different "levels of explanation". Compositionality is one of the 
main features of stratified views of language and thought and, as discussed 
above, this is confused with notions of explanation tied up with the desire 
of semantics and linguistics to be seen as sciences. These are themes that 
will recur in the exploration of the issues involved in adoption of a stratified 
view. 
In order to provide a basis for remarks to follow in the more general 
approach to the problem I take in Chapter 6, the next chapter examines 
some crucial results and implications of some work in neuroscience. 
23(Lakoff 1988) p. 307 
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Chapter 5 
Semantics and Neuroscience 
Commonly, it is lamented that the gap between the sorts of evidence sup-
plied by low-level brain science and that required by cognitive science and 
its work in natural language semantics is so large as to be currently in-
hibitive of relations between the two. This is regrettable since the excesses 
of the formalist program have been exactly those warned against by be-
haviourism in its fear of "mental models" and it might be argued that any 
sort of empirical evidence that might bear on semantics would be most wel-
come. Behaviourism in psychology warned of the dangers of constructing 
models which had no determinate basis. Postulations of mechanisms of the 
"mind" or of"cognition" were thought to be worrisome as no direct evidence 
was available in respect of them. The fear was that psychological ontologies 
would come to be accepted on the basis of nothing more than the attractive-
ness, coherence and implementability of models designed to fit data. Not 
to disparage the use of such criteria, it was not thought however that they 
should be the primary determinants of theory. Behaviourism in this field 
was largely a movement to preserve the basis of empiricism. Cognitive 
Psychology and the formalist approach to mind and language embodied a 
subtle shift in what was taken to be an appropriate basis for empirical re-
search. Behaviourism was a denial of the possibility of such a shift. It was 
a shift from a basis of relevant observables to one of questionably relevant 
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observable manifestations of relevant non-observables; a shift from regu-
larities in the subject matter to regularities in something you suppose to 
give you clues about your subject matter. Behaviourism worried that the 
lack of a relevant empirical basis for certain subjects caused them to create 
spurious ones by redefining the notion of "empirical base" in a way actu-
ally not really constrained by empirical requirements. So, in attempting 
to motivate a picture of semantics by data from the brain sciences in op-
position to a stratified view, certain assumptions are necessary and broad 
implications of the type of data available need first to be examined in order 
to establish the basis of the evidence which is to be discussed. 
Additionally, Lhere is a need to elucidate some of the implications of the 
geometrical models favoured by empirical brain science as these have a di-
rect bearing on the philosophical issues surrounding the relation between 
types of explanation in Cognitive Science. It is apparent that work in the 
semantics of human cognition cannot fail to be affected by issues bearing on 
the influence of perception on cognition and thus by post-Kantian thought 
in general. It is important then to note that work in neuroscience in the 
last few decades has found it germane to compare some of the results ob-
tained with general post-Kantian concepts. This is interesting as it implies 
an empirically supported basis on which to draw the broad outlines of an 
account of language and thought. The general Kantian flavour of neuro-
science research that has touched upon broadly semantic issues gives us 
reason to reject the traditional formal approach and to embrace a quite dif-
ferent theory. However, the theory suggested is so fundamentally different 
in terms of the sorts of explanations allowed that it is necessary to under-
stand the motivations behind the neurological theory and also the broad 
implications that it has. In formulating these ideas, we must be careful to 
sidestep (and explain this sidestep of) the explanatory desiderata of the for-
malist lest we burden ourselves with explanatory criteria of no relevance 
to the actualities of brain behaviour. 
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5.1 The Import of Kantian Transcendentalism 
Kant's famous work in the "Critique of Pure Reason" is held as a milestone 
in philosophy. It is a work that bears heavily on the relationship between 
mind and world and thus on issues of realism, idealism and scepticism. 
The implications for semantics and Cognitive Science are also immense 
but underappreciated. Part of the reason for this is that the philosophical 
concerns of Kant are not obviously related to traditional work in formal 
semantics; partly also because there have been many complex criticisms of 
Kantian philosophy since which are not easily couched in terms relevant 
to modern cognitive science. This latter problem is duA mainly to the lan-
guage and concepts available to Kant at the time; he talked of the "mind" 
rather than the brain and Cognitive Science, as is well known, is still con-
cerned with the incessant mind/body debate and thus arguments that de-
pend on this area are best left alone. A step towards rendering Kant's work 
as more obviously relevant to Cognitive Science is to facilitate an approach 
that is couched in the modern monistic idiom and that has suppor t from 
brain sciences. 
The fundamental message of the Critique has to do with a certain rela-
tion between mind and world where the mind is seen as an active element. 
Kant rejected the realist model where mind was a passive model of reality, 
taking the evidence from recalcitrant illusion further and arguing th at the 
impositions of the mind are ubiquitous, all-pervasive and thus constitutive 
of that which we call "reality". The effect of this sort of theory is, as Kant 
undertook, to investigate "reality" by investigating the structures of the 
mind since, ex hypothesi, the latter is constitutive of the former. This forces 
a rather different paradigm onto any subject area that accepts these basic 
principles. 
Kant's two great "impositions" of the mind were space and time. 
"It is, therefore, solely from the human standpoint that we 
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can speak of space ... Ifwe depart from the subjective condition, 
the representation of space stands for nothing whatsoever."1 
"I can indeed say that my representations follow one another; 
but this is only to say that we are conscious of them as in a time-
sequence, that is, in conformity with the form of inner sense. 
Time is not, therefore, something in itself, nor is it an objective 
determination inherent in things."2 
The surface manifestations of these categorical impositions are not signs 
by which we could hope to separate the "real" from the "ideal" as this sep-
aration supposes a freedom from the very categories that lead to the signs. 
John Hospers3 likens this situation to a village of fisherman who only haVf~ 
nets with holes 1' square. They never catch any fish under 1' long and con-
clude that there are no such fish in the sea. They regard this as a fact about 
the sea while not realising that it is a fact about their nets. The ubiquity 
of the effect of this on their epistemological life is taken by them to be a 
fact about ontology. Thus, any explanation of a part of what we take to be 
real is fatally flawed if it takes the evidence as supposing that the real and 
the ideal are epistemologically separable. That this is an epistemological 
problem, Kant was quite clear: 
"This ideality of space and time leaves, however, the certainty 
of empirical knowledge unaffected, for we are equally sure of it, 
whether these forms necessarily inhere in things in themselves 
or only in our intuition of them."4 
What, it might be asked, about the certainty of more theoretical knowl-
edge? This can hardly be unaffected as the ontological assumptions of a 
theory are rather dependent on views of idealism. A process of composi-
tionality in formal semantics, for example, requires a base to its recursion. 
1(Kant 1787) p.71 
2(Kant 1787) p.79 
3(Hospers 1956) 
4 (Kant 1787) p.80 
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This base is in danger if there is an assumption that it is possible by "di-
rect'' association with objects in the world or if the notion of"object" that is 
used to build up extensions involving sets for predicates etc. are motivated 
by a nai:ve realism. The emphasis on research, in the light of such Kan-
tian ideas is to be on an examination of how our manifest language and 
thoughts are to be understood in terms of the categories of the mind. What 
is done in modern formal semantics is rather that the nature of language 
and thought is to be understood in terms of the aforementioned manifesta-
tions, its regularities and apparent structure. This is, on Kantian terms, 
a mistake as the apparent manifest structures arising from interaction of 
the categories need not be obvious and indeed one etfoct has been such as 
to lead us into the errors of nai:ve realism. Kant presents the archetype of 
the argument that how things appear to be on the surface gives no real clue 
as to how they are formed, caused or performed. The reason for this is sim-
ply the lack of an external point of reference that enables us to distinguish 
reality from appearance. 
As an example, languages generally contain mechanisms for marking 
tenses. We can distinguish between past, present and future. As a re-
sult, we have logics and formalisms utilising time-coordinates in order to 
capture the difference in "meaning" between "I saw John" and "I will see 
John". We might have, t = now & at (t, see (me, John)) and t = now 
& at (t', see (me, John)) where t' > t etc. The sub-formula concerning 
times is well-formed and thus can stand alone, be combined with other for-
mulae and dropped etc. Thus we render the implicit assumption about the 
orthogonality of time. We take in factors of the language we use as be-
ing a guide to the models of its underlying nature, of its "real" source and 
origin. In Kantian terminology, this is the impossible inference from phe-
nomena to noumena. Another good example is the work in "propositional 
attitudes". We note that we often have syntactic propositions occurring af-
ter the word, say, "believes". So, we have a "propositional" syntactic theory 
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of sentences containing the word "belief" which gives us certain syntactic 
entries for such words. However, we then are tempted to infer that belief 
itself is "propositional". We "believe propositions". Language structure has 
led us to a theory of a very different sort of structure; a "mental" structure 
and a structure of "meanings". If there really is a sort of division between 
something like Kant's phenomena and noumena - and I think there are 
good reasons why something like this can be upheld for reasons given be-
low - then the evidence oflanguage is very poor as it inextricably mixes up 
the way the world is with the way we force it to be. Using language regular-
ities to explain semantics is then, problematic as the structure of language 
need have nothing in common with the structure of that which gives rise to 
it. Language manifests patterns certainly but the lesson from Kant is that 
the cause of a pattern is necessarily inscrutable from simply looking at the 
pattern. On the Kantian picture then, I shall argue that the methodology 
of traditional approaches to language and thought are completely miscon-
ceived in their use of patterns in explaining the cause of those patterns. 
Naturally, what is required is an argument that the Kantian crite-
ria are desirable. One could simply reject Kantian transcendentalism and 
leave formal semantics and theories of language and thought in Cognitive 
Science in place. However, there are good empirical reasons, I think, why 
this cannot be done. The support comes from research performed in the last 
decade and and a half in neuroscience and psychology. Obviously, whereas 
Kant was wont to talk of "the mind", modern brain sciences prefers to talk 
of the brain. This is of little consequence I think given that neo-Kantians, 
in particular Schopenhauer, rephrased Kantian theory explicitly in terms 
of the brain; where Kant talked of categories of the mind, Schopenhauer 
talks of the categories imposed by the workings of the brain. Worries about 
dualism had reared themselves in the meantime. The important point of 
the Kantian theory is that much of what we take to be reality is contrived 
internally. Two particular areas of modern research, those of "Categor-
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ical Perception" and research into motor coordination in the cerebellum, 
display these Kantian tendencies clearly. I think it an essential step in ap-
proaching a reasonable methodology in Cognitive Science as a whole that 
this connection be made clear. It is essentially the task of this whole work 
to show that the implications of such a connection are overwhelming and 
involve even the most concrete instances of work in the field. 
5.2 Categorical Perception 
A feature of our perceptions of continuous data is that we tend to "quan-
tise" into discrete sections. The categories that we tend to group things into 
are perceived as having a greater similarity between their elements than 
is the case between inter-category elements even though the difference can 
be shown to be the same. For example, it can be shown that we tend to 
see all red colours as more similar to each other than to any yellow colour, 
even though, for certain choices, the difference in wavelengths is identical. 
This is a general phenomena that can be used to provide, for example, a 
naturalised basis for the perception of natural kinds. These are, accord-
ing to this model, merely types of things that the structures in our brain 
are so organised to see as having more in common with each other than 
with other things, even though other measurements - sometimes taken to 
be more objective - give different results. It is exactly that our categories 
are a result of the structure of our brain. It seems to me that this conclu-
sion is very much in the spirit of Kant where the imposition of space as 
a condition of sensible appearances results in categories such as "unity", 
"plurality" and "totality". Of interest is exactly how this process is thought 
to occur. In modern times, the thought has been that there is some sort of 
virtual "conceptual space" which the neural activity of the brain embodies. 
This space has certain topologies and metrics which make the quantising of 
continuous perceptual data necessary. This is, I think, the modern analog 
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ofKantian categories; the sensible condition of space imposes categories on 
thought and perception. 
An example is the Voronoi Tessellation5 of a space of points. If we 
have a metric space in which points represent, for example, perceptions of 
colours, then as long as we have decided on certain archetypal colours -
we need to be able to decide upon one example of each colour that we are 
sure about - the space will automatically be divided into convex regions 
corresponding to each colour. This happens by the following method: for 
each point p in the space, p is counted as being an example of the nearest of 
the archetypal points mentioned above. "Nearest" here requires a distance 
measure defined on the space; hence, the space needs to be metric. A convex 
region of a space is defined in the usual mathematical way: a region is 
convex ifffor any pair of points Sn and Sm in the region, all points between Sn 
and Sm are also in the region. Such regions are also said to be "connected". 
This then is a possible definition of a categorical perception; one which falls 
within a convex region of a metric space. 
It is then on this sort of picture, the structure of the brain that results 
in the manifest properties of the resulting thoughts. CP effects are, I think, 
a good analogue of the Kantian imposition of categories on sensible experi-
ence. An important thing to note is the type of explanation offered for their 
origins today. The theory couched in terms of metric spaces and points is 
geometrical and is something we shall come across again. The lesson from 
this however is rather that the existence of CP effects lends credence to 
the Kantian picture and helps to set it in a modern idiom. We might even 
hypothesise, as a more specific example, that the brain imposes the Kan-
tian category of "plurality" by individuation based on Voronoi Tessellation 
of conceptual spaces. We conceive of many things by the space in which 
they are conceived, embodied in the brain, having a metric which defines 
in the way described, convex spaces. These convex spaces correspond to 
5This example is briefly covered in (Gardenfors 1993a). 
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our categories and figure in our perceptions and cognition. There are even 
more explicitly Kantian analogies to be drawn when we consider research 
in the empirical brain sciences. 
Importantly, is is obvious in the case of CP that the categories result-
ing from the underlying geometry are not indicative of an essential level 
of explanation of our category use involving just these categories. They 
are manifestations of certain informational dependencies underpinning the 
surface features of out conceptual structure. Thus, the level of categorical 
perception is structurally misleading as to the causal factors in the influ-
ence on our thought and language. I note that this begins to address the 
concerns I expressed in Chapter 4 regarding the evidential status of the 
features of out language. This subject will be shown to be a central point of 
balance of my whole argument. 
5.3 The Implications of Theories of Coordina tion 
Investigation of the structure of the brain has grown considerably in recent 
years. If one were to expect corroboration of the form of idealism initiated 
by Kant, brain research is exactly where one would expect to find it. Start-
ing around fifteen years ago, two neuroscientists, Andras Pellionisz and 
Rodolfo Llinas, began to publish work concerned with coordination in the 
cerebellum. Their concern was a post-Newtonian model of space-time rep-
resentation in the brain. In an important sense, this work is contrary to 
Kant due to the well-known criticism to do with Kant's insistence on the 
a priori nature of Euclidean space representation in the mind. The devel-
opment of non-Euclidean geometries tended to cast doubt on Kant's rather 
extreme insistence on the existence of certain synthetic a priori truths. 
Thus, when we deliver a model of integrated space-time representation, we 
go beyond Kant given his pre-Einsteinian idea that the two are separate 
and give rise to distinct categories. However, the general Kantian similar-
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module for resolving time references, one for spatial position etc. in our 
theory and suggest this as a model of how we actually do manifest our se-
mantic regularities. However, the seeming separation we manifest is not 
worth anything as a guide to how the brain manages to facilitate language 
and its semantic regularities. Separability in Einstein's physics is a special 
case illusion that is stable only within certain limits. Likewise, we cannot 
be sure that the separability of space and time suggested by language is 
not an illusion rendered by certain limits on the causes of the phenomena. 
Indeed, we have the rather uncomfortable evidence from neuroscience that 
a division between space and time representation in the brain is a myth. 
'l'ime coordinates are blurred and space-coordinates are relative to a time-
frame. Pellionisz and Llinas give an attractive metaphor for the situation 
in likening the situation to a group of high-speed battle tanks being coor-
dinated by horse-cavalry messengers; the messengers are slower than that 
which they carry messages about. 
Now, phenomenologically, in normal experience, we have a rather uni-
tary sensation of time and space which can be used to perform many very 
complex tasks of coordination etc. This implies that the brain must per-
form some very complex intermediate tricks in order to present things in 
this way. Our experiences are of separable space and time positions but we 
know from neuroscience that this is an illusion not adhered to in the brain. 
So, the very fundamentals of our view of reality must be in some way en-
gendered by the machinations of the brain. One could hardly ask for more 
Kantian evidence regarding the very foundations - space and time - of 
the transcendental framework. This is of pivotal importance in my com-
ments and assessments to come. It is an empirical support of the simple 
and rather obvious observation that inspection of manifest features is of no 
use whatever in determining fundamental causes of such features. This is 
a more general form of the familiar skepticism about introspection and its 
evidential role. Chapter 8 considers the overall form of the assumptions in-
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volved in traditional formalism with respect to the significance of manifest 
features. 
More evidence is provided when we examine the nature of motor coor-
dination. Take the example of a man catching a ball. The task of coordi-
nation is to manipulate the body in such a way so that the hand coincides 
with the ball at some point and in a state suitable for catching it. The 
ball, for us, exists in a four-dimensional space, three space and one time 
which appears orthogonal; that is, it appears that these coordinates are 
independent and that change in one is completely separate to change in 
another. However, the required position of the body is not described by a 
spacA so simple. The degrees of freedom are large, there are many muscles 
at work and they depend for their position on each other. Thus the space 
necessitated by them is many dimensional and complex. The task for the 
brain then is to map between these spaces in order to define the place of 
the ball in the motor-space, thus enabling the man to catch it. Unfortu-
nately, the motor-space is what is known as overcomplete; there are many, 
many ways of embedding a lower dimensional space into a higher; there 
are many ways of catching a ball. However, we manage to perform the task 
very quickly and in many cases, in an expert fashion. Given that the task 
is overdetermined, again, the brain must impose some restrictions in order 
for us to be able to act in real time. There is not time to process all of the 
possible ways of catching a ball: all of the possible permutations of muscle 
tension and limb position, and then to choose the most economical. 
It is interesting, and important I think, here to digress slightly and 
draw a parallel with work in formal semantics, particularly within the AI 
community during the 1960s and 1970s. Much work was done in order to 
address the problem of computational explosion in search paradigms. In a 
sense, we can recast their problems in these terms; the task of deciding be-
tween logically valid inferences regarding a situation and coming to choose 
the most appropriate one is exactly the problem of attempting to overcome 
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overcompleteness. There are many ways to, as it were, put blocks on top of 
other blocks and to infer how to remove a bomb from the room but we act so 
rapidly, search until one strategy is decided upon is simply not pragmati-
cally feasible. Thus much effort was spent on attempting to develop formal 
systems with restrictions built into them. Non-monotonic logics, circum-
scription and restricted quantification were all used at one time to attempt 
to address this problem. Their aim was to restrict the search space and 
thus time taken to act; it was, in effect, to render a task less overcomplete. 
The problem with this sort of approach is that the time taken to recognise 
and process restrictions balances the time saved in following unpromising 
paths. The reason for this is the formalisms chosen. As mentioned in detail 
in chapter 3, essentially the illusion of the meta/object language distinction 
when it comes to real world implementation of certain formalisms means 
that overcoming overcompleteness by more rules, sentences or whatever 
of a similar formal system means no difference in real world plausibility. 
The mistake is to suppose that overcompleteness is, in itself, the problem. 
It is actually that overcompleteness ensures that you take too long unless 
something is done about it. Thus, one can solve overcompleteness within 
the constraints of traditional formalism at the expense of creating more 
processing elsewhere that ensures you have made no progress in addressed 
real time action. The problem is simply speed and not the merely techni-
cal consideration of overcompleteness which is only a particular method of 
hindering the former. 
Again, to maintain the phenomenology of our usual perceptions whilst 
dealing with these sorts of considerations, the brain must, in some way, 
impose some structure on our experience. It seems as though space and 
time are indeed fundamental conditions of our sensible experience, seen in 
this way. The categories we might predicate of our phenomenal perception 
would, on this picture, be a product of these fundamental conditions, in the 
required Kantian sense. An important matter now is to describe how the 
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modern neurological theory accounts for the brain's action in these matters. 
This will give us a picture of the mechanisms of category imposition and 
also give us some information that will be relevant, as promised, to doubts 
about the foundation of traditional programmes in formal semantics. 
5.4 Tensors and Invariant Relationships 
A "space" in general, is merely a set of possible combinations of qualities. 
We might have a space of possible colours, or types of car for example. Each 
point in a space will have a value for a specified number of quality dimen-
sions. For example, a car might have values for top speed, engine type; a 
colour vaules for hue and saturation. These quality dimensions are said to 
be "axes" of the space and the number of axes determines the "dimensional-
ity" of a space. For example, a colour space typically has three dimensions 
of red, green and blue values. Each point in this space defines a unique 
colour and our general categories of "green, "yellow" etc. correspond to re-
gions in the space. In order to map from red, green and blue value triplets 
in such a space to another specification of colour space using dimensions, 
for example, of cyan, magenta and yellow, we would simply take the colour 
specified by the red, green and blue components and decompose it into its 
cyan, magenta and yellow components. The colour remains invariant, the 
values along the dimensions in the two spaces are different. This is simply 
a case of redescribing the same thing. 
If we map between arbitrary spaces with arbitrary dimensionality for 
example, we would not expect certain things of points in such spaces. For 
example, if we had a point in a four dimensional space (three space and 
one time) that represented a ball in flight, the actual values along each 
axis we would not expect to remain the same when the point was repre-
sented in terms of a fifteen dimensional space, each dimension of which 
was the tension of a certain muscle or the angle of a certain joint in an arm 
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in the act of catching the ball. However, it is a matter of mathematics that 
certain transformations between such different reference frames maintain 
certain relationships. If the hand coincides with the ball in one space then 
there are certain sorts of transformations that will guarantee that they co-
incide in the other space. It is not determined which point since the axes 
and scale of the axes are so different, but the fact that they coincide will 
be preserved. This is a simple case of a transformational invariant; a rela-
tionship that is preserved in character between changes of reference frame. 
The example above of the colour remaining the same through the change 
of r eference frame (from red, green, blue values to cyan, magenta, yellow 
values) is an example of a transformational invariant. The mathematics of 
transformational invariants is tensor analysis. A tensorial relationship is 
one which remains for all coordinate systems, regardless of their degrees 
of freedom (dimensionality), scale of axes or other complications which we 
shall discuss below. This generality of relationship has a distinctly Kan-
tian ring to it and I think it is a particularly good paraphrase of Kant's 
"forms of intuition". The universal subjectivity of the conditions of space 
and time in the Critique is mirrored by the universal invariance of certain 
relations that the brain preserves. The actual neuronal implementation of 
such invariances is not important: 
"This approach implies that while the neuronal networks of 
a particular brain are individual, there exists an invariant geo-
metrical property ... that is common for all networks."8 
Tensors are technically a sub-class of "geometrical entities"9 . Such an en-
t ity is supposed to be something that has an existence independent of the 
reference frames in which it might come to be represented. Tensors are 
8(Pellionisz & Llinas 1980) 
9 A phrase from (Kron 1939); a classic reference for tensor analysis of networks, even 
though his treatment is largely of electrical problems. It is known that Kron's terminology 
is rather idiosyncratic but I use it here for its clarity in expository purposes. 
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such entities with certain restrictions on their mathematical definition 1°. 
The general point of a tensorial treatment is that it specifies relations be-
tween points in arbitrary reference frames. An example will help to il-
lustrate this. Suppose we have one-dimensional space representing the 
absolute lengths of pieces of a particular wood in metres. Then ifwe chose 
to represent the wood in another one-dimensional space whose axis repre-
sented weight in pounds, we would have different numerical values for the 
value for each piece of wood. However, the relation that one piece of wood 
was two-thirds as long as another would be mirrored by it being two-thirds 
as light compared with the other in the new space; the relation between the 
values for these two pieces of wood as being two-thirds is invariant with 
respect to conversion between these particular spaces. This is the heart 
of tensor analysis; it is a method of determining invariants for transfor-
mations of reference frame. The invariants of a transformation define a 
certain geometrical entity which allows one to map between the different 
reference frames. Now, the invariants of a system define this in a unique 
way, allowing a unique mapping from one reference frame to another. Thus, 
overcompleteness is avoided as there are many possible ways of represent-
ing lower dimensional spaces in higher but only one actual way; the way 
defined by the invariants of the system. The invariants constrain the map-
ping to a unique solution in the way that the ratio of lengths of the pieces 
of wood in the space above constrained the representation in the space us-
ing weights to a certain proportion. This way of treating overcompleteness 
will define a unique mapping that obviates the need for search through 
many possible mappings. Thus, relationships are determined by the geom-
etry of the brain and we have grounds for saying that Kant's "conditions 
of sensible experience" are accounted for by possessing a common physi-
cally embodied tensorial relationship between all of the manifestations of 
10Technically, tensors do not cover relationships that depend on certain functions of the 
related elements. 
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fundamental brain-imposed structures. 
It is this notion of "invariant", defined above, that suggests a certain 
approach to understanding language and thought in humans. If the invari-
ant features of our language and though ts are, in essence, constancies in 
the mappings between references frames that the brain performs in its ev-
eryday operation, then we have a naturalised basis for our common ontolo-
gies. We might define what we phenomenologically take to be an "object" 
thus: take all reference frame mappings. An invariance of a certain rela-
tion between our input information is what we call "objects". A "property" 
might turn out to be an invariance of a different sort etc. This is a particu-
lar iru;lance of the general way in which systems can be defined in terms of 
the invariances they give rise to. Kron's work on electrical systems demon-
strates in detail how we may characterise a system by the invariances that 
hold between the different frames of reference that model it throughout its 
operation11. It also demonstrates that the invariants of a system are usu-
ally extremely abstract. Typically, for electrical networks, the invariances 
are complex relations between currents, voltages, fields and the like. This 
means that there is no intuitive and obvious way of classifying a particular 
system, hence the need for a mathematical framework. 
5.5 Ho lism and Dependence 
As mentioned above, one further matter implied by the approach we have 
been discussing needs to be made clear. This matter is, I think, of supreme 
importance for Cognitive Science and its attitude to logical formalism. It 
seems very likely that the sorts of reference frames that the brain employs 
to perform motor coordination are not orthogonal. This means that the 
degrees of freedom a system has are not independent of each other. Picto-
rially, this corresponds to a space having axes th at are at more or less than 
11(Kron 1939) 
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a 90 degree angle to other axes. This involves then, informational depen-
dency. This means that the components representing an invariant will not 
be "separable". This, in essence, is to suggest that the elements that occur 
in such spaces are not decomposable into separate contributions from en-
tities in the world. If each contribution to a geometrical entity (point, line, 
area etc.) in a space is dependent in complex ways on all others, then there 
is no way to single out independent "qualities" that are constitutive of the 
building blocks of the points in the system 12 . Pellionisz and Llinas point 
this out for the case of motor coordination: 
"Thus, while a goal of the CNS is to establish an external co-
incidence of events, this goal has to be achieved by using space-
coordinates inside the CNS such that each of them refer to a 
different external time-point."13 
That is to say, the space and time coordinates are not separable. Now, if this 
sort of complexity is necessitated by motor coordination, I argue that it is 
reasonable to suppose that much more complex and evolutionary posterior 
phenomena - language and thought - will certainly involve at least this 
level of complexity and will thus necessitate non-orthogonal (sometimes 
called "oblique") reference frames. 
It is worthwhile, then, to explain exactly what this means in terms of 
language and thought. Firstly, it is an empirical matter to determine what 
relationships are preserved in transformations between reference frames. 
One needs to look at the operation of a system and investigate what sorts of 
things remain constant. This in itself means that the fundamental defining 
features of a system are not really open to a priori theorising. The man-
ifest features of a system do not give any good guide to the actual causal 
processes that give rise to it since the characteristics of it will belong to a 
system whose constitutive components are inseparable, for mathematical 
12This is because the information is contravariantly composed; see below 
13(Pellionisz & Llinas 1982) 
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reasons. If this is true, then attempts at "decomposition" of meanings and 
the like are simply inappropriate. The surface manifestations of the activ-
ity of brain systems is opaque to this sort of investigation. Investigation 
has to be of low-level systems, their reference frames and the invariants 
that they define. Secondly, the types of invariants we would expect to find 
are nothing like the normal "explanatory" features of a formal system. The 
sorts of things that remain invariant between reference frame transfor-
mations are generally very abstract; the case above of simple coincidence 
is an atypical example. For example, in geometrical systems, invariants 
tend to be things like complex relations between lengths, angles etc. These 
relations generally are not intuitive, have no correspondence to obvious 
features we recognise and can only be determined by examination of the 
system. This is a facet of that which was mentioned at the beginning of 
this chapter; that the normal explanatory desiderata of the formalist will 
not be met but rather side-stepped. The formalist tends to like a theory 
where each element has some describable correspondence with elements 
of the area to be explained. For example, sentences might correspond to 
"propositions" in the model, sub-elements of sentences like adjectives have 
a corresponding model element like "property'', nouns are "objects" and so 
on. Each lesser element of the model has a corresponding and often intu-
itive correspondent. Indeed, one of the oft-cited reasons for moving on from 
Montague Grammar is that its theoretical constructs become "unintuitive". 
Language is "intuitive" and thus we are fooled into thinking that its causes 
must be. This desire for a one:one mapping between domain and range of a 
theoretical system is, I think, quite obviously a desire caused by features of 
the formal systems adopted to describe the theory. This is discussed more 
fully in Chapter 4. 
If I am correct about this, then there simply is no way of describing in 
language, contrary to the practise of logical formalism, the basic features 
that contribute to our use oflanguage and thought. The basic features are 
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extremely abstract properties of informational relation, combined in an in-
separable manner. Formalists are wont to criticise "network" approaches 
to language and thought for failing to provide sets of basic building blocks 
and modes of combination. Apart from this criticism begging the explana-
tory question, the tensor approach has a good argument that this is simply 
not relevant. It is necessitated by the type of systems required by the brain 
and implied by empirical research that the sorts of explanatory material 
traditionally desired are inappropriate and impossible. 
5.6 A Key to the Historical Problem 
A "metric" tensor defines the notion of "distance" between points in a space 
and thus allows one to translate between different reference frames by 
translating the geometrical notion of distance from one point to another 
into terms applicable to a new reference frame. In our common encounters 
with geometry, and in the simple systems designed to suggest "geometrical" 
semantic theories (see Chapter 7), the metric tensor is merely the identity 
matrix as transformations from one Euclidean space to another of the same 
dimensionality and same axes require no special mapping. In spaces where 
the metric tensor is the identity matrix (these are spaces where the general 
rule for the distance between two points reduces to the Pythagorean square 
law), we lose, however, a distinction crucial to a general tensor theory and 
more importantly, crucial to an understanding of the nature of semantics 
as perceived as manifestation of brain processing. Indeed, it seems to me 
that an explanation of why the formalist programme was led into error can 
be constructed on the basis described above in association with two con-
cepts typically lost in such simple models but which are central to general 
tensor theory. The components of points in a reference frame can be of two 
types. They can be covariant or contravariant. Technically, this means 
that the components in one reference frame are determined in another ref-
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erence frame by one of two different methods. However, the feature that 
interests us here is rather the nature of the separability of components. A 
point with covariant components has components that are decomposable 
into their separate values independently but which do not combine, by the 
simple parallelogram rule, in the usual geometrical manner, to create the 
point. A point with contravariant components is not decomposable into its 
unique separate values but its components do combine to give the point. 
Figure 5.1 summarises this difference. As mentioned above, in simple ge-
ometry, this distinction does not exist. The covariant components of a point 
in space are exactly the same as the contravariant components since the 
axes are orthogonal (at 90 degrees to each other) and thus the metric ten-
sor is the identity matrix. The disappearance of this crucial distinction in 
simple reference frames will be of importance when examining recent "geo-
metrical" approaches to semantics in chapter 7. In terms of semantics, I see 
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Figure 5.1: Summary of covariant and contravariant vector expressions 
in orthogonal and oblique systems. Dashed lines (B) and (D) represent 
contravariant components which combine to create the vector by the 
common parallelogram rule but which are dependent in oblique ref-
erence frames. Dotted lines (A) and (C) represent covariant vector 
components which do not combine to create the vector but which are 
independent even in oblique reference frames. 
the implication of this as the following; certain thoughts or phrases can be 
represented in two ways. Either they are a homogeneous whole that can-
not be broken down into contributing parts but which the brain knows how 
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to construct - they are contravariant information. Or they are separable 
into parts which do not combine to give that which they are parts of- they 
are covariant. The "decomposition" in the case of covariant information is 
nothing like the sort of thing commonly so-called within formal semantics. 
The decomposition is simply a way of chopping things up so that the in-
formation may be reused in some way to build behaviour - contravariant 
information. Pellionisz and Llinas' work supports this as they view sen-
sory perception as taking in covariant information and resulting behaviour 
as outputting contravariant. So, behaviour is not decomposable into that 
which composes it as the information is contravariantly conceived. What 
sort of examples do we have of this in nature? A good example is the move-
ment of points on the face of a cube. If the cube is made of a rigid material, 
there will be no movement along certain axes of points on faces orthogonal 
to the direction of movement. However, if the cube is of an elastic m aterial, 
the general inertial stress of movement in one direction will have an effect 
on the movement of points on orthogonal faces due to distortion caused by 
acceleration. Put another way, in an elastic medium, the position of a point 
is dependent not only on forces in the direction of planes in which the point 
lies, but also on forces that would be irrelevant in a rigid material. Chart-
ing the movement of points on a cube of jelly is more complex than charting 
the movement of points on a cube of iron. 
Sensorially, we chop covariant information up along the axes of the 
reference frames that the brain embodies and then need a way of eventu-
ally constructing a contravariant representation that can actually combine 
components into a behaviour. Dysmetric lack of motor coordination can 
be modelled as failing to do just this. It transpires that it corresponds to 
the mistakes that one would expect if attempting to construct behaviour 
using covariant components directly without transforming them into con-
travariant counterparts14 . That which converts between covariant and con-
14See (Pellionisz & Llinas 1980, Pellionisz & Llinas 1982) 
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travariant information is the metric tensor. This is a geometrical entity 
that essentially defines a metric on reference frames. Lack of motor coor-
dination then corresponds to bypassing the metric tensor. The situation 
is like measuring the size of an angle in radians and then attempting to 
reconstruct it by taking the radian measurement to be normal degrees. I 
argue that the trouble formal semantics has had in the history of AI and 
Cognitive Science is an aspect of this. Whereas motor coordination prob-
lems are due to taking covariant information as contravariant, formal se-
mantics has taken contravariant information as covariant. This obviously 
needs some explaining. 
Our behaviour needs constructing. It is universally agreed that lan-
guage and thought are phenomena possessing components; it is the actual 
constitution and nature of these components that is at issue. If we ac-
cept the above theory, then it is clear that our language utterances and ex-
amples of our thoughts are essentially outputs of certain brain functions. 
Outputs have to be constructed and thus must be contravariant in nature. 
Only contravariant components can actually combine to give an output due 
to the simple geometry of the well-known parallelogram rule. It is also not 
particularly controversial that our inputs must be analysed in some way 
by the brain. Information must be extracted or gleaned. If this is the 
case, sensory input must be seen as covariant; covariant components can 
be independently determined from different sources which are embodied 
in the modalities of sense experience. Now, without knowledge of the ex-
act composition of the metric tensor mediating between covariant and con-
travariant representations, there is no way of decomposing contravariant 
information nor of constructing correct outputs from covariant. However, 
this is exactly what formal semantics attempts to do. It attempts to break 
down our linguistic output into contributing and orthogonal components 
and then to build back up to language. Simply put, there is a suspicion that 
we are in danger of taking what we do to be data in the investigation of how 
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we do it. Here we have, in the form of a tensorial model of general brain 
function, good reasons to suppose this cannot be done. If what we do is the 
result of a very complex and interdependent system of information combi-
nation, then taking this as the basic data in an attempt to explain how we 
do it simply will not work. It means that the concepts that we may use to 
explain how we do what we do are completely different to those involved 
in describing what we do. The key to relating these descriptions would be, 
in this theory, the metric tensor relating covariant and contravariant in-
formation. Determining this is not a matter for formal semantics however; 
it is a matter for low-level brain research of the appropriate sort. The es-
sential interdependence of Lhe information combined in the manifestations 
of our brain's processing means that a theory that attempts to take its cue 
from these manifestations is fundamentally mistaken. The key to the pat-
terns in the manifestations of the system are rather in the embodied metric 
that allows information to be analysed and reconstructed. This key is not 
open to a priori speculation, rational reconstructions, formal redescriptions 
or any of the common strategies for analysis in formal semantics. It is a 
purely empirical matter to determine the invariants defined by such a key 
and thus a matter for neuroscience and brain research. It is, because of this 
very fact, impossible to give concrete examples of the invariants involved in 
the geometries contributing to our characteristic uses oflanguage and our 
common patterns of semantic inference. The invariants would be couched 
in purely mathematical terms best paraphrased by giving general features 
of patterns manifested as a result. The biases of the formal systems are 
against this sort of explanation since it does in no way mirror the manifes-
tations of language. One of the main purposes of this work is to remove the 
basis of this prejudice as it rests on the built-in assumptions of a certain 
formalism. 
The ramifications of the fact that the outputs of a system conceived 
of in this manner are not a guide to their causes are, I think, enormous. 
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It is, indeed, the fundamental theme of this work to explore the implica-
tions of this phenomenon. When the manifestations of a system are only 
understandable with reference to the structures mediating between its in-
puts and outputs, the outputs lose their attraction as a starting point for 
theorising. Also, the necessity of postulating sui generis levels of explana-
tion with regard to such a system are seen to be unnecessary and simply a 
product of the mystification involved in wondering what on earth to do oth-
erwise to satisfy the requirements of what we have come to see as desirable 
sorts of "explanation". These themes are to take up the majority of what 
follows. The next chapter is a critique of a more philosophical and abstract 
expression uf the stratified viewpoint. It demonstrates the underlying as-
sumptions clearly and I relate them to work in Cognitive Science in order 
to provide an important conclusion to this thesis; that much work in Cog-
nitive Science is infected with the assumptions of a general philosophical 
position which prevents it from achieving many of its aims. 
In this chapter, I have discussed tensors as analogs of clasical vectors. 
This is because vectors can be considered as tensors of "rank one". This is 
a common convenience employed since Einstein (see (Sokolnikoff 1951) p. 
61 and particularly p.62) which I shall relax in Chapter 8 where I draw out 
my views of the consequences of a tensorial approach. 
Chapter 6 
The Problems of Stratified 
Theory 
It is important to set the problems with the space of solutions for tradi-
tional formalist concerns within a wider context in order to obtain a better 
view of the central issues. Within the more philosophical community, there 
are examples of a practise, not obviously, but I maintain, fundamentally 
related to the practices of the formalist enterprise in Cognitive Science and 
its concerns for natural language semantics in particular. The attitude 
we are concerned with involves a certain approach towards aspects of the 
mind and their explanation in terms of reductionism. It is the task of this 
chapter to explore this other side of the coin and to show that the mistakes 
here are merely different but more fundamental aspects of the same prob-
lems that formalism in natural language semantics suffers from in more 
technical and specialised instances. 
We might term the general philosophical approach underlying the for-
malists' strategies as a stratified one. There is a basic belief that the mind, 
language, thought or whatever cannot be properly explained without postu-
lating different "levels" or "strata" of processing, conception or whatever. A 
typical suggestion might be that we can only understand language use if we 
do so on a model involving different "levels of representation" or "realms". 
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A rather basic view of this form is that of Pylyshyn's "levels of explana-
tion" where systematicities in our data supposedly necessitate a level that 
exhibits the required systematicity in order to correctly account for the 
phenomenon. This is too simplistic, obviously. A systematicity in our data 
may well be an artifact of how we choose to look at it; everyone working in 
semantics has had the experience of playing with attractive formal systems 
and then encountering the daunting face of real language and wondering 
where all the systematicity of the model domains disappeared to. Also, to 
merely adopt a level of explanation that contains exactly the putative sys-
tematicity we need is to rule out a huge space of possible explanations that 
du nut "explain" systematic features by simply mirroring them. For exam-
ple, ifwe notice that "N' always follows "B" in spoken language, we cancer-
tainly "explain" this by generating a level of explanation using a formalism 
that ensures this. However, this is a rather degenerate case of "explaining" 
and is surely not something necessary for explanation of a phenomenon. 
Mathematics uses very abstract building blocks to give explanations of phe-
nomena without merely incorporating the regularities into the description 
of its formalism. To mention a theme of other chapters, adopting a composi-
tional formalism to explain putatively compositional language semantics is 
like inventing a new mathematics to explain a new phenomenon when com-
binations and abstractions of existing mathematics will do perfectly well. 
This latter strategy also facilitates connections with existing explanations. 
So, the penalty for inventing other levels of explanation is quite high; we 
cannot obviously link the resulting theories in with existing knowledge -
exactly the problem formal semantics has in addressing the brain sciences 
for example. 
However, in addition to this sort of stratified view, there is another that 
seems on the surface to draw from a different concern. There is a long-
standing problem since Kant and the significant post-Kantians regarding 
the relation of the mind or brain to the world. What is the relation and 
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how do we explain it? How much of our picture of the world can ideal-
ism claim? The tension is between allowing complete idealism and thus 
no role for a reality-in-itself to play and complete realism which allows the 
possibility of an unpalatable reductionism. Since Kant, philosophers have 
been desperately looking for a middle ground between these two positions, 
mainly because Kant failed to provide convincing arguments for noumena 
and thus leaving us drifting towards complete idealism. It is important 
to see, in general at first, how this fits in with the stratificational theories 
mentioned above. The point of those who wish to hold a middle ground in 
this debate is that complete realism is denied because there is a level or 
a "realm" which is irreducible to physical reality and thus which necessi-
tates a different sort of explanation. This is not really an advocation of 
dualism, Cartesian or otherwise, merely a weaker claim that a certain sort 
of explanation is necessitated by a certain sort of phenomenon. The sort 
of explanation is familiar; it is one couched in terms of formalisms deal-
ing with "reasons" and concepts. Thus, there is a commonality between 
this sort of philosophical predilection for a style of explanation of the in-
herently reasoning part of man and the formalists' argument for a formal 
level of explanation. At the end of the next Chapter, I shall discuss an ap-
proach to a closely related problem, the Symbol Grounding Problem, that 
mirrors in Cognitive Science the difficulties that are present in the more 
abstract treatment of this chapter. 
What is the philosophical root of this sort of bias? In an elucidation 
of this topic, I shall draw on the work of John McDowell, particularly his 
Mind and World as it gives a clear exposition of the philosophical basis of 
the desire for the orthogonality of explanations in this area. McDowell's 
arguments are typical of many anti-reductionist arguments by the way in 
which the central motivations of the position are rather coyly mentioned 
in passing. This weakness shows up in the internal contradictions which 
are forced on the theory as it tries to reconcile a link between different 
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levels of explanation without having the levels collapse into one another. 
The task of the philosopher and the formalist here is to render the levels 
of explanation close enough for their relation to be possible but far enough 
from each other for them to remain distinct as explanatory levels. In this, 
I shall argue that McDowell variously fails on both counts and shall point 
out what parallels with formal semantics this failure exhibits. 
6. l Realms and Explanation 
The task McDowell sets himself is to accommodate Kantian idealism into a 
picture that avoids the lat.:k of"friction" with the world necessitated by com-
plete idealism. He also wants to avoid the opposite where the connection 
between the mind and the world is so close that both realms are resolved 
into one. He terms this "bald naturalism". McDowell espouses a dichotomy 
between the "realm of reasons" (ROR) and the "realm of law" (ROL). The 
former is that which is characterised by Kant's notion of "spontaneity" -
the possibility of combinations and syntheses of concepts in order to create 
new concepts, independent of the sensory impacts of the external world. 
The quality is "spontaneous" as it does not, as does perception, rely on an 
external impingement from withou t; judgement is seen as an internal af-
fair, capable of regulation and manifestation from within its own sphere. 
When the causes of manifestations originate from two distinct places, we 
may, it is argued, consider them separate and sui generis. There is acer-
tain realm of explanation that makes reference to the "representations the 
mind produces from itself" as opposed to those it makes as a result of sen-
sory experiences. It is the former that constitute the ROR and the latter, 
the ROL. The ROL is that of external reality. The realm in which expe-
rience occurs and where the mind/world interface exists. This distinction 
would be the same as the real/ideal if it were not for the import of the no-
t ion of "justification"; there is no easy demarcation between the ROR and 
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the ROL since Kant, as we cannot now see justification for beliefs and ac-
tion as coming from two sources, the world and the mind. Since Kant, the 
epistemological difference has ceased to exist and the ontological differ-
ence come to be questionable. So, the difference between the ROR and the 
ROL is that between levels of explanation in the justification of belief and 
knowledge. We must admit post-Kant that the space of possible reasons for 
something is no larger than the space of concepts. The "Myth of the Given" 
is exploded and we may now no longer hold that some non-rational access 
of"given", direct contact with the world justifies and explains certain states 
of mind. So, the distinction between mind and world is blurred at the very 
least. What McDowell aims to do is to prevent the distinction becoming 
too blurred; in becoming a non-distinction. This, he thinks, would be to 
collapse the ROR into the ROL and give in to bald naturalism along with 
its concomitant reductionism or physicalism. 
We can see here a similar strategy to that adopted by the formal se-
manticists. There is a desire to prevent the lion's share of explanation 
going to a "low-level" theory. This is motivated either by noting features 
that are putatively only explicable at "higher" levels of description or by 
more generally holding that the higher level of description is ineliminable 
for other r easons. Two responses are generally possible to this sort of po-
sition: firstly, to show that maintaining the stratified theory leads to con-
tradictions and secondly; attempting to remove the basis that supports the 
necessity of certain strata for proper explanation. We proceed along these 
lines in turn. 
6.2 McDowell's Approach 
In order to achieve the results he wishes, McDowell has to reject David-
son's position that the world exerts a merely causal influence on the mind. 
This, he thinks, would collapse the whole picture into the ROL. If there is 
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nothing in the relationship between mind and world that is essential to the 
ROR, then there is no good reason to hold a stratified account involving it. 
So, for McDowell, the world must assert a rational influence on thought. 
This is a general way of expressing the formal semanticists' belief in the 
necessity of logical formalism in the explanation of language. Something 
more than a merely causal influence implies more structure; McDowell 
accounts for this by postulating the ROR and formal semanticists by the 
structural expedients of formal systems. A rational relationship is inher-
ently more structured than a causal relationship since reasons are, by their 
very nature, composed. A reason is something we present as an argument, 
evaluated by iis clarity and the components of which it is made, thus, a ra-
tional relationship is one that can be broken down according to the canons 
of rationality: validity, clarity, soundness and the like. If the influence of 
the world on our minds or brains is not a rational one, then it follows that 
it lacks the canons of rationality and thus appears to us to be inscrutable. 
This is, to many, intolerable as it suggests that man's place in the world is 
not determinable as his links with it are forever obscured. The belief in a 
rational influence on thought, a rational connection with the world is thus 
a desire for a picture of the activity of mind that shares these features. The 
activity of mind includes language and thought and thus it is natural that 
we would, if following this motivation, come to warmly regard a techni-
cal system that embodies the characteristics of rationality. This is exactly 
the desire for systems of formal semantics. McDowell's tactic is to remove 
the clear boundary between the conceptual and non-conceptual, as indi-
cated by Kant, while maintaining that the ROR - the conceptual - is sui 
generis. Thus, the boundary must go but the distinction must not wholly 
collapse. Again, for formal semantics, the distinction must not be too h ard 
otherwise there is a risk of independence from facts about the brain and 
this threatens dualism of various sorts. However, the necessity for formal 
systems must remain, even though they must relate to the low-level work-
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ings of the physical organism somehow. It is exactly the same tension in 
both cases and the way in which McDowell attempts to approach this is, I 
think, very illuminating as to the difficulties for formal natural language 
semantics and to an understanding of the essential tension in traditional 
Cognitive Science. 
Now, how to remove the distinction between the conceptual and non-
conceptual? This is, in different terms, the age old question in Cognitive 
Science of "how does a reduction of language to brain states work?". Well, 
at first, it would seem that there is a fundamental difficulty as our concepts 
are relatively coarse as compared with experience. This is part of the fa-
mous rejection of standard AI by Dreyfus; that much knowledge is not con-
ceptual and thus not amenable to formal analysis. There is, it is thought, 
"extra information" that concepts do not capture as they are essentially ab-
stractions from the real world and thus less sensitive to detail; indeed, this 
is part of the attraction of the notion of a "concept" as it means it can be 
applied in many situations. The extra information involved in experience 
would seem then to be, ex hypothesi, non-conceptual. This would, in turn, 
imply th at there is a necessary and fundamental distinction between the 
conceptual and the non-conceptual, due to the possible informational detail 
of the conceptual, of the ROR. In McDowell's terms, the ROL would then 
be necessarily non-conceptual and thus we would need to rely on a version 
of the Myth of the Given; would need direct access to certain information. 
This is something that Kant and any following realistic epistemology for-
bids. 
If conceptual granularity of information is fundamentally different from 
non-conceptual granularity, then we have a difference that blocks the move 
that would reconcile the ROR and the ROL and thus we are led to idealism 
as McDowell despairs of the only alternative: a merely causal connection. 
The suggested solution is to not suppose that conceptual granularity and 
experience are independent. We become conceptually adequate "on the fly" 
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and in real time, principally by ostension. We say "that colour" or "this" 
and thus make our concepts finer tuned as we act1 . Thus, in this way the 
supposedly fundamental difference between the ROR and ROL is bridged 
by allowing experience to inform conceptual discrimination. This is how 
formal semanticists avoid having to specify the entire set of predicates in 
their systems; they assume that predicates are employed as they are found 
and thus an exhaustive lexicon is not a prerequisite of a theory. This seems 
obvious until one examines, in McDowell's case, the assumptions this re-
quires and the contradiction that it implies. 
In order for this to have the desired effect, ostensive content must be, 
in some way, rationally relate<l to conceptual content. Any lesser link will 
not do as it would not, as shown above, suffice to prevent a collapse of the 
ROR/ROL distinction. Now, conceptual content is conceived, in an explic-
itly Quinean manner2 , as being conceptual due to its place in a network of 
capacities joined by their possible employment in spontaneous judgement. 
McDowell asks the rhetorical question "why should short-lived ostensive 
content not be rationally integrated into spontaneity?". The best that Mc-
Dowell can do in answer to this is to argue that unless is it indeed so in-
tegrated, we will not have a rational link. This is transparently question 
begging. 
"If those impingements [of ostensives] are conceived as out-
side the scope of spontaneity ... then the best they can yield is 
that we cannot be blamed for believing whatever they lead us to 
believe, not that we are justified in believing it."3 
Here, McDowell is appealing to a notion of responsibility in order to sup-
port an argument purporting to establish a conclusion having much wider 
reaching implications. It is an argument for the rational linkage of the ROL 
with the ROR based on a completely orthogonal desire to correspond to an 
1See (McDowell 1994) pp. 57-58 
2See footnote on p. 13 in (McDowell 1994) 
3(McDowell 1994) p. 13 
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idea of responsibility and justification. This is like the formalist replying to 
the question "but what about the link of these formalisms to the physical 
brain?" with the retort "there must be a link otherwise the formalism is 
vacuous". The reply in both cases is question-begging and ill-motivated. 
Furthermore, in direct reply to this issue, there are good reasons why os-
tension cannot furnish us with the required rational link with the ROR. 
Repetition of experience, familiarity and history of usage are features 
that result in content becoming embedded in a conceptual network. Con-
ceptual content is that which is so semantically worn that it constitutes a 
Neurathian boat in which less worn content floats. It is precisely because 
this sort of content is not short-lived and transitory that it is conceptual. 
Ostension therefore cannot possibly have the desired rational links with 
the conceptual since rational links are in the remit of the ROR which, at 
the very least, excludes this aspect of the ROL. Ostension is a way of over-
coming the inertia that conceptually embedded information has. It is not 
something that provides a necessary means of rational relation to such 
information. If ostension could provide the link that McDowell thinks it 
can, then it would not be part of the ROL, would not be essential to the 
non-conceptual and thus would not relate the ROR to anything. Idealism 
would then result. 
This problem can be emphasised from a different direction. McDowell's 
theory requires that experience is in a sense passive. By this, he means to 
ensure that there is some friction between the conceptual and the world, 
thus avoiding idealism; if conceptual capacities are thoroughly active all 
the way out to the point where, in the Quinean idiom, they touch the world, 
then there is no constraint on their application from without the concep-
tual. But, to have spontaneity restricted so that it does not extend all the 
way out to experience is to fall victim to the Myth of the Given. So, we 
require that some, but not all, aspects of the non-conceptual are common 
to spontaneity, thus making a link but not collapsing the distinction. The 
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short-lived experiential capacities, typified by ostensives, that are required 
to link the separate realms thus are passive but are required to share some 
recognisable feature of the spontaneous in order to perform their theoreti-
cal duty. This content needs to have some real conceptual characteristic in 
order for it to be correctly dubbed, in part, "conceptual"; this must not be 
mere "word-play"4 . What, then, is that which allows experience a flavour of 
the conceptual, of the spontaneous? It is simply being involved, elsewhere, 
in spontaneous judgements and thus having conceptual relations. 
To recap then, the fine-grained experiential capacities that seemed to 
demonstrate an irreconcilable difference between the conceptual and the 
non-conceptual are not insurmountable as the gap is bridged by recalci-
trant experience making the conceptual more sensitive in real-time. It re-
mains a passive act but connects with the conceptual by having rational 
relations forged in spontaneous judgement elsewhere. So, such experien-
tial content is conceptually linked parasitically upon its conceptual use in 
other places. Now, presumably this "other" conceptual usage is mostly in 
the future. If it were not, a history of previous spontaneous usage would 
mean that we would indeed be indulging in mere "word play" in dubbing 
it "non-conceptual" at all. Such a history of participation in spontaneous 
judgement would mean that there was no gap in conceptual and experien-
tial granularity that it would be needed to bridge. If I ostend many times 
a new colour that I am conceptually unable to accommodate, then it be-
comes part of my conceptual apparatus and thus this is modified and the 
ostension looses its non-conceptual character. Indeed, it is not too radical 
to suggest that this is how many concepts are formed. This leaves McDow-
ell forced to say that the necessary spontaneous-like feature of experiential 
content is only such due to its hypothetical use in the future. This is in-
deed mere word-play. One cannot relate A and B by something that has the 
necessary property only hypothetically. That is like saying that x relates A 
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and B because if it were used in a certain way in the future, it would have 
the property that would enable it to do so. The passivity McDowell requires 
to prevent idealism seems damaging to the project of providing more than 
causal links between the ROR and ROL for the simple reason that passive 
content is, ex hypothesi, not rationally integrated and thus not conceptual. 
Thus the link cannot be rational. It seems to be clutching at straws to at-
tempt to render experiential content conceptual by appealing to a future 
active use of the content. If such content is passive, it seems barred from 
becoming conceptual in addition to maintaining its passive nature. If it is 
not passive, the ROR collapses into the ROL and one has bald naturalism. 
After this argument, we need to step back and see what has been said 
regarding the fundamental issue about stratified systems and their ap-
proach to semantics and language. We have seen that the attempt to main-
tain a difference - one that does not lead to idealism - between a level 
of explanation in terms of low-level laws and one in terms of rationality 
and spontaneity is doomed to collapse. This is due to the tensions between 
the requirements of friction with the world and fear of too much friction 
that causes, so to speak, any "higher" level of explanation to melt away. In 
modern semantics and linguistics, we have analogues of the requirement of 
spontaneity in the observation that language seems to be very productive: 
we can create a supposedly infinite variety of sentences. This is exactly 
the modern formalist echo of McDowell's more philosophical concern for 
a realm of ineliminable spontaneity. McDowell's desire for this Realm of 
Reason is exactly the formalists desire for, say, a recursive formalism. The 
formalist has a typical set of features that are supposed to be definitive of 
the higher level of explanation. Compositionality is a favourite. Their task 
is, like McDowell, to keep this while not alienating themselves from the 
attachments to the low-level data which would render them irrelevant to a 
study of human cognition. There is one level, the "low" level of explanation, 
usually in terms of physics, the brain or whatever which must be accommo-
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dated. Additionally, there is supposed to be a "higher" level of explanation 
that accounts for features of the manifestations of the low-level operations. 
A significant characteristic of stratified views is that the higher-level ex-
planations are taken to be ineliminable and are sui generis. This is the 
most important point and indicates that this particular level of explana-
tion demarcates a particularly necessary part whose omission would ren-
der the theory useless. It is mainly the characteristics of the higher level 
of explanation in which the sui generis nature of the system lies. It is an 
essentialism with respect to some of the patterns manifest in our language 
and thought. This essentialism serves a twofold purpose. Firstly, it pro-
vides - the question of whether it does so honestly can be left until later -
a virtual basis of data to be accounted for. We reify the patterns and hold 
them to be data to be explained; inputs to our formal systems. The second 
and more obvious reason why this essentialism of manifest patterns is so 
important is often mentioned; if one's theory is reducible to another, it is 
not as interesting, a whole "depressing" ontology of physical facts is the 
only "real" description if the higher levels are eliminable etc. McDowell, 
indeed, lets slip the latter concern in his comments about the unromantic 
overtones of a collapse of the ROR into the ROL. The formalists must h old 
that there is something that necessarily has characteristics of the formal 
level of explanation which must be invoked in an explan ation of the rela-
tion between mind and the world. This is simply a manifestation of the 
underlying philosophical worry that the central apparent features of mind 
are not to be "explained away" or theoretically reduced but are to be be 
guaranteed by holding a theory that has such apparent properties as be-
ing sui generis. The properties are enshrined in a level of explanation said 
to be irreducible. The common problem is then to relate these sui generis 
properties to the real, empirical world, thus avoiding what McDowell calls 
"rampant Platonism". We have seen that McDowell pushes his ROR so far 
away from the ROL that it is impossible to provide the sort of link that is 
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required in order to make sense of our animal nature; the fact that we are 
embodied and subject to physical law. The ROL is certainly relevant, the 
ROR only tenuously so. In order to strengthen his case, McDowell paints 
a sui generis picture of the ROR so as to contrast it with the ROL but this 
provides for a lacuna between them that he cannot fill and thus he is led 
exactly to a "rampant Platonism" where the ROR stands alone and aloof 
from the world. Formal natural language semantics follows exactly this 
pattern in its insistence on the formal level of explanation. The strictures 
regarding its explanations are such that it has famously been noted that it 
fails in real-world application; the lacuna necessitated in a formal strati-
fied theory is, again, unfillable because the distance required to have two, 
separate parts of the theory is too great to be crossed by something having 
characteristics of both parts without them collapsing into one. Famously, 
recursive formalisms, knowledge-base searching, production system rule-
bases etc. are all at odds with the speed of real human action. One of 
the levels of explanation, it is clear, must go. The ROL is certain. We are 
more confident about the fact that we are subject to the laws of the physi-
cal world than we are about there being a special realm of reasons, a level 
of logical explanation for our mental cogitation. Therefore, it is only rea-
sonable to drop the ROR, allow it to collapse into the ROL and settle for a 
"bald" naturalism, no-matter the irrelevant concerns about the unromance 
ofit. 
6.3 Second Nature 
McDowell proceeds to expand on his solution by introducing the notion of 
"second n ature" which he claims to derive from Aristotle. This is simply 
that our spontaneous judgement is so embedded within our environment 
that it plays as significant a part in our experience as that played by na-
ture, which sit s firmly in the ROL. We can, I think, see this as a reverse 
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of the strategy espoused previously. Before, McDowell was attempting to 
illustrate the r ational links afforded by aspects of experience; he was try-
ing to show that experience has features that link it to the ROR. Here, he 
is arguing that the realm of the conceptual has features that link it to the 
ROL. Our conceptual capacities have the quality of being second nature 
and thus link us to the primary nature of the empirical world. McDowell 
thus sees language as a medium for transmitting shared conceptions that 
become part of our mental furniture; it is primarily a cultural transmis-
sion device rather than a means of communication. The link between the 
ROR and ROL is thus forged in two ways, once by law-bound experience 
sharing some characteristics of the conceptual and once by the conceptual 
possessing law-like characteristics of nature. 
Once again however, this argument only allows for a collapse of the 
ROR into the ROL. This second nature, derived from the ROR, is "natu-
ralised" in experience and thus contributes to the content of experience. 
This, I think, is actually an attractive picture in one respect; it reflects the 
Kantian doctrine that our experience of the world involves more than the 
simple experience of an external reality. The conceptual indistinguishabil-
ity permeates everything. However, it does not reflect the necessary con-
comitant which is that a decomposition into the contribution by the world 
and a contribution by the mind is something that can only be approached 
through a method, highly suspect to modern thinkers, of transcendental 
critique. McDowell aims to demarcate the two while allowing them to be so 
similar as to be mistaken for each other in experience. If the ROR can re-
ally furnish us with a second nature, then how can we establish that there 
is indeed a ROR? Introspection could not help for if it could, this second 
nature, this surrogate empirical reality would not have succeeded in dis-
guising itself enough in order to carry off the link required to firmly embed 
it within our experience. This second nature is certainly not an argument 
for the ROR/ROL distinction. It is something that could not be perceived 
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for that would contradict its very existence. Second nature must always be 
perceived as nature or else it is perceived as artificial. So, the argument 
from second nature is attractive but has little to do with establishing the 
sui generis nature of the ROR. I argue for a different conclusion using the 
concept below. No, the ROR requires the notion of second nature in order to 
provide a link with the ROL otherwise the result is "rampant Platonism". 
So, McDowell is forced into such a position as the following illustrates: 
"Given the notion of second nature, we can say that the way 
our lives are shaped by reason is natural, even while we deny 
that the structure of the space of reasons can be integrated into 
the layout of the realm of law."5 
It appears, then that the ROR is non-natural but acts upon the ROL in a 
natural manner. It is sui generis but its action is fully naturalised. The 
paving of the road to dualism here is more than merely apparent. The 
motivation for this view is clear where on p. 87 of Mind and World we find 
"we cannot capture what it is to possess and employ the un-
derstanding, a faculty of spontaneity, in terms of concepts that 
place things in the realm of law." 
This is one of the central motivations for the entire picture that McDowell 
espouses and it echoes the formalists concern that we cannot capture the 
central features of human languages without a formal system. However, 
the thrust of Kantian idealism is such that an argument from the features 
of the explanandum can only ever establish a much weaker claim such as 
"we cannot capture what it seems like to possess and employ 
the understanding, a faculty of spontaneity, in terms of concepts 
that place things in the realm of law." 
This is uncontroversial and follows simply from the epistemological opac-
ity of the origins of our perceptions. Quite simply, an agent's account of 
5(McDowell 1994) pp. 87 - 88 
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his perceptions is no evidence for anything other than how things seems 
to be and that is no evidence at all for a theory that wishes to establish 
the existence of sui generis but necessarily experientially indistinguish-
able realms of the mind. Formal semantics echoes this exactly in taking 
language to be evidence for the mechanisms giving rise to language. We 
seem to be explaining X when we perceive features in X and then design 
a level of explanation that is sensitive to those features. Really, we are 
merely redescribing the features that we perceive and bolstering up the 
level of explanation achieved by reification of the features that are mani-
fest in the output. 
Second nature is a useful concept as it embodies what Quine terms 
the "pollution" of the stream of empirical experience by every preceding 
experience. It embodies Kant's ''conditions of sensible experience". It con-
tributes to an epistemological opacity of causal determinations but can in-
dicate nothing about ontology. The mistake is to concentrate too much on 
the ''second" rather than "nature". The former seems to suggest something 
masquerading as the real thing. However, nothing is as clear as this. We 
have terrible difficulty in ordering things according to their "naturalness". 
What are the natural kinds? Some people think that chairs and tables are 
more "really part of nature" than the legal system, plastic bags or justice 
but no-one has a good idea of what is really natural and what is not. Since 
Kant, we hardly know what to make of the question. So, to have a second 
nature that is clearly "second", is to slip a distinctly incongruous element 
into a theory which claims epistemological homogeneity. One cannot have 
a truly "second" nature without some way of telling fakes from the real 
object and we cannot do this by taking our cue from the perceptions that 
result from the indistinguishable causes. Perceptions have patterns, lan-
guage has patterns but these need be no guide at all to the patterns of the 
causes of these patterns. The main reasons that formal semanticists and 
many philosophers have been fooled into using language or the structure 
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of thoughts as a guide is simply because they are not aware of the applica-
bility of ways of generating patterns from unlike patterns. Formal seman-
ticists utilise systems designed around the notion of a canonical language, 
motivated by shortcomings with natural languages. Not very surprising 
then that the patterns their formalisms show are patterns mirrored in the 
language structure they claim to explain. McDowell sees patterns in the 
spontaneous actions of judgement; he sees a structured conceptual realm. 
He does not see this structure in the ROL and thus requires a sui generis 
level of explanation to accommodate these seemingly unique patterns. 
" . .. movements of limbs without concepts are mere happenings, not 
expressions of agency"6 according to McDowell. This is a tacit and common 
overstatement of the rejection of behaviourism. It is more a definition than 
a declarative statement. Movements oflimbs are taken to be expressions of 
agency regardless of whether they are "really" without concepts millions of 
times every day by children watching actors at the cinema, children play-
ing with toys and pretending to react to the "actions" of other toys, people 
fooled by shadows which, presumably, move "without concepts". If these 
cases are "mistakes" and a misapplication of the notion of "agency", then 
it is a mistake that is generally inscrutable in the manifest actions. The 
idea that actions without concepts are accidents comes from Kant and was 
meant to indicate the all-pervasive nature of the categories of sensible intu-
ition. Since all of our actions are permeated necessarily with the categories 
of the mind, we do not, by exhaustive enumeration of cases, know any other 
way of talking about action that does not involve concepts. However, this 
is not to say that such an argument can establish that the concepts con-
stitute a sui generis level of explanation. This would be a reification that 
went beyond the implied weaker claim that the concept of "action" involved 
the concept of "concept". I may not be able to explain the basics of thermo-
dynamics to beginning physics students without the concept of indivisible 
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elastic atoms. This does not, of course, mean that such things exist or even 
that they are thereafter necessary for anything other than this pedagogi-
cal task. McDowell's position is more relevant to what to call something 
when we err, it does not establish a sui generis realm over and above "mere 
happenings" since it fails to establish a rational as opposed to a causal link 
between the ROR and the ROL and thus that there really are two different 
realms at all. Given the epistemological opacity of the causes of percep-
tions, we might stipulate the difference between components of actions or 
thoughts; those involved in the ROR and those involved in the ROL. H ow-
ever, these can never become apparent to us epistemically since, if they 
did, the connections that prevent rampant Platonism or bald naturalism 
would disappear. We avoid these two only at the price of having no possi-
ble empirical basis for a theory holding a division between the two realms. 
The only basis for a theory wishing to hold a stratified view is to hope that 
patterns resulting from the interaction between the putative realms are 
indicative of their essentially differen t natures. I turn now to an account 
of how an attention to modern brain theory, placed firmly in McDowell's 
Realm of Law, can allow an explanation of manifest patterns that does not 
necessitate a higher sui generis level of explanation. 
6.4 Patterns from Invariants 
It is a simple idea that the patterns that we perceive in something need 
not be causally efficacious. Patterns and regularity can fit data but do 
not thereby imply anything about the causes of the data. Quine famously 
champions this piece of common sense with respect to Chomskian linguis-
tics7 but it is a common problem within the areas under discussion. We 
are tempted to ground the patterns in our data we take to be important 
in something we understand and if we cannot understand a certain way 
7See especially (Quine 1972) 
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of building these patterns, we invent a level of explanation that enshrines 
the patterns sui generis. The geometrical picture of brain operation given 
in chapter 5 relies on a general mathematical model, tensor analysis, that 
requires that the invariants that define the systems are real invariants. 
That is, an invariant across the abstract spaces employed to process infor-
mation in the brain must have a corollary in the real world; there must be 
some invariant in the environment. This is expressed more intuitively by 
saying that the central informational features that characterise our brain's 
activity must have an anchor as the mathematics presupposes this. Thus, 
such a model is committed to a minimal ontology of "invariants". It is com-
mitted to no more than this as the only thing common, by definition, to the 
spaces employed by the brain in its operation are unchanging r elations. It 
is only these that are required to be real for the mathematics to make any 
sense. This is ontology by reduction. We strip away those concepts we find 
evidence to suppose are imposed by the geometries imposed by the brain 
and we embrace what is left. This is an empirical enterprise. If we trust 
the work of Pellionisz and Llinas, then we already have an account of how 
space and time are imposed by the geometrical structures and processes 
that the brain employs in order to implement sensory-motor coordination. 
Given the considerations involved in labelling the axes of a geometrical 
brain-space (see Chapter 7) we should be extremely sceptical about being 
able to give convenient words to describe the basic feature contributing to 
our language and thoughts. 
Now, this is strongly Kantian as abstract invariant relations are not 
the sort of thing easily classifiable. The sorts of invariants in complex ge-
ometries are, as explained in chapter 5, highly unintuitive and certainly 
without names in the usual medium-sized object-ontology of common sense. 
The invariants of the transformations between different geometrical spaces 
give rise to geometries. These geometries are, I argue, exactly that which 
shape our experiences and perceptions; they are Kant's conditions of sen-
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sible experience. Now, the patterns we see in our experience are, on this 
model, the result of the underlying invariants of the system. It may be a 
constant ratio of one informational ingredient to another, it may be a very 
complex constraint on the possible information from a particular source, 
as restricted by other sources. The famous lateral inhibition effect of the 
eyes is a simple example of this and there are many more that are common 
currency in basic psychology and biology textbooks; our speech is not parti-
tioned phonetically into the neat word divisions we phenomenally perceive, 
our skin does not register temperature in a linear manner commensurate 
with the usual scales etc. To give an overview of the lateral inhibition case, 
our eyes exaggerate the light/dark boundaries in our visual field consider-
ably; the world is "actually'' more blurry than we see it. Thus a ratio of 
light/dark is kept constant (invariant) on boundaries by a relation between 
the activities of the cells bordering the boundary reflection in the eye. So, 
this invariant defines a geometry with, in this case, a non-standard met-
ric which increases the perceived "distance" between the light intensities 
of areas on different sides of the light/dark boundary. Note that this in-
variant could in no way be determined merely from the phenomenology of 
the case. Holding things invariant is an important thing for animals to be 
able to do as it ensures a regularity in the environment one can exploit. It 
matters little if the invariant is "really" there as this cannot be determined 
by the animal. The survival value of being able to rely on a constant, how-
ever caused, is enormous; maybe an animal's eyes filter everything so that 
it appears uniformly dull at all light intensities. This is not what happens 
"in the real world" but affords a huge advantage when hunting or escap-
ing in tree-covered environments where one might burst from cover and 
into sunlight many times. Invariants defi.ne phenomenology and thus are 
transparent to it. The discovery of lateral inhibition and all of these other 
examples of distorting invariants were empirically afforded by studying, 
for example, the cells of the eye or the transduction of the skin. They could 
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hardly have been discovered any other way. This is a classic case of the 
necessity of empirical study of the "low-level" of a system in determining 
effects that are the result of the physical make-up of the system. This is a 
form of "embodied analyticity" where the composition of the system ubiq-
uitously determines its outputs. It is, so to speak, a matter of definition of 
the physical structure that perceptions are as they are. If one is to revert to 
the Kantian notion of analyticity, the subject of a particular instance of an 
animal is contained in the predicate of "being so and so type of creature". 
The first moral of this picture is that patterns may be determined in ex-
tremely complex ways by nonintuitive elements such as abstract relational 
invariants. This means that a simple sui generis treatment of language, 
semantics and thought is certainly not exhaustive of the possibilities for 
explanation in this area even though the radically unintuitive nature of 
the explanational elements in the sort of theory here advocated may be 
construed, irrelevantly, as counting against it. As detailed in chapter 5, 
certain types of information, so called "contravariantly" composed informa-
tion, cannot be broken into its constituents due to their interdependence. 
The particular interdependence is a result of the geometry of the partic-
ular space which is, in turn, a result of the invariants underlying it. For 
example, the original position of a particular coloured ball in a bag of fifty 
similar balls after vigorous shaking is not determinable from the final con-
figuration, even if we know all of the laws that govern elastic collisions. 
The relation between final and original position is so dependent on those 
of all other balls, we do not have the information to determine this. So 
it is with language and thought; the relation between the patterns of our 
language and thought and their realisation in the brain are necessarily in-
scrutable from the patterns themselves since the elements of the pattern 
are so interdependent. It is my view that interdependence is captured in 
the approach here advocated by the notion of contravariant information 
which means that the sources of the patterns manifest in our language 
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and thought are not determinable from the surface data. Any account of 
the origins of regularities in language and thought must, therefore, be re-
stricted to an empirical study of the low-level geometries and invariants 
that the human brain is sensitive to, just as in the case of the discovery of 
lateral inhibition. 
6.5 Rethinking Second Na ture 
What is left of the desirable features of McDowell's Aristotelean notion of 
"second nature" in a picture such as this? It gave us a way of expressing 
Kant's observation that the origins of the objects of our perceptions were 
not dividable into "world" and "non-world". The point is that nature, while 
possibly divided ontologically, is not divided epistemically. This is an im-
portant point. A general conception of the brain as implementing complex 
geometries requires real invariants in the environment. The crucial thing 
about the notion of an invariant is that is it essentially a relational con-
cept. Invariants are relations between things like angles, length ratios, 
areas, volumes etc. Now, an invariant relation can hold between, so to 
speak, anything. It is a constant relation between information. Informa-
tion, in turn, is absolutely neutral with respect to our everyday ontologies. 
Information, geometrically expressed, is the same whether it is, to us, "of" 
a table, a chair, a convention, a fashion, a contemporary intellectual is-
sue and so on. The patterns we see in our mentation are numerous but 
do not necessarily have anything to do with the organisation of the brain 
processes that give rise to them. Information and the invariants of its mul-
tifarious relations in a given system are neutral to our classifications. This 
is simply a more precise way of expressing the common empiricist doctrine 
of "raw data"; it is simply all we can be committed to when we divorce from 
our own conditions of experience. So, the notion of second nature is a useful 
mnemonic to remind us that invariants in the environment are as much a 
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part of "nature" as anything else we might take to be. Second nature is 
only "second" in the classifications that result from this indeterminacy of 
the origins of our experiences. 
This moves us onto the central point of these observations. A common 
tactic in the face of Kantian considerations or the inadequacy of formal 
structures is to hold on to a stratified theory and to allow that the r elation 
between the parts of the theory is very complex. The parts are interdepen-
dent, as in McDowell's supposed relation between ROR and ROL. It is the 
same in traditional semantics. The relation between "meaning'' and con-
text or "pragmatics" is glossed as complex in order to provide some reason 
why the theory faces problems in accounting for certain data. This view 
is completely backwards. The interdependence, to have any plausibility in 
the light of Kant and modern brain theory, must be so close, that there 
is no non-empirical8 way of determining what the elements said to be in-
terdependent are. An interdependence of information complex enough to 
support semantic life prevents a casual or a priori specification of the un-
derlying parts and sources of the information. It is not something than can 
augment an ailing stratified system in order to give a name to its failures. 
In the case of McDowell, we cannot say that the ROR and the ROL are 
separate but closely linked as a link close enough to account for a reason-
able interpretation of second nature blocks any philosophical attempts to 
conclude their very existence and separateness. If the brain is information 
neutral with regard to its inputs, as it must be at a low-level - discrimi-
nation of source of impulse is not something that neurons etc. do - and its 
manifestations are not thereby sortable into those originating in the ROR 
but naturalised to appear to come from the ROL, and those directly ema-
nating from the ROL, what hope is there for a theory that starts from such 
8This point must be carefully understood in the light of the comments about lateral 
inhibition above. Empirical work may tell us about the mechanisms contributing to our 
manifestations and this can provide the only route to a meaningful analysis of them. This 
is discussed further below. 
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a distinction? The crux of the problem is that there is no way to give an 
argument for a stratified theory based on the phenomenology or manifest 
structure of perception and experience. Empirical investigation into the 
invariances defined by the processing are more promising but the power 
of the geometrical and mathematical systems commonly employed is such 
that stratified theories such as McDowell's never arise. Since the structure 
of the manifestations of a systems are not taken as sui generis features to 
be explained, there is no need to pay lip service to such features and thus 
no need to maintain an irrelevant concern for intuitive models, theories 
which embody the features to be explained and a priori constructions of 
features. 
6.6 Analytic Truth and Noumenal Meanings 
Quine's landmark "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" claims to demonstrate that 
stratified theories in semantics require an analytic/synthetic distinction in 
order to demarcate between contributions to meaning from the system on 
the one hand and the world on the other. He claims that this distinction is 
essentially unclear and thus stratified theories of the type he is concerned 
with9 are without basis. This is akin to that which I claim: the contribution 
of the world and the mind are essentially indivisible due to the way that 
information is processed in the brain. This division is utterly inscrutable 
in the manifestations of the brain and thus language regularities are of no 
use whatever in properly explaining human semantics. In natural science, 
we have a matter to be right or wrong about, according to Quine. We have 
such a rich set of controls and background assumptions that we can hold 
certain things constant in order to examine the independent effects of cer-
tain phenomena etc. In semantics, we have nothing to be wrong or right 
9Quine talks of intensional linguistic semantics which is a paradigm of the stratified 
system in Cognitive Science with its level of "propositional" representation. This is, for 
example, a direct philosophical offshoot of the tenor of McDowell's ROR. 
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about. We are looking for "meanings" but need them, in turn, in order for 
the entire enquiry to have any constraints. The point is that semantics has 
no stable information, the source of which we can be sure, while sciences 
have such a rich background, much can be held as stable in order to lever 
new experience into place. The useful "facts" in enquiry are those which 
allow us to determine whether our results come from our methods or th e 
world. According to Quine, despite underdetermination, we have enough 
coherency to be able to make this distinction do some work. In semantics, 
however, we do not have the standards, because of the famous indetermi-
nacy of translation which guarantees an infinity of possible ways of slicing 
up the world/word boundary, and thus have no "facts" to help the enquiry. 
I have expressed this by arguing for the impossibility of decomposing infor-
mation embodied in a contravariant manner. Indeed, the ways of breaking 
up such information into components is vastly underdetermined unless one 
possesses the key to the invariants of a system. As mention in an earlier 
chapter, these are not obvious at the level of their manifestation and thus I 
claim that the geometrical picture presented supports fully Quine's claims 
in respect of translation. 
It is well here to examine Katz's argument that linguistics, of all of 
the approaches that claim to be able to distinguish analytic and synthetic, 
succeeds where others fail. If Katz is correct, there is indeed something to 
be gleaned from manifest patterns and therefore a stratified theory may be 
based on such. Unfortunately, Katz's argument is completely circular. He 
argues that modern decompositional semantics provides the only sensible 
manner in which to define analyticity as it gives a systematic meaning to 
the Kantian formulation of this in terms of the subject being contained in 
the predicate. 
"Relative to an assignment of decompositional representa-
tions to sentences, we can define analyticity in terms of the se-
mantic representations of the full predicate and each of its terms 
but one being formally contained in the semantic representation 
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of the remaining term."10 
The notable first phrase gives the entire game away. Need it be pointed 
out that a stratified theory cannot be justified on the basis of a successful 
demarcation of analyticity, and thereby a possible account of the import of 
manifest features of language, if it rests upon "an assignment of decom-
positional representations"? This, after all, is just a stratified theory; the 
very one which assumes a level of propositional representation akin to Mc-
Dowell's ROR. Katz is rather casual in remarking that "The first thing to 
note about such a definition of analyticity is that it makes no reference 
to thought processes ... ". Not explicitly, granted, but the kind of repre-
sentational system he envisages is exactly that, supposedly captured in a 
formal system designed to picture language-neutral content as a spoke in 
the wheel of a general grammar. Katz is keen on the generally systematic 
nature of the formalism he envisages. It is this which is supposed to cap-
ture the division between the contributions from the world and that from 
the language itself. However, the systematicity of the formalism he advo-
cates is not something that is derived independently from that which it is 
applied to, as in the case of the physicists application of mathematics. It 
is desired because of and indeed derived from the imperfections of natural 
languages for scientific pursuits. The systematism of the formal is guar-
anteed to be able to make distinctions that fit language as it is distilled 
from that very language. There is no surprise that we can draw an ana-
lytic/synthetic distinction in a formalism designed to do violence to natural 
language precisely because the latter cannot make such a distinction. 
It may be objected that the implications of a general geometrical the-
ory of brain processing imply nothing stronger than the conclusion that the 
stratification inherent in the relation between mind and world, thought 
and language is inscrutable, but real nonetheless. We may not be satis-
10(Katz 1990)p. 190 
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fled that the current epistemic is the boundary of our possible knowledge 
in this matter. Maybe the issue regarding the stratification language is 
merely underdetermined rather than intractable. This is Katz's view and 
means that, as he puts it, semantics and the philosophical positions un-
derpinning it are in no worse position than underdetermined theories in 
the natural sciences. He asks why we might not allow ourselves noumenal 
meanings that we cannot get to but that are still real in some sense. The 
difference is simply that underdetermination requires something to be un-
determined about. This something must be a central high-inertia element 
of our Quinean web-like ontology. We have physical reality in the case of 
natural science but we have nothing in the case of semantics. As detailed 
in chapter 4, formal semantics simply is not richly embedded enough in our 
conceptual framework in order for it to have points of leverage that would 
enable it to claim a subject matter fundamental to our understanding of 
human cognition. We have no evidence for the existence of "meanings" 
other than the dictates of the formal systems that sometimes like to claim 
that they have scientifically suggested the existence 0£ In turn, these sys-
tems require the existence of meanings in order to justify themselves. In 
semantic formalism, as for McDowell, there is only one possible outcome; 
a huge petitio principii. The stratified view that we would like to conclude 
from the manifestations of our thought and language has nothing to moti-
vate it other than patterns based ultimately on a singular explanation that 
obviates stratification. A reasonable motivation for a stratified view would 
require a division between informational contribution from the world and 
that from the brain but a distinction needs something solid to push against. 
The rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction removes this possibility 
and formalists such as Katz are left begging the question by arguing that 
formalism saves the distinction which is then used to save formalism's cen-
tral feature: the stratified view. 
Chapter 7 
Geometry and Semantics 
Since the advent of connectionism, there has been growing interest in dis-
tributed models of information processing. That this interest has spread 
throughout the AI and Cognitive Science communities is in part due to a 
desire to compete with the dominant symbolic paradigm but is also borne 
of a recognition of the power of such models. The surge of interest in this 
direction is, perhaps more modestly, a resurgence: as long ago as the 1960s, 
there were attempts to develop geometrical models of certain semantic phe-
nomena 1 but these were more concerned with the task of increasing the 
usefulness of artificial languages for use in the philosophy of science. 
In recent years, there has been more and more interest in exploiting 
broadly geometrical systems in order to regiment order into the modelling 
of human language semantics2. The main theme of this chapter is that 
most recent attempts of semanticists to embrace aspects of geometrical rep-
resentation fall foul of some of the most undesirable features of the sym-
bolic paradigm they seek to compete with. These failings are, as I shall 
show, examples of stratificational assumptions fundamentally the same as 
those in traditional formal natural language semantics. It is interesting to 
1(van Fraassen 1966, van Fraassen 1967) 
2Recent accounts have included (Gardenfors 1990, Gardenfors 1993b, Gardenfors 
1993a, Churchland 1986a, Churchland 1986b, Crangle & Suppes 1989, Jackendoff 1988) 
» 137 « 
» 138 « 
note that these failings are less apparent in related research in psychol-
ogy. For instance, Roger Shepard has been pursuing research into concept 
formation and use for many years using quite sophisticated geometrical 
models. See e.g. (Shepard 1980). However, the concerns of the psychologist 
are different to the concerns of the semanticist: the latter more with the 
lessons to be learned from the native speaker rather than the acquisition 
by the inchoate. If a "geometrical semantics" is to constitute a worthwhile 
direction of study in contrast to the traditional symbolic program, it is im-
portant to identify and divest of the elements that are objectionable in such 
models. 
The task of developing a "geometrical" account of semantics is a diffi-
cult one but one that needs to be tackled if we are to fully appreciate the 
basic assumptions involved in explaining human language and cognition. 
As an example of the advantages of this approach, let us outline some early 
steps by Peter Gardenfors (Gardenfors 1990) who has shown how a geo-
metrical notion of "concept" can interestingly account for the tendency of 
humans to choose, to use Nelson Goodman's terminology, projectable over 
non-projectable predicates. This is a problem for a symbolic semantics as 
the extensional definition of predicates that lies at the heart of such ac-
counts is neutral with respect to the actual contents of a given extension. If 
predicates are defined by extensions then the criteria for choosing between 
possible predicates to describe something is the task of choosing between 
extensions. The projectability problem is exactly the problem of deciding 
between extensions. The problem can be formulated in a simplified version 
simply in the following manner. 
Suppose we have a green emerald in front ofus. What predicates apply 
to it? "Green" is obvious but extensionally adequate is also "grue" which is 
true of something that is green now and blue tomorrow. Which predicate 
should apply? Green or grue? Since predicates are sets of objects in the 
classical tradition, does this emerald belong to the green or the grue set? 
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Green is said to be a projectable predicate as it is projectable over all times. 
Humans, as a matter of fact, rarely choose predicates like "grue" that in-
volve a time-coordinate. Why? Traditional semantics has no answer to 
this as all extensions are theoretically equivalent. By construing concepts 
as convex regions of conceptual space, Gardenfors avoids the projectabil-
ity problem by making projectability, in effect, a structural feature of a 
conceptual space rather than a conclusion of a symbolic inference. If one 
conceives of a conceptual space describing the colours and having a time-
axis, it can be seen that "grue" occupies two unconnected areas of the space 
whilst "green" does not. 
Figure 7.1: Projectable predicates are convex regions of a conceptual space. 
An initial important point to note here is that we do not need to infer 
that grue is not a sound predicate: it follows from the structure of the geo-
metrical spaces that form the basis of the conceptual processing. I believe 
that this sort of approach comes very close to addressing the problems so 
forcefully expressed by Hubert Dreyfus in his classic (Dreyfus 1992). Drey-
fus was one of the first to bring to the attention of AI workers, the fact that 
the storage and processing needed to model human cognition in a symbolic 
paradigm is utterly implausible as an explanation of how humans m anage 
the task. Dreyfus draws from Heidegger, Husserl and Merleau-Ponty to 
argue for a primacy of context that is impossible to store as explicit facts 
and is resistant to traditional approaches to inference because 
• The facts required for human inference are seldom explicit. 
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• The facts are never statically meaningful. They never have an invari-
ant meaning between situations. 
• It is therefore never possible to enumerate all of the facts necessary 
to perform inference in any formal symbolic system. 
The sort of model proposed by Gardenfors demonstrates that the "facts" can 
be seen as the result of the structural arrangement of aspects of the brain. 
The main problem with the traditional treatment of inference and predi-
cates is one of plausibility. The number of facts one would need to store 
in order to be able to make reasonable inferences about e.g. the objects 
in a small room is more than even the most liberal sub-neuronal model of 
information storage would sanction. Work on trying to implement "con-
texts" and "presuppositions" have sought to overcome this with notions of 
"default reasoning", "contextual hierarchies" and the like. These strategies 
traditionally appear as lists of static information u sed to restrict inference 
in one way or another. If Dreyfus is right, these lists are nothing to do 
with real contextual information and are necessarily incomplete. The grue 
problem highlights this well as it shows that the resolution of a problem 
to do with choice between extensional equivalents cannot be solved by ap-
pealing to fundamentally extensional theories. In addition, one encounters 
an infinite regress of contexts as one has to appeal to higher and higher 
level contexts to decide what information is relevant at a given time. This 
is a fundamental point and I shall expand upon it further. 
A choice between alternative statements of facts might depend upon 
other facts. Possible alternatives between these further facts might, in turn 
depend on other facts. In the end, however, a decision requires grounding 
if it is ever to manifest. If we learn anything from the grue paradox, we 
learn that facts require something of a different character to determine 
them. Essentially, we need some structure in the framework in which facts 
become facts for the indeterminacy to halt. Something must force us to 
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stop at accepting one fact out of a possible variety, of accepting green as 
opposed to the infinity of non-projectable predicates. For Dreyfus, it is the 
"context". One might say: a context is something that gives facts specific 
meanings and is not something created out of facts. Context precedes facts; 
context creates facts. To model contextual information as lists of facts or 
presuppositions is precisely preceding the horse with the cart. The prob-
lem here is that the symbolic paradigm sees "context" in a very different 
light to the sense in which Dreyfus means it. Context for the symbolist is 
more symbols whereas, for Dreyfus, the whole thing that makes context 
tractable and meaningful is that it is not. This is another, more philosoph-
ical expression of the point raised in chapter 5, that we must act in real 
time. We must choose, the choice process must end and it is not clear how 
this can happen if a choice depends upon something about which there is 
as much choice as the first thing. 
The difficulty with this and one of the main reasons why Dreyfus is so 
vehemently attacked is that we simply have little idea how to approach the 
issues after we have accepted that the symbolic paradigm's notion of con-
text is not what he was looking for. The whole goal of computational imple-
mentation and modelling in the traditional paradigm is made possible by 
the explicit delineation of things. One cannot use the context to compute 
if one does not h ave a computer-readable form of the context. There is an 
alternative to having to explicitly store facts if we countenance the idea of 
a structured conceptual space. In a geometrical model of information pro-
cessing, we have at our disposal a very powerful set of ways of expressing 
information dependencies and relations. Information dependencies can be 
a result of the structure of the space and thus part of the very basis of our 
conceptions; this is much closer to the sense of "context" we need as it is 
not expressible in terms of the facts it will define. In a sense, this means 
that the starting point of semantics is not "basic" units - semantic values 
of syntactically simple parts, but rather the structures in which the puta-
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tively simple parts are embedded. This casts doubt on the notion of com-
positionality since, on this picture, semantics of a "part" is possessed only 
derivatively from surrounding contexts and compositionality is exactly the 
reverse of this. 
This has important ramifications for understanding the notion of an-
alyticity. Given a structure imposed by a certain space, relations between 
elements in such a space are such by deflnition of the space. Indeed Gare-
denfors says 
" . . . it follows from the topological structure of different qual-
ity dimensions that certain statements will become analytically 
true (in the sense that they are independent of empirical consid-
erations)."3 
This is encouraging as the computational explosion of performing tra-
ditional inference on machines much faster than human processing speeds 
is well-known evidence that people are not likely performing classical in-
ferences when they cogitate. If the conclusions they reach are simply a 
result of informational dependencies enshrined in the intricacies of the 
spaces implemented by the brain to process information, nothing like in-
ference needs to take place. One can see why Dreyfus talks of humans 
just "seeing" answers and "focusing'' on things. Thus, I think that the key 
to understanding human information processing is more a case of under-
standing the way in which the information is stored and used rather than 
concentrating on static interpretations of "meanings" and how they can be 
combined. The hypothesis is that the central things about our semantic us-
age must have a basis in the structure of the system employed to process 
the information otherwise supposing that we are explaining how humans 
perform such tasks is at odds with at least the computational requirements 
of our model. I say ((at least" as I think that without this, it is at odds with 
the philosophical requirements too. 
3(Gardenfors 1993a) p.9 
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7. 1 Some Geometrical Theories 
There has been little work in semantics examining what may be deemed 
to be "geometrical" theories. A geometrical theory is one in which the sys-
tem used to model semantic relations, combinations and values is repre-
sented as some kind of space of possible valued n-tuples. Each point and 
possibly area or volume would correspond to some semantic feature. For 
example, we may have three dimensions labelled "Number of Legs", "Fur 
density" and "Height". Maybe "dog'' might be a region for which the values 
of these dimensions falls within certain limits. Taking a cue from physics, 
one might suppose a much more general space with more abstract labels for 
the axes involving what you take to be the primary qualities shared by all 
things and hope to delineate everything in that space. Perhaps you might 
choose "atomic mass", "space-time coordinates" and "velocity" as your di-
mensions. This is unlikely to distinguish, semantically speaking, a book 
from a chair however. It is clear then, that a large part of the evaluation of 
a geometrical approach will depend on what it chooses to label its axes. It 
is, in effect, the same problem as what decomposition to give to a seman-
tically complex element in the traditional approach and this is an area we 
shall return to examine shortly. 
Paul Churchland espouses a view in which multi-dimensional spaces 
(hyperspaces) might contain hypersurfaces on which, points are all of the 
grammatical sentences of a language. Further, 
" ... the logical relations between them [would be] reflected 
as spatial relations of some kind."4 
Here we have a geometrical model that seeks to be able to account for the 
usual concerns of semantics in a new way. It is a way that Churchland 
hopes might provide a reduction of the familiar Chomskian picture. The 
relations between semantic units would be seen as geometrical relations. 
4(Churchland 1986a) 
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We are considerably more informed regarding the brain's implementation 
of these than its supposed implementation of any of the formalists tradi-
tional theoretical entities and processes. Of course, this would only be a re-
duction of the familiar picture if the basic elements of this picture were not 
part of the system being reduced. So, Churchland is careful to choose "ob-
jective" and blatantly brain-level qualities for the dimensions of the spaces 
that he proposes. For example, his canonical example is Land's colour cube 
wherein the three dimensions are Hz scales corresponding to the amount 
of red, green or blue in a particular colour. Similarity of colour in our per-
ceptions is explained as metrical distance in the colour space. The first 
problem that results from choosing such labels for the axes of a space is 
that the common problems regarding qualia arise. Basically, to take such 
empirically fundamental attributes as frequencies as the labels of the axes 
of a semantic space, is to suggest a fairly bland sort of reductionism that 
seems to reduce things to features so inessential, they fail to demarcate be-
tween experiences. This is just the usual qualia inversion problem. If my 
experience of green is your experience of red, then knowing that green is a 
certain triple of frequencies and red another different set helps not at all 
to distinguish between these two experiences. This is because the relation 
between the Hz and the phenomenal descriptions seems to be completely 
contingent. It is hard to see how the phenomenal result of the combination 
of an n-tuple of basic, physical dimensions could be linked to those dimen-
sions in any way that would make sense of semantic similarity. In the same 
way, the notion of metrical distance is of no use in explaining our phenom-
enal perceptions of similarity as this relation is also contingent. The point 
is forcefully expressed by Fodor and Lepore in their critique of Churchland. 
They argue that the dimensions must be related, in some non-contingent 
way, to the content of the phenomenal perception otherwise the link be-
tween the explanans and the explanandum is too weak to avoid even basic 
concerns about qualia. 
» 145 « 
There is a point of value here from Fodor and Lepore that will be be 
discussed more below. It is to do with the types of label that will occur on 
the dimensions of the spaces. Their point about the contingency of the val-
ues of non-semantic labels is ill-founded however. If the relation between 
the phenomenal qualities and the dimensions of the underlying space is 
not contingent, then one explains nothing - one merely defines. Fodor and 
Lepore intend to have semantic relations accounted for in terms of other se-
mantic terms. They would rather see the dimensions labelled with seman-
tic labels that could contribute to the content of the concepts defined by the 
space. However, the "content", as they see it, is the usual propositional at-
titude notion of content and thus the relation between the dimensions and 
the points in the space must be necessary, given a suitable compositional 
treatment. It is clear that Fodor and Lepore are failing to make the con-
ceptual shift necessary to accommodate Churchland's geometrical theory. 
This is fuelled, however, by Churchland's desire to accommodate some of 
the desiderata of the formalist approach; he would like to account for lan-
guage in terms of "grammatical sets of utterances" and "logical relations". 
However, Churchland employs basic features simply not suited to the task 
of doing this. The tools of the formalist have built into them certain as-
sumptions regarding language (compositionality, truth functionality etc.). 
In addition, they have certain goals in mind (adequate grammars etc.). 
Churchland is making the mistake of desiring the latter without wanting 
to use the former. In their critique, Fodor and Lepore are correct in chastis-
ing Churchland for attempting to build the formalist goal out of parts not 
suited to the task. However, their own conception of his mistakes goes too 
far in arguing that the problem is the contingency of the relation between 
the parts and the whole. Fodor and Lepore seem to require that we must 
have an answer to the question of "why'' do we think, say, one word means 
something like another word or one colour looks more like green than red. 
Thus, the connection between the basic theoretical posits of a system and 
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their linguistic or cognitive manifestation must be more than contingent. 
It is not clear why we need to answer this question. It is simply just part 
of the way our brain is built that certain things are true of us and thus the 
"why" question needs either no answer or one that merely describes the 
structures that lead to the manifestations. A "why" question to a formalist 
is really only answered by showing a decomposition of "meanings" in a for-
mal system and thus there is no surprise that Fodor and Lepore think that 
Churchland has not answered the question. He does not, in fact, think it is 
important. That is the whole thrust of his Eliminativism. 
Nevertheless, Fodor and Lepore have a good point when they say that 
Churchland's geometrical theory results merely in "semantics by stipula-
tion". If the dimensions of a space are low-level physical features and are 
thus non-semantic, then how do we determine what is represented by the-
oretical components of the theory? For example, why does a particular 
semantic construct become represented in the theory as a region rather 
than a point or a line? We cannot explain this by reference to the semantic 
features as these are traditionally determined by their contents and the 
dimensions give no clue as to this, as mentioned above. The dimensions 
might cause a certain mental state but only their content can classify them 
properly. Thus, we must merely stipulate what geometrical features corre-
spond to what semantic features and this is, according to Fodor and Lepore, 
ludicrous and unempirical. This is a point well taken since there is no way 
of mapping geometry to semantics in this way that is not governed simply 
by the desire to make it all work. Since this is exactly the main part of 
the basis on which I criticised formal semantics in Chapter 3, I can hardly 
endorse Churchland's position here. 
The way out of this is to realise that a move to a geometrical picture 
is one that requires rather more than a shift in terminology. It requires 
a fundamental change in the conception of methodology in Cognitive Sci-
ence. Fodor's approach is typically "top-down" in that he takes for granted 
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what is to be explained and attempts to do so. He has started with a prob-
lem and seeks to solve it . The problem is to find out what the basis of 
the manifest patterns of language and thought are. This is done by taking 
the patterns as data and attempting to account for them. Churchland is 
in an unpleasant position as he alludes to similar top-down goals but uses 
rather bottom-up tools. These tools are designed to show how patterns are 
constructed; the patterns are the conclusion, not the premise5 . A move to-
wards removing this problem is to drop the requirements that the formalist 
program forces on us. Compositionality is one which drives Fodor's theoris-
ing and one which I think can be relaxed. This is discussed in Chapter 4. 
However, there is a more important point in relation to Fodor's biases that 
it is germane to discuss. 
Mental states are only classified by their contents if we believe that 
being able to understand the classification is important. It is important if 
you would like to have the usual solution to the qualia inversion problem. 
You show how the states are actually differentiated by showing the steps 
by which the states are constructed; by analysing their "content". But the 
notion of "content" is hardly something obvious. "Content" is something 
that we abstract from the surface manifestations oflanguage and thus the 
assumption is that such manifest patterns are a guide to the actual make-
up of a mental state. But what evidence do we use in order to decide upon 
an an alysis of the content of a state? We are guided by the formalism we 
are using and the way in which it is designed to split up the patterns . A 
propositional calculus chops into larger pieces than a predicate; modern 
logics make still finer distinctions (see my remarks on Katz's attitude to-
wards this in Chapter 3). The formalism decides what is to count as a 
pattern - predicate/argument pairs are not a pattern in propositional logic 
5See p . 419 of Patricia Churchland's Neurophilosophy where this consideration of"top-
down" vs "bottom-up" methodology is briefly noted. She too does not see the problems, 
however, of combining the top-down aspirations with the bottom-up tools. 
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for example - and thus decides on the evidence. If the formalism decides 
on the evidence, then the formalism decides on the "content" of a mental 
state. Classification of mental states is therefore dependent on the for-
malism used to perform the classification. This is much worse than the 
underdetermination of the natural sciences as there is no observation, or 
empirical base of any sort. It is entirely faked by the choice of formalism: 
see Chapter 8. So, the top-down approach in semantics is a methodological 
bugbear that requires no loyalty on Churchland's part as it conflicts with 
the empirical aspir ations of his theory. More importantly, the axes of a con-
ceptual space evidently need not be semantic, as Fodor suggest s, as this 
solves nothing at all. It merely reflects the structure of the formalism u sed 
to analyse conceptual content and, for lack of empirical relevance, reduces 
the specification of "meanings" and thus semantics to an exercise in def-
inition rather than explan ation. One explains by showing how one thing 
connects to another, not how one might impose a structure on something 
and then claiming how revealing of structure the formalism that imposed 
it in the first place, really is. 
Churchland's picture was well-motivated since it attempted to address 
the unempirical nature of the formalists view by embodying a connection 
between the non-semantic and the semantic. One could hardly "explain" 
semantics otherwise. There is still, however, the problem of what to label 
one's dimensions in a geometrical picture. If the dimensions are semantic 
features, we merely ape Fodor 's formalist view. If they are simple physical 
attributes, we are at a loss as to how to combine them to produce seman-
tics, a point well taken from Fodor. Remember that Fodor and Lepore ques-
tioned the role and labelling of the dimensions in Churchland's geometrical 
model 
"We're claiming, in effect, that Churchland h as confused him-
self by taking the labels on the semantic dimensions for granted."6 
6(Fodor & Lepore 1992) p. 199 
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Let us look at the work of Peter Gardenfors again briefly in order to see this 
problem in relief once more. Gardenfors has a theory of conceptual spaces 
that has a similar form to Churchland's. He has similar problems when 
attempting to define the dimensions of his spaces. For example, Gardenfors 
argues that the dimensions of a given conceptual space are things like 
"color, spatial position, weight, temperature, etc."7 
Again, we have the problem of knowing how these combine to give us 
anything recognisably semantic. As with Churchland, where does Garden-
fors obtain the labels for these axes? If they are broken down from the 
patterns in our semantic manifestations, we have the element of top-down 
methodology that infected Churchland and which makes Fodor's claims to 
explanation, as opposed to mere definition, so questionable. Also, why are 
geometrical theories vague about the exact dimensions? As is the case for 
traditional approaches to this problem, the "etc" in the quote above is a 
promise to fill in all the determinate qualities of a static model. Giving 
a complete specification of all of the axes of a space is just like trying to 
lexically decompose it into a unique and complete description. If we take 
Dreyfus' criticisms seriously, this is not possible and no-one, since work be-
gan on this in the 1950's, has succeeded in filling in even a tiny portion 
of this dangerous promissory abbreviation or plausibly suggesting how we 
might. This weakness in current geometrical approaches does not go unno-
ticed by its opponents, as we have seen. Indeed, concepts of colour, weight 
etc. are not constitutive of a conceptual space. They are "facts" we perceive 
as a result of the information dependencies enshrined in the structure of 
the space. If such predicates were the labels of the dimensions of a space, 
it would be hard to see just how then a geometrical approach would dif-
fer from a traditional symbolic one. Both would be using atomic and basic 
facts or concepts as the building blocks to higher-level structures. This is a 
7(Gardenfors 1993a) pp. 8- 9 
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mistake as the putative basic elements, the labels of the dimensions of our 
spaces, only exist by virtue of being embedded in a context; a context that 
results from the dependencies necessitated by a highly structured space. 
The labels are not determinable from the patterns that the space gives rise 
to since this would be exactly the same mistake as supposing that the for-
mal building blocks of semantics are discoverable from the manifestations 
of language. We must assume, in order to believe that the top-down anal-
ysis of language patterns is of use in explaining anything in semantics, 
that the putative parts of the patterns are independent. We must be able 
to determine them separately otherwise the dependencies involved in the 
composition of manifest language forms would make Lhe task completely 
indeterminate. In fact, this is exactly the case, as argued in Chapter 5. 
The processing involved in information manifesting as what we call "se-
mantic" must involve complexity at least as great as phenomena such as 
limb coordination and thus must involve geometrical models where the de-
pendencies between information in output are so strong as to make it im-
possible, without knowing the "key" (metric tensor) that generates it, to 
work down to the basic building blocks in a top-down fashion. The only 
way to even make it appear as if one is doing this is to employ a formal-
ism that imposes a structure on the patterns of the language data. The 
choice of formalism determines everything in a system inherently immune 
to analysis at the level of its manifest patterns. What sort of dependencies 
are we considering? Typically, the paradigm of the traditional approach to 
semantics in Cognitive Science and AI is the logical atomism of Wittgen-
stein's Tractatus. H ere, all atomic facts are independent, hence the need 
for a huge mass of inference rules to link them. The facts are orthogo-
nal to each other. This would correspond to a simple geometrical model 
where, in Euclidean space, the axes were all at 90 degrees to each other. 
In this model, the metric tensor is the identity m atrix. This is the picture 
corresponding to the basic formal models. Each determinable feature of a 
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semantic unit is separate and can be ascertained independently of the oth-
ers. In geometrical terms, change of value along one dimension involves 
no change at all along the other. Many of the geometrical approaches in-
volved in neural network research never move beyond this simple model; 
Churchland and Gardenfors, due to their mistakes in embracing the usual 
top-down approach, also share this sort of geometrical picture. The reason 
is, I think, because any form of informational dependency would prevent 
one from determining the axes for a particular natural language example 
and thus from giving expository clarification to the theory. This is a temp-
tation that should be resisted. If a geometrical system really implies that 
manifest patterns are no use as evidence, then one should be honest and 
simply not give examples based on such evidence. It is misleading as it 
suggests that the system is suggesting basic units of analysis - the labels 
of the dimensions - but it is not. These are being determined intuitively 
by appealing to some vague notion of "basic" or "abstract" features, taken 
as obviously fundamental in some sense. In a way, this is worse than the 
formalists' tactic of taking the basic units from the way that the formalism 
breaks the manifest patterns up since this, at least, has some independent 
motivation from formalism, albeit misguided. 
In a geometrical picture where the axes are not orthogonal to each 
other, as neurological research strongly suggests for more primitive tasks 
such as motor coordination, fundamental changes in our conception of in-
formation processing are necessitated. Here, a change in value along one 
dimension necessitates a change in value along another: points in this type 
of space have a context of informational dependency underlying them due 
to the space they inhabit. In addition, the notion of "distance" between 
points and hence the notions of area and volume of regions are dependent 
on where in the space they lie. These sort of complications make the task 
of deciding on the geometrical representations of manifest features com-
pletely indeterminate and thus Fodor and Lepore's criticism of the "seman-
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ties by stipulation" of Churchland is well taken . There are countless ways 
of deciding on which geometrical features correspond to which semantic 
features; this is r ife underdeterminism. Gardenfors seems to think that 
there is an obvious way of dividing up the concepts in order to map seman-
tics onto geometry. 
" . .. individual names are assigned vectors (i.e., points in the 
conceptual space) .. . predicates of the language that denote pri-
mary properties are assigned regions in the conceptual space."8 
Certainly this is an intuit ive way to proceed but methodologically, it fares 
no better th an the imposition of structure by formalism choice in the tradi-
tional approach. lfwe acknowledge a more sophisticated geometrical view, 
we have available invariants; abstract features embodying constant geo-
metrical relations . The richness of the system s that these define is the 
subject of tensor analysis. To assume that we can make a geometrical 
model of semantics based on a simple, orthogonal Euclidean geometry is 
analogous to supposing that we might fully capture natural language in a 
propositional calculus. Unfortunately, once one embraces a more abstract 
geometrical theory, certain implications render the top-down methodology 
irrelevant. This is explicable in the following manner. Our cognition dis-
plays, certainly, regularities. It is natural, upon seeing regularities to think 
of rules that underly them. Regularities are described in a certain vocabu-
lary; that of "nouns", "verbs" etc. is a familiar one. It is, however, a mistake 
to suppose that the regularities of a certain vocabulary can be explained 
only by reference to that vocabulary. A regularity described in the vocab-
ulary of, say contemporary linguistics, need not be caused by anything so 
describable. The reason why it is commonly attempted in this manner 
is because an explanation in another vocabulary is much less easy to un-
derstand as an explanation. The stages of the explanation do not use the 
8(Gardenfors 1993a) pp. 8- 9. Italics his. 
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vocabulary of the explained and thus it is difficult to follow it as an explana-
tion. We tend to call, instead, such things reductions and this has come to 
have rather unpleasant connotations since it seems to be eliminating some-
thing. However, if we realise that there really was nothing to eliminate in 
the first place; we only had vague regularities in our common vocabulary 
after all, it is obvious that a reduction, in this sense, is indeed an expla-
nation. In fact, it is more of an explanation than one cast in terms of the 
vocabulary that the regularities are phrased in since otherwise it is difficult 
to see how such an explanation connects to other parts of science and thus 
it is hard to understand just what such an explanation has to do with hu-
man cognition at all. This is a shadow of the problem that McDowell has, 
which is discussed in Chapter 6; that of distancing ourselves from point-
lessly feared reductions and its resultant rendering of the whole enterprise 
as irrelevant to human cognition. Overall, the problem is well captured by 
the epithet th at formalism and contemporary cognitive science as a whole 
mistakes regularities for hints of systems of rules. It is common in the 
natural sciences that regularities on the scale our perceptions can detect 
are the result of features of micro-level systems. Patterns in snowflakes 
are explained by crystallography, not by reference to snowflakes. Linguists 
and formal semanticists still, however cling to a methodology that explains 
semantic patterns by reference to semantic features. Famously, we have 
failed to find hard rules for any semantic phenomenon of the sort we have, 
for example, in chemical bonding. This is because the patterns we find in 
semantics and language are explicable only in terms of informational de-
pendencies involving a completely different vocabulary. It is the hypothesis 
of this work that that vocabulary must be a geometrical or topological one 
if we are to be realistic about the evolutionary and neuroscientific evidence. 
» 154 « 
7.2 The Rethinking of Examples 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the necessity of more complex geometrical struc-
tures involves a certain amount of new distinctions in the theories that re-
sult. There are two ways, the distinction between them obscured in simple 
systems, of determining information in a geometrical space: contravari-
ant and covariant. Contravariant vectors are, on this model, constructed 
for the outputs of a system. Our execution of acts is contravariantly con-
ceived. The feature of this notion most important here is that because the 
components of a contravariant vector can be combined easily in any sort 
of space, they cannot be broken into their constituents without knowledge 
of the way in which they were combined. This knowledge is only possi-
ble through knowing the tensor employed in the creation. This, in effect, 
amounts to knowing the topological structure of the spaces involved. So, an 
account of the origins and components of the outputs of a complex system, 
such as that involved in inferring, uttering a sentence or thinking, requires 
knowledge of the fundamental structure of the brain-implemented geome-
try physically embodying the system. It is clear that this sort of knowledge 
is quite out of the realm of logic systems, linguistic grammars and most 
of Cognitive Science. It is a strictly empirical neuroscientific enterprise 
involved with identifying and examining networks in the brain and the 
possible geometrical systems they can plausibly be seen to embody. 
There is a serious implication in this for Cognitive Science, quite apart 
from the implication that it would render much of it obsolete and mean 
"massive unemployment in Cognitive Science"9 - something that is almost 
presented as an argument against geometrical systems by Fodor and Lep-
ore. The common tactic in linguistics and formal semantics is to illustrate 
the supposed explanations by actual decompositions, constructions or mod-
els etc. If the information we have, the manifestations of language are 
9(Fodor & Lepore 1992), p. 187 
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contravariantly constructed, then we simply can give no such examples. 
Without the empirical research required to demonstrate the structurally 
imposed conditions of the operating of a system, our examples are con-
structed "blind". We have no reason to suppose them to have anything to 
do with how the regularities are manifested by the brain. Additionally, the 
only possible "basic" elements that determine the manifest regularities on 
our geometrical picture are the invariants described by the geometry of the 
systems involved. These invariants will be, as I have mentioned, extremely 
abstract relations between geometrical features and thus will not corre-
spond to concepts we recognise as "semantics". We are used to this in the 
natural sciences where we have many concepts that are mathematically 
defined but which have little correlation with our phenomenal categories. 
"Electron spin", "torque", "rest mass" and the like are powerful explanatory 
concepts whose bases are solely mathematical and sometimes blatantly ge-
ometrical invariants. Incredibly, formal semantics and linguistics seem to 
expect that human cognition, surely one of the most complex of all systems 
we know of, to be explicable in terms of concepts we are very familiar with. 
Indeed, in the very early formalist empiricist traditions, the basis was sup-
posed to be the most simple and obvious observables. It would be simply 
incredible if this were the case; a sui generis level of explanation in terms 
of semantic features and propositional attitudes would be completely at 
odds with the rest of science that, for example, the Chomskian tradition 
desperately wants to unite with. 
So, what of our earlier question; what of the axes of the geometrical 
systems the brain embodies in its role as manifesting agent of the realm of 
the "semantic"? Clearly, we simply cannot tell from looking at the mani-
fest patterns oflanguage and thought. These are output and output in the 
systems under examination is not a good guide to the causes of the regulari-
ties in output. There is indeed no guarantee that the output is even slightly 
revealing of its causes. This means that proponents of"geometrical seman-
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ties" should avoid at all costs attempting to specify a priori the dimensions 
along which we can determine the possible points in a space. If this is 
attempted, we must undertake the top-down labours of the traditional the-
ories and fall foul of the same problem in different guises. We have, at 
least, to thank Fodor and Lepore for pointing this out. The methodological 
urge to "give examples" so prevalent in natural language semantics today 
is to be resisted as I regard the implication of the above that this simply 
cannot be done and, when it is, it is extremely misleading. Language can-
not be built out of language since this would not explain how it is caused. 
There has been, however, a certain amount of research conducted into how 
the interface between formal systems and the accepted brain-like models 
can be described. This is known as the "symbol-grounding" problem and is 
an attempt to block exactly my criticism here. It is an attempt to "ground" 
the formal systems in naturalised theory, preventing the sui generis level 
of formal description being too distanced from explanations of real human 
cognition. In this sense it is exactly that which, in Chapter 6 I describe as 
concerning McDowell. It is an attempt to connect with the real issues of 
the physical implementation of semantics without loosing the formal level 
of description. In the terminology of Chapter 6, it is exactly an attempt to 
connect the Realm of Reason and the Realm of Law. What is particularly 
interesting about the Symbol Grounding Problem, is that it is a much less 
abstract attempt than McDowell's, well set in the traditional of Cognitive 
Science. As such, it is essential to examine it as an attempt to bypass a 
thoroughly geometrical picture and thus the implications it has. 
7.3 The Symbol Grounding Problem 
Since a formal system manipulates, by design, symbols, there is a natu-
rally a wonder how and why the symbols connect to that which they are 
taken to be symbols of If this question cannot be answered, then we are 
» 157 « 
left with the conclusion that the symbols in a formal analysis have no rela-
tion to that which they are putatively about. Basically, a system of formal 
symbols is nothing, in Cognitive Science, if it has no connection to what 
is presumed to be an important factor in the embodiment of such systems, 
the brain. This is just the same problem as McDowell's worry of the Realm 
of Reasons "spinning in a void" with no connection to the physical world. 
Traditionally, formalist Cognitive Science tends to regard this particular 
problem with disdain. There is an assumption that we need not concern 
ourselves with the actual grounding of symbolic manipulation of logical 
structures; all that is taken care of by someone else who is looking at in-
put/output issues. Ever since the advent of cognitive psychology, we know 
this to be a mistake. There is no clean division between perception and 
cognition. The latter infects the former, thus explaining illusions and the 
like. "Perception is active" is the motto today and we cannot suppose that 
the manipulation of formal systems can be looked at without regard for 
how the symbols get their significance. Stevan Harnad has examined this 
problem and he points out that when one strips away the sensory-motor 
areas of the brain, one is not left with very much at all and certainly not: 
" . . . some homuncular computational core-in-a-vat that all this 
transduction [is] input TO. No, to a great extend we ARE our 
sensorimotor transducers and their activities, rather than being 
their ghostly computational executives."10 
Harnad is absolutely right to attack this as a fundamental flaw in tradi-
tional symbolist thinking. It is conceptually na'ive to suppose we might 
just "bolt-on" I/O modules to symbol systems. In fact, it seems surprising 
that anyone in AI ever really thought that it would be possible given the 
general reaction against passive perception th at arose in tandem with cog-
nitive psychology. A great deal of cognition indeed goes on during what 
used to be considered simple, mechanical I/O and this is a fact that Har-
10(Harnad 1993) 
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natl uses to launch into his exposition of the Symbol Grounding Problem. 
The problem, as Harnad formulates it, is that of determining how the basic 
symbols in a formal system get their "meaning". Harnad asks how the ar-
bitrary, meaningless symbols of such a system can be grounded in anything 
other than other arbitrary, meaningless symbols. He calls this the symbol-
ist "merry-go-round" and likens the problem to trying to learn Chinese as 
a first language from a Chinese/Chinese dictionary. It would just be, ac-
cording to Harnad, a progression from one meaningless symbol to another 
with meaning never entering the picture at any point. The symbols are 
never "grounded": they never link to the world of experience and thus can 
never say anything about it. The system is "hanging from a sky-hook" and 
never touches the ground of reality. Therefore, a pure symbol system can 
never be adequate to human cognition; the Realm of Reason is not enough 
in itself. Symbol systems are in need of grounding in a non-symbolic way in 
order to prevent the merry-go-round and to link them to the real world and 
thereby endow them with implicit meaning. The problem can be expressed 
more clearly thus: the beauty of the symbolist approach is that it takes all 
of the trouble out of dealing with messy domains by providing a mapping 
from the domain into a formal system. If one can make this mapping in a 
systematic way, one can then manipulate symbols that can be said to stand 
for objects in the domain in a way much more suited to the apparatus with 
which you must work. More concretely, if the brain can provide a map-
ping from the world to arbitrary symbols, efficient computational methods 
for manipulating the symbols will preserve the relations of things in the 
world. The real benefit comes as the computational methods are purely 
syntactic, they only need to know the general shape of the symbols rather 
than the complicated issue of their references, meanings etc. Of course, as 
Harnad points out, this is only of any use when one can interpret the sym-
bols and their manipulations in a systematic way in the real world. This 
is not a problem for the observer of such a system as he can impose such 
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an interpretation. However, for the system itself, the only way that this 
can happen is if it has a link with the real world at some point in order to 
give the mapping a reference point, a grounding. Consider figure 7 .2. This 
Symbolic World 
The Rl.\al Worl(I 
Figure 7 .2: Symbol/World Mapping 
rather simplistic diagram serves to demonstrate an important point. The 
topology of the symbolic world can only be a useful mapping of the topol-
ogy of the real world if there is a link (the dotted line in the diagram) at 
some point that sets up an initial interpretation for some part of the sym-
bol system 11 • In the diagram, we can see that the structure of the symbol 
system is topologically isomorphic to the structure of the real world. The 
crucial point is that this is only possible through the existence of the dotted 
link. This provides a non-arbitrary, non-symbolic grounding for the entire 
symbol system. It must exist for the symbol system to have any claim to 
real meaning12. McDowell realises this problem in a more abstract sense; 
he expresses it in the requirement that the Platonism of the Realm of Rea-
sons must be naturalised. It is instructive then, to relate how the way in 
11 Harnad makes it clear that the systematicity requirement for symbol systems is strict 
enough to ensure that the chances of a symbol system being systematically interpretable 
in itself as referring to the real world without a link to it is negligible. The symbol system 
has to be grounded in the world somehow. 
12Note that there does not have to be only one link. It is just there there must be at 
least one such link in order to ground the system. 
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which McDowell fails to support this sort of stratified view translates into a 
similar pattern in Harnad's failure to support a hybrid formal/non-formal 
system. This is important as it demonstrates the fundamental nature of 
the difficulties underlying a large portion of Cognitive Science as a result 
of the considerations given in Chapter 5. 
7.3. 1 Problems With "Grounding Symbols" 
Why would one want to ground symbols? Why not simply have a thor-
oughly non-formal system and do away with the troublesome formal stra-
tum altogether? The reason is that Harnad is convinced of the necessity 
of Fodor and Pylyshyn's criteria of explanation in terms of systematicity 
and compositionality. He is convinced that the formal strata is the only one 
possible that could account for these features and thus wishes to retain it. 
We ground a symbol as follows. Our perception performs fundamentally 
two tasks: identification and discrimination. Discrimination is merely the 
ability to tell one thing from another but identification allows us to classify 
things as one of a type previously experienced. Identification is allowed by 
the iconic nature of perceptions. This is in direct contrast to the formal 
stratum - as it must be in order to be a solution to the formal's impotence 
in grounding - as an iconic representation maintains features of the actu-
ally raw sensory data; the iconic representation of a cow might be a vaguely 
cow-shaped blob on the retina for example. Identification, 
" ... somehow reduces iconic representations to the invariant 
sensory features that will subserve successful categorization."13 
and categorisation imposes a structure on perceptions: so-called "categori-
cal perception" (see Chapter 5). This means that they are "discontinuous" 
with the physical data: these categorical representations are distortions 
13(Harnad 1992) 
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or "warpings" of the analog sensory data and identification is the process 
of warping sensory properties in order to keep a useable set of categories 
for future use. Notice the strongly Kantian element here which is directly 
comparable to McDowell's desire to adhere to this sort of requirement. This 
categorisation is a natural process as the analog world is so continuous that 
if we did not categorise our input, we would be at pains to develop the most 
important concept of all: regularity. This phenomenon makes possible the 
crucial step in the solution of the Symbol Grounding Problem. The cate-
gories we contrive from our data can be given unique, arbitrary names and 
the names can be our "elementary symbols". These names are grounded 
as they follow directly and non-arbitrarily from our iconic representations. 
Harnad considers the groundedness property a transmittable (or perhaps 
"transitive") one and so any symbolic representations created using these 
gTounded symbols will also be grounded. The symbols thus constructed 
can be considered grounded in their relation to a unique determination of 
category membership. The following example is given: Suppose a robot 
could distinguish objects and categories Turing-indistinguishably from a 
human. In particular, suppose it could identify a horse on the basis of its 
iconic representation and "stripes" on the basis of its iconic and categorical 
representations. When presented with the symbol string: 
zebra= horse & stripes 
it could "decode and use" this symbol string even though: 
" . . . "zebra" was a previously undefined symbol and unencoun-
tered object."14 
This is because "zebra= horse & stripes" is grounded in the non-arbitrary 
categorical representations given by its experience of horses and stripes. 
Note it is not claimed that "horse" or "stripes" are fundamental categories. 
14(Harnad 1992) 
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Harnad is committed to the existence of ground-level fundamental cate-
gories but he does not suggest what they might be. In any case, these 
categories are always revisable as he subscribes to a neo-Popperian falli-
bilism dubbed "approximationism". This is the doctrine that our categories, 
once created, are only approximate and converge to relatively stable states. 
The equilibrium can always be upset by a recalcitrant identification: our 
categories are revisable. Hamad assumes that there are certain "invari-
ant" features of perception that constitute the basic categories in this pic-
ture. This is necessary to get the whole thing started; we must "ground the 
grounding procedure", so to speak. Now, I agree that there is a necessity for 
postulating, as a minim.um for an explanation of human cognition, invari-
ants in the environment15 but this is completely at odds with the retention 
of the formal str atum in the explanation since Harnad thinks 
" ... introspection is unlikely to reveal the mechanisms under-
lying our robotic and cognitive capacities .. . "16 
Harnad is motivated in his insistence on the inscrutability of such in-
variants by the problem of vanishing intersections. This is the age-old AI 
and philosophical problem of determining what properties are essentia l 
to all instances of a concept. What, we may ask, are the invariant fea-
tures that pick out dogs, chairs, or more famously, games? Obviously, if 
we hold that the invariants are inscrutable, then this problem is, if not ex-
plained, sidestepped. So, Harnad believes we cannot discover these invari-
ants by introspection. This is rather strange as they combine, in appar-
ently rather simple ways if the example above is representative, to form 
the formal level. Formal systems are, as Harnad knows, designed to be 
compositional so that they can be broken down and examined in exactly 
the manner required to get to their basic elements. Thus, inscrutable in-
15There is a lso a mathematical necessity if one is to employ tensor calculus. See Chapter 
5 
16(Harnad 1992) 
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variants are not compatible with a stratum issuing from them with the 
explicit feature of being scrutable. Environmental invariants, I argue, are 
indeed inscrutable, but not because of the problem of the vanishing inter-
sections. That particular problem is a result of the way that our manifest 
concepts are constructed by the brain. Classification and thus conceptual-
isation is an output of the system and thus is a contravariant execution 
vector according to a tensorial model. This means that the components of 
our concepts will not be obtainable from the concepts themselves, simply by 
virtue of the way the information is combined to give them. The unhappy 
marriage of inscrutable invariants and a formal level stratum is Harnad's 
attempL Lu keep the Realm of Reason and the Realm of Law connected to 
each other. It is clear, once the implications of the relevant brain research 
are taken into consideration, that this results in a contradiction between 
the necessary inscrutability of invariants and the scrutability of the formal 
system they result in. At least Harnad wants to avoid the mistake of the 
philosophers who he thinks have, 
" ... from the vantage point of their armchairs, based on in-
trospecting about the definitions and sensory properties of ab-
stract categories."17 
In this he is correct but it is not possible to really avoid the problems if one 
has a view that allows a formal system that, by design, is bound to want to 
let you split up the "data" in a perspicuous manner. The naturalist streak 
advocating robotics research, neurobiology or whatever, cannot tolerate a 
formal system that seems to make it easy to find "atoms" in your data; it 
spoils the whole point of doing this sort of naturalised investigation. The 
problem is not, as Harnad seems to think it is, armchair speculation as 
such. It is the stratified view that it goes hand in hand with. The strata 
have to be very different but then they contradict each other as we have 
seen with McDowell. 
17(Harnad 1992) 
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7.4 Conceptua l Semantics 
The late 1980s saw quite an explosion in various theories designed to move 
away from the traditional externalist and extensional semantics. We have 
seen Gardenfors and his semantics in terms of "conceptual spaces" and 
Lakoff's "conceptual linguistics". I would like to dwell a moment, as a con-
cluding note to this chapter, on Ray Jackendoff's "conceptual semantics"18. 
The motivations behind this are in accordance with the issues I have raised 
so far: 
" . .. since one's construal of the world is heavily mediated by 
complex computational processes which have little if anything 
to do with language, reference in natural language is likely to 
reflect the internal representation of the world as least as much 
as it does the external world per se ."19 
Jackendoff wants, essentially, to dig a little deeper into our manifest pat-
terns of output and to take seriously certain of them that traditional se-
mantics ignores. He, for example, wants to take the "pragmatic anaphora" 
involved in sentences like "I can do that", which accompanied by a point-
ing action, refers to, say, an action by another, as serious evidence as to 
the ontology we must impute to natural language. We must look at pat-
terns like these and conclude, Jackendoff argues, that things like "events" 
and "places" are an essential ingredient in the ontology of a natural lan-
guage semantics. This, I think, while having a reason able motivation, is 
incorrect. Any patterns in our outputs are suspect as causal components 
in our cognition. While it is true that traditional semantics has biases built 
in as regards ontology, this does not mean that extending the patterns we 
take seriously in our language output will give us a better understanding of 
the processes involved in generating that output. It may, and as Jackendoff 
demonstrates does, provide technical and formal advantages ifwe take cer-
18 (Jackendoff 1983, Jackendoff 1985, Jackendoff 1988) 
19(Jack endoff 1988) p. 83 
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tain patterns as evidence of basic-level ontological categories, but this has 
no implications for the way in which we actually construct and employ lan-
guage. Jackendoff assumes that there is a level of mental representation 
located somewhere between the level of neurons and the formal systems 
that provides a grounding for the patterns we see in the latter. This is ba-
sically a stratified view with three levels, the third intermediary has the 
task of making the link from the formal to the neuronal more plausible. 
This cannot work since the intermediary level that J ackendoff endorses is 
simply a more liberal analysis of our manifest output patterns. "Cognitive 
semantics" has failed to realise that it is not the type of patterns we find in 
our output that is misleading; it is the use of any of these patterns in form-
ing causal stories about the process of cognition and language in humans. 
There is a general point to be made about the possibility of removing ob-
jections to stratified theory by adding more strata and this will be brought 
out in the following. 
In this chapter, I have shown that the philosophical assumptions of a 
stratified approach runs deep, even into supposed radical alternatives that 
aim more towards the type of view I advise. I shall now conclude by draw-
ing together these assumptions to see what is left and what philosophical 
implications there are for Cognitive Science and its branch of natural lan-
guage semantics. 
Chapter 8 
Objections and Conclusions 
8.1 Objections 
Here I shall tackle the main objections to the view described here that 
might come from the community of those engaged in the practises of formal 
semantics. It is important to first draw the following distinction which has 
been addressed elsewhere in this thesis but not quite in the way I now ap-
proach it. We must divide the field of "formal semantics", broad as it is, into 
certain practises. I do this because I am wary of trying to address pseudo-
objections since I think that much of this large community would actually 
be completely apathetic to my view because they are engaged in recon-
structive enterprises rather than developing explanatory accounts. View-
ing formal symbol systems simply as useful models of"high-level" cognitive 
processing is not something with which I have any quarrel. Such a view is 
extremely useful for implementing many Information Technology tools and 
language engineering products. My concerns are about the causal role of 
such system s and the explanatory use made of them and so I have little to 
say about and little to fear from such an attitude. A lot of the information-
theoretical approaches seem to me to be like this. The emphasis seems to 
be on developing a view based on some broad notion of "information" that 
might include not only the usual views found, for example in mathematics 
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and computer science, but also some idea oflinguistic "meaning" and more 
colloquial versions. The impetus is one of integration and regimentation of 
similar concepts in order to provide a cohesive framework. An example of 
this is Channel Theory ((Barwise & Seligman 1992, Barwise & Seligman 
1993)) which attempts to model "information flow" by use of a theoretical 
construct called an informational "channel". This is influenced by ideas 
from Dretske1 and is explained as a model of errors in information flow 
that enable better implementation of, for example, fault-tolerant software. 
The real objections will come from those who argue an explanatory 
and causal role for their symbolic formalisms. A prevalent objection, as ev-
idenced by certain arguments often given to support symbolic semantics2 
is that the notion of context of which I am making so much should be ad-
dressed at the level of symbolic representation since, if we do not do this, 
there seems no way to do it and Cognitive Science misses something es-
sential out. I reiterate that if this is an argument at all, it is certainly not 
one in favour of a symbolic treatment of context but rather, on my view, a 
plea to be allowed to err consistently. Situation Semantics is a modern se-
mantic theory which advocates just this and I examined objections coming 
from this school in Chapter 4. I have addressed objections stemming from 
fundamental tenants of the formalist position in my discussion of Fodor 
and Chomsky previously but now I wish to turn to more recently occurring 
possible objections from working semanticists. 
An objection might be raised that I am collecting an awful lot of differ-
ent theories under the heading of "formal" and dismissing them all with a 
broad sweep. There are, it might be argued, a lot of differences between 
theories broadly termed "formal" or "symbolic" that are relevant to my ob-
jections to that whole area, thus rendering my views only partially effec-
tive. One such argument would probably invoke the crucial differences 
1 Especially (Dretske 1981) 
21 noted this in specific reference to vonEckardt in Chapter 2 for example. 
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between traditional systems of formal logic as applied to language - the 
"Davidsonian" programme and those systems following Montague which 
considerably enrich the formalism and the motivation for its use. For ex-
ample, (Lappin 1997) holds the view that the Montagovian tradition is a 
more successful approach to natural language semantics as it does not have 
the strict logicality requirements of the essentially first-order Davidsonian 
model. This relaxes some of the formal constraints on the account and al-
lows in a wider range of possible explanations . This is seen as a major 
difference and one which might be taken as an objection to my view as I do 
not consider this type of difference in my rejection of the general formal-
ist level of explanation. In order to reply to this, I must begin by saying 
what I think is in contention here. It is the fact that a richer set of se-
mantic types is more able to account for semantic distinctions than a more 
restricted set. Now, I cannot see why anyone would want to deny this. The 
further notion is that the crucial seemingly non-symbolic aspects I dwell 
upon can be addressed by developing the symbolic notions to encompass 
more and more subtle and complex aspects and interactions of more ba-
sic semantic terms. Montague was a key figure in being able to account 
for many more semantic phenomena by extending the allowable semantic 
types of the formal language and providing rigorous justifications for the 
manner in which this was undertaken. The natural reply to this is that 
the differences between such approaches, whilst differing r adically in se-
mantic typology, are differing with respect to a notion of "type" that they 
both share. I cannot allow that a richer set of semantic types will help 
to develop a notion of context, provide an interface between biological and 
formal levels of description and also aid in a full descriptive, explanatory 
and causal model of cognition since the whole point of these notions is that 
they require something necessarily disjoint with such a thing. If one builds 
up these desirable results through richer semantic types, in terms of ex-
planation, there really only are semantic types and thus you declare that 
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there really weren't any of the problems you needed richer semantic types 
to solve! No semanticist takes seriously the idea that there is no explana-
tory worth in "context" and brain structure. If semantic types can in a 
causal theory be used to explain connections to such things, then one is not 
taking them seriously. A causal theory is something very serious and if one 
attributes causal powers within human cognition to semantic types then 
the price is that there is little work for anything else to do. Since work is 
certainly done by context and the brain as far as cognition goes, this is al-
most a reductio ad absurdum of a formalist position that claims to explain 
in the sense of providing a causal account. Conversely, as I have stressed 
all through this work, a nun-causal account is not really very interesting to 
Cognitive Science as an explanatory discipline. 
A possible major objection arises from the more recent formalist schools 
concerned with representations that have more radically modified or ex-
tended the traditional logic formalisms. A large concern has grown up 
around the notion of"structured representation", particularly in the area of 
discourse analysis. The main protagonist is Hans Kamp and his "Discourse 
Representation Theory"3 has been widely accepted as a model of good re-
search in formal semantics. Kamp's concerns are directly relevant here 
as he has quite radical claims for the cognitive status and indeed causal 
properties of the representation he espouses. The key here is that the rep-
resentation is highly structured: the explicitly graphical mode of presen-
tation of the theory is essential to its theoretical claims which are centred 
around the fact that semantic structure is attributable to syntactic units 
such that they combine in a combinatorial manner. There is a central con-
struction algorithm which takes the structured representations of syntac-
tic units (usually parametric as in Montague grammar: the model theory is 
compositional in a fairly standard way) and combines them to form larger 
and larger representational structures up to the level of multi-sentence dis-
3The canonical statement of this can be found in (Kamp & Reyle 1993) 
» 170 ~ 
courses. The whole power of this is in the structure assigned to syntactic 
units. In a sense, this is nothing new as the same is true of Montague 
grammar. The difference is that one of the motivations for the particular 
graphical representation chosen is that Montagovian models become hor-
ribly complex for large sentences and their structure becomes so complex, 
it is not perspicuous or appealing to methodological parsimony. Leaving 
aside the question of whether this is really a suitable motivation for a new 
explanatory paradigm, it at least is clear that the notion of structured men-
tal representation has reached a certain plateau here with it being seen as 
so important, the whole theoretical impetus is based around its desiderata. 
Philosophically, the issue is Lhe same as with Fodor who also insists on 
structured mental representations. I have arguably thrown this out since I 
have questioned compositionality which is so closely related to structured 
representation, it is inseparable. I would reply that there is no disagree-
ment about the necessity for a notion of structure. There manifestly is such 
a thing in our cognitive life. But the question is, where does this structure 
come from? Kamp is clearly arguing that it is derived from the formal level 
he aims his theory at. Kamp and Reyle's whole notion of structure is pred-
icated on the basic case of an "initial" sentence in a discourse which has no 
information structure (i.e. context) to which it relates. This of course is an 
impossible situation which they admit themselves: 
"Almost all interpretation relies on antecedent information, 
deriving from general knowledge and from earlier communica-
tions between speaker and the recipient. We will have more to 
say about this in Volume 2."4 
The fact that this is relegated to a footnote is as interesting as are 
many other aspects of this admittance. Firstly, no mention is made of the 
role of cognitive categories in the contribution of antecedent information. 
These are far more fundamental and even constitutive of the effect that 
4Footnote top. 54, Ibid 
» 171 « 
"general knowledge" and "earlier communications" have on communica-
tion. Further, the elements that are mentioned are specified in terms of 
a formal account identical to that which they are supposed to ground. That 
is, it looks very much as if the "general knowledge" and "earlier communi-
cations" will be modelled in DRT too even though it is exactly this theory 
that requires this completely unrealistic notion of "initial sentence". I think 
it germane to point out that Volume 2 has not, at time of writing, appeared. 
It looks, in retrospect, an awful lot like Terry Winograd's famously never 
written book "Semantics" which was to follow on from "Syntax". 
My argument, to recap, runs as follows: 
• Structure that we posit to play an explanatory role in human cogni-
tion must have causal powers. That is, different structures must have 
different effects on our cognition. It must do something. 
• Structure posited at the level of formal symbols cannot have these 
causal powers because if it did, it would not take seriously the idea of 
non-formal and non-symbolic elements relevant to cognition which is 
really beyond question. 
• The reason it would not take these seriously is that its causal pow-
ers can only be phrased at a level which is, by definition, completely 
orthogonal to these other elements. 
• Thus, there would be no connection between formal semantics and 
notions like "context" and obviously relevant neurological data. 
• So, keeping its causal powers to itself renders formal semantics iso-
lated from matters which are, by any reasonable standards, far more 
obviously relevant to cognition than formal symbols: no-one would 
doubt that brain's topology is relevant and no-one with any grasp of 
the history of philosophy would doubt that context is. Many doubt 
that formal symbol systems are. Allowing causal powers elsewhere 
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renders formal semantics explanatorially irrelevant. This is exactly 
the tension in Cognitive Science. 
So, I must keep a notion of structure but reject a formal semantics ap-
proach to this idea. This is very disturbing to the whole practise of Cogni-
tive Science since, as I have argued, with this goes an awful lot of method-
ology too. We cannot give detailed systems of semantic categories, types, 
examples of derivation, constructions etc. any more. I keep the notion of 
structure by talking of structured spaces which give rise to the structure 
we see in our language and thought. This, I have argued, is really the only 
possible way to see things ifwe take seriously a holistic and integrated view 
of cognition. Structure in our surface thought and language is present but 
only by virtue of much more abstract structure at the neurological level. 
Only this can be seen to be causal. It is upsetting to Cognitive Science as 
often practised as the kind of structure I am talking about is not specifiable 
in the usual logical terms. That this is a large problem demonstrates the 
methodological grip that formal semantics has on Cognitive Science. So, 
my reply to the advocates of modern structural formal semantics is that I 
have no quarrel about structure, just about where it originates and where 
its causal properties are operational. 
I now tackle the most vital criticism that might be raised against my 
view. I have argued that the prescriptive nature of the logical machinery 
enables it to be able to cope with all possible things that it takes to be data; 
that is, I cannot see that there any limits that a formalist might reach with 
his work given that it is, for reasons I have described, guaranteed to be 
able to account for any linguistic data. Anticipating this problem, Edward 
Keenan5 has attempted to reply to a form of my objection that comes from 
Putnam6 and is given credence as an argument against formal semantics 
5(Keenan 1996). See also (Keenan 1976, Keenan & Faltz 1978, Keenan 1987) 
6(Putnam 1981) 
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by Lewis7• Putnam's point is that there are an unlimited number of se-
mantic models which differ yet are extensionally equivalent. This can be 
seen to be a demonstration that there is no real (i.e. external to formal se-
mantics) criteria for deciding between formal semantic models oflanguage 
and cognition. I am in agreement with this conclusion although for dif-
ferent reasons given earlier. Keenan's goal is to show that this is not a 
problem and that there are actually good reasons, at the level of formal 
semantics, for ruling out certain approaches because he claims to be able 
to distinguish a rigorous notion of "logical objects". This hinges around the 
notion of "Invariance under Automorphisms" which establishes the class of 
things that are invariant with respect to logically important transforma-
tions. Now, if Keenan is right, he has established an invariance at the level 
of formal symbolism which might be used to claim that this is the empiri-
cal data of formal semantics, thus contradicting my argument in Chapter 
4 that formal semantics really has no respectable notion of empirical data. 
After all, I put great weight on the notion of invariance myself and so, such 
a notion should at least be acceptable coming from the formal semantics 
community. Keenan makes a crucial point though when he says: 
"One might have hoped for a more "absolute" notion of logi-
cal object, one that did not depend on the choice of universe or 
type."8 
He then goes on to say how the notion is relative to the ontology of the 
semantic model and the type of object being considered. This is very im-
portant as it shows that the standard for defining this concept of "logical 
object" depends crucially on the prior acceptance of the central concepts of 
traditional formal model theory: namely the notion of "domain of interpre-
tation" (the universe or ontology) and the notion of "semantic type". If this 
notion, so important for providing an independence of formal semantics, is 
7 (Lewis 1984) 
8(Keenan 1996) p. 19 
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definable - as Keenan admits - only in respect to the methodological fun-
daments of that discipline, then, I think it is clear that "logical objects" are 
in no way going to provide any real invariant that can be said to establish 
a realm of data for formal semantics. They are only an invariant of for-
mal semantics and thus cannot provide a foundation for this very practise. 
You might classify the set of all unicorns on the basis of the "invariant" 
of "horn-owning" but that doesn't mean there are any. Only real invari-
ants can provide such a basis, that is, invariants that are such in virtue 
of something other than the theory you are using them to establish. As a 
corollary to this argument, it is a feature of tensor theory that the invari-
ants modelled must have a real existence in the world i.e independent of 
their description in the theory. It is clear that the idea of a "logical object" 
does not have this. 
A less serious objection but one which will occur to all fair-minded read-
ers sympathetic to formal semantics is this: formal semantics is surely 
useful in helping us to understand language and cognition. To reject it 
completely is going too far; it simply must be of some real interest. This is 
not clear to me at all. It is of some interest certainly, just not one that can 
play an explanatory role in Cognitive Science. But, the objection is stronger 
than that. It asks whether a model, describing causal mechanisms or not, 
might not help us understand a phenomenon. Normally, I would say yes. 
However, I think the case with formal semantics and Cognitive Science is 
so unique that the normal rules do not apply. Primarily, the difference is 
that the hindrances outweigh the helps: the methodological dogma that re-
sults from taking formal symbolic models even as helpful models is too high 
a price to pay. Secondly, I have argued that a model that is depicting the 
non-decomposable behaviour of the workings of the brain is really ofno use 
to understanding how cognition is caused which I take to be the primary 
goal of anything called Cognitive Science. Describing surface structures is 
of use in helping cognitively distressed people since, as I have argued, these 
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surface structures of cognition re-enter into the pool of information about 
the world in a way which makes them indistinguishable from any other 
information. Thus, these structures can effect the way we think. This does 
not mean they have causal powers in the genesis of cognition, merely it 
is a recognition that we are interacting with our environment in a very 
deep way. Basically, our cognitive structures play the role of ingredients 
rather than as the recipe itself - a recipe-like model might help us whip 
some order into our cognitive life. Again, the effect is more therapeutic 
than explanatory. Models help us do things far more often than they help 
us explain things. Of extreme importance is that the ability to do implies 
nothing about the ability to explain. One can, for example, enable some-
body to program in a high-level computer language by giving them a model 
involving little men (variables) running about between rooms (functions) 
or telephoning from room to room (passing by reference). One can imagine 
this model extended with all sorts of ingenuity to cover the usual program-
ming idioms. It enables one to program. It does not explain anything at 
all about how the language really gets things done. One may say though, 
"but it is isomorphic" - that is, getting back to the real issue - formal se-
mantic models are isomorphic to the "real way it is done". This is not taken 
seriously by anyone though since the opening part of any material on, for 
example, connectionist language processing, laments that we don't know 
what semantic concepts like "proposition", "predicate" etc. map onto at the 
neural processing level. That is, that sort of isomorphism is extremely con-
tentious. When it is claimed, the formal symbolic level is usually claimed 
as "virtual" or "reducible" to the neural. Again, this is the danger that has 
permeated my thinking on this whole topic: as soon as the formal seman-
tic level is close enough to the neural level (the limiting case is complete 
isomorphism ), it collapses into this level and disappears as an explanatory 
element. If it stays far enough away, it becomes too isolated to bear the 
pressure of the canonically relevant empirical and philosophical evidence. 
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8.2 Conc lusions 
It is clear then, that there are certain assumptions that the formalist ap-
proach to semantics in Cognitive Science cannot be upheld in the face of 
empirically motivated brain research. The philosophical implications of 
the way the brain seems to perform processing are quite far-reaching and 
touch, as we have seen, not just on particular features of semantics but on 
the very idea of a stratified picture th at allows for links between "levels" 
of a fundamentally different kind. In particular, there is a temptation to 
reify the manifest patterns in language and to suppose them to constitute 
an independent and sui generis level of explanation. I have argued that the 
reasons for this are as follows. Firstly, the formal systems employed in the 
traditional approach to language and semantics were designed as reforma-
tive tools to aid the coercion of natural languages into canonical artificial 
languages, in order to help the progress of a science free from the misunder-
standings possible otherwise. The mistake has been to employ these sys-
tems as descriptive and explanatory, th us reifying the categories, concepts 
and distinctions inherent in them which were regarded as essential fea-
tures of desired languages rather than existing ones. The effect of this has 
been to force language and thought into a mould where the only possible op-
tion is the postulation of an independent level of explanation corresponding 
to the coerced features. This resulted in the famous failures of symbolic AI 
earlier this century in its attempts to model knowledge in terms of symbols 
and logical manipulation. Chomsky's competence/performance distinction 
plus the advance of research into formal systems has enabled such sys-
tems to survive still, however, since anomalies can now be addressed by 
postulating another "deeper" level of symbolic processing involving more 
formalism specifically designed to solve particular problems. The compe-
tence/performance distinction allows modern linguistics to avoid altering 
fundamental assumptions regarding formalism when the obvious manifest 
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features do not conform. 
Secondly, there is a traditional suspicion of the notion of a pattern that 
does not allow an explanation at the level the pattern is manifest. We are 
not comfortable in calling something an "explanation" unless it is composed 
out of units we understand as being related to the explanandum. This is 
explicit in, for example, Fodor's requirement that the contents of mental 
states be semantically specifiable; they are to be specified in the language 
of a formal system, specifically a compositional system. I have argued else-
where that it is exactly the requirement of compositionality that prompts 
us to favour such explanations in the first place9 and thus the inference 
from the formal level of explanation to certain models of language is ex-
actly backwards in this respect; it is our formal systems that dictate our 
theory, particularly because they are designed to be reformative systems 
and not descriptive of natural languages. As such, they have, built in to 
them, assumptions about the patterns manifest in language and the ways 
in which the patterns are constructed. Chomsky has confused the whole is-
sue with the above mentioned competence/performance distinction. This is 
a model where the actual performance of language - its manifest patterns 
- are not seen as a guide to its cause. This is something I have been urging. 
However, the solution Chomsky proposes renders the "real" basis of data 
on a hypothetical level of competence which is, naturally, more conducive 
to modelling with the formalisms he favours. The causes of language are, 
in this picture, even less related to anything obviously seen as "evidence" 
than with a theory based on performance. Thus, even though the manifest 
patterns in our output are no good guide to their causes, the patterns in a 
hypothetical level of description are certainly in no better state. Patterns 
at such a level are simply imposed by the description of the level. This clar-
ifies the problem considerably. The reason that manifest patterns are no 
guide to their causes is due to the way that the patterns are indeed caused. 
9(Kime 1996) 
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I have argued generally that this involves informational dependency of a 
certain, complex sort where each element of the cause is dependent on some 
of the others for its effect. If this exact matrix of dependencies (the matrix 
describing a metric tensor) is not known, then nothing can be inferred from 
the patterns. A hypothetical stratum such as Chomsky's is designed to be 
amenable to the sort of formal analysis that "performance" denies. Thus, in 
its design, the perspicuity desired will remove the essential interdependent 
feature of the manifest output and thus will be, quite simply, an a priori 
stipulation about the components of the output. If one takes the manifest 
output as data, nothing can be inferred from this alone. If one attempts 
to create a level of description not having the feature of interdependency 
of causes, then one is in conflict with the implications of brain research 
and the essential characteristic of our output manifestations. One can-
not bypass a problem by simply allowing oneself to re-describe it in more 
manageable terms but missing out the central feature that makes it so 
problematic. 
It is important to see what is being suggested here. It is not that the 
regularities of language and thought are being modelled badly by formal 
systems. It is rather that the patterns themselves are not evidence of 
anything and thus the formal systems are merely describing regularities 
that we have no good reason to suppose indicate anything about the causal 
structures giving rise to them. In fact, if we believe two rather plausible 
claims: that the brain is reasonably seen as employing certain highly com-
plex geometrical processing and that these are involved in the manipula-
tion of information tentatively called "semantic", the mathematics involved 
ensure that the manifest patterns cannot possibly, by themselves, give us 
any indication as to their causes. 
The patterns we take to be important in language and thought lack 
an essential characteristic of the patterns that a natural science aims at 
explaining. Such patterns are not, in an important sense, pre-theoretic. 
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Much has been made of the movement from common sense to science by, 
e.g. Quine and this is a vital ingredient in accounting for any variety of em-
pirical content. In natural science, we encounter certain patterns without 
any contrived scientific terminology or distinctions and aim to investigate 
them by designing such. In linguistics, our data is much more dependent 
on having a theory to talk about them in. The regularities are in terms of 
certain chunks - "verbs", "modifiers", "clauses" which are part of the for-
malisms and theories designed to account for these patterns. In a natural 
science, we have general tools like mathematics that presuppose much less 
specifically, if at all in some cases, anything about the structure of the pat-
terns in the data. For example, we might mathematically model patterns in 
plant distributions using concepts such as "average", "density" and the like. 
These are not nearly as explanatorially loaded with suggestions of causal 
mechanisms as terms used in linguistics such as "property", "proposition" 
and the like. This is not to deny that we may err in supposing certain 
patterns ourselves in the use of our tools through biases of certain sorts 
but the tools themselves are very abstract and do not force us into a posi-
tion where we are forced to see certain patterns. This, however, is exactly 
the case in linguistics and formal semantics as the tools were not designed 
as general systems but as specific, normative moulds into which we pour 
our data. Thus, the "basis" of formal semantics and linguistics is not pre-
theoretical in the sense of being free from the impositions of the structures 
implied by the tools used. Thus, there is, as Quine has pointed out, no real 
"empirical base" of any sort for natural language semantics. This makes 
underdetermination much worse for such theories, see Chapter 7. 
So, while one would not want to deny that the patterns we term as 
involving "nouns", "predicates", "quantifiers" etc. exist in our manifest lan-
guage and thought, one would want to deny certain claims as to the sort of 
basis this constitutes for an explanation of human language and cognition. 
We would expect patterns in our output and we would expect this to bear 
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some relation to patterns in both our input and patterns in the structure of 
our processing mechanisms. However, since Kant, we are suspicious that 
the latter are considerably preponderant over the former and that their ac-
tion is ubiquitous. Thus the task is to separate the different contributions 
to the output patterns. Since the patterns contributed by the processing 
itself will not be introspectively available and thus, neither will the input 
patterns, simply put, it is naive to put faith in analysis of the output which 
is essentially exactly what formal semantics and linguistics does. Chom-
sky's move of giving linguistics a more regular level of "competence" as 
data is, as I hope is obvious from the above, of no use as it sidesteps the 
whole i.s.sue involved in the troublesome feature of the manifest output and 
thus weakens its claims to relevance in the case of human language and 
thought. 
A famous view, stemming most obviously from early Wittgenstein is 
the "picture" view oflanguage where the structure oflanguage and thought 
mirrors the world. From an evolutionary perspective, this is rather uneco-
nomical as, if there is structure in the world, re-representing it again inter-
nally is a heavy overhead in processing and therefore time. Much better to 
use the information already in the environment to enable you to act. For-
mal semantics often finds itself in trying to be adequate to the structure in 
the world. We like to make our semantics square with the way the world is 
presented to us. Thus we worry about the temporal order of pronoun res-
olution, quantifier ordering, researchers like Harnad try to marry iconic 
representation with formal systems that preserve iconic features etc. This 
is a str ange occupation since it effectively completely forgets and bypasses 
the structure imposed by the internal processing by the brain. Trying to 
map our output onto our input with no concern for the mediation by Kant's 
categories of perception is ignoring possibly the greatest contributor to or-
der in our phenomenal experience. It is like attempting to sneak in all of 
the mediation of the brain into the structure of the outputs; we try to cram 
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everything into the formal system we see implied by patterns in the out-
put and get ourselves into horrible complications as a result. There is no 
substitute for empirical work in examining the mechanisms for mediation 
of input/output in the brain. Attempting to do this by modelling the result-
ing patterns in an artificial system of formal symbols results in exactly the 
problems AI has experienced over the last fifty years; computational ex-
plosion, monotonicity problems, the messiness of real language and so on. 
This is because, although there are patterns we might model on a formal 
system, the constraints on the patterns are not even manifest at the level 
of the formalism. The constraints are, according to the geometrical model 
advocated, abstract informational invariants of the systems involved in the 
brain. Thus attempts to constrain, say, inference to "natural" patterns have 
been rather basic and the results rather disappointing ((Dreyfus 1992) has 
some good examples). Basically, all of the information we need to properly 
account for language and thought is simply not present in its manifesta-
tion, which is simply to say that Kant was correct in that much of the im-
portant material is in the mediation and not the output. Some have seen 
part of this problem and have, as a result attempted to bring into their 
theories certain topological ideas as an attempt to explain the ubiquity of 
certain patterns. Lakoff (see Chapter 4) is a good example of this although 
he fails to realise that the constraints are not specifiable at the level they 
actually have force. If they were, we could have a purely formal system that 
controlled the application of its rules and inferences with no regard for the 
role played by the brain in human cognition. Lakoff's failing is, I think, a 
direct result of his linguistics training that make him favour explanations 
whose components are of the level of formal systems; Lakoff still favours a 
system that can satisfy the desire for compositional models for example10. 
I have expressed the overall problem as one of spurious stratification of 
explanations in Cognitive Science. Part of this problem is of an abstract na-
10See (Lakoff 1988) p. 306 
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ture to do with the relationships between the strata. Part ofit (see Chapter 
3) is a more pragmatic issue of relevance to embodiment of the supposed 
levels of explanation in real systems. Since, as Quine argues in (Quine 
1972), explanation is a matter of delineating causes, stratification is essen-
tially a way of generating manifest causes to aid explanation. We do not 
feel that we have explained until we have shown a cause but in cases where 
causes are essentially inscrutable, we tend to fabricate levels at which they 
are scrutable. It is not felt to be sufficient to know that there is a cause; 
it is necessary to show it. This is the basis of Fodor's view that giving up 
propositional languages of thought is to be resisted on the grounds that, 
without it, we would nol have a story to tell about cognition. This is the 
difference between those who think there might be a story to tell, as yet 
untold or practically untellable and those who actually require that a story 
be told now. Fodor is of the latter sort. He prefers a story, however fan-
tastic, to none at all11 . The unfortunate consequence is that a story, once 
told, becomes embedded and thus limits the telling of others12. The com-
fort of having a story comes to outweigh the importance of knowing that 
things are more complex than it appears; possibly more complex than it is 
possible to understand. I discuss this latter point below. 
McDowell also prefers a story and his is more grandiose in style; it 
requires a stratification of two fundamentally different but linked aspects 
which are what we might picturesquely call the Platonic forms of the strata 
in Fodor's more technical distinction. The reasons for rejecting both of 
these views and thereby the basis of traditional formal semantics and Cog-
nitive Science is slightly different in each case and it is illuminating to 
examine the differences in order to see what is essentially incorrect about 
the urge towards stratification in such endeavours. Interestingly, the cri-
teria by which we rejected McDowell's stratified view in Chapter 6 is used, 
11This is explicit in (Fodor 1987). 
12This is addressed in (Kime 1996) 
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by McDowell himself in his critique ofQuine13. This is based on Davidson's 
supposed identification in Quine of an untenable dualism. In a commen-
tary on Quine14, Davidson notes a section from Word and Object where it 
is written: 
"we can investigate the world, and man as a part of it, and 
thus find out what cues he could have of what goes on around 
him. Subtracting his cues from his world view, we get man's net 
contribution as the difference."15 
Davidson sees this as establishing a "third dogma of empiricism", that of 
the dualism between scheme and content. This dualism is that of suppos-
ing that there is a a separation between that which is cognised and the 
framework in which it is cognised. We have a certain way of looking at 
things which are independent of the way of looking. This, for Quine, is the 
basis of empiricism and is not meant to imply that the relationship between 
scheme and content is simply, separable or scrutable. However, McDowell 
agrees with Davidson that this is an appeal to a neutral empirical basis 
which has little relation to the conceptual realm . Thus, the elements of 
this dualism being exactly McDowell's Realm of Reason and Realm of Law, 
there would be no rational interaction and thus this, for McDowell, con-
stitutes a reductio of Quine's position. So, McDowell uses the conclusion 
that Quine's dualism of empirical content and conceptual scheme fails to 
maintain a connection between the two and thus casts doubt on the very 
idea, to borrow a phrase from Davidson, of there being such a dualism. No-
tice, that this is the form of argument we used with respect to ostensives 
in order to demonstrate that McDowell's own dualism of Realms of Reason 
and Law could not connect in the desired way and were therefore part of a 
spurious division. McDowell's problem is in the connection of the levels of 
the stratification. In trying to account for the single phenomenon of human 
13(McDowell 1994) pp. 156- 157 
14(Davidson 1990) 
15(Quine 1960) p. 5 
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cognition and its relation to the world, he employs a dual of explanatory 
levels. In order for them to coexist as an explanation of the same thing, 
they must be linked but their postulated differences conflict with this to 
the extent of contradiction. Davidson himself echoes this mistake in the 
context of further critique of Quine's third dogma: 
"Different points of view make sense, but only if there is a 
common coordinate system on which to plot them; yet the exis-
tence of a common system belies the claim of dramatic incompa-
rabili ty."16 
The mistake is essentially the latter clause. Common systems of "coordi-
nates" say nothing about the status of claims to incomparability when the 
ways in which something might come to be a point in such a system can 
essentially be disguised. The way in which I "come to the conclusion" of 
a belief, not in the sense of a reasoned path but the sense involved in the 
brain's activity and processing leading to such a belief, will be the result of a 
complex combination of information, the components in which are not obvi-
ous from the final resulting belief. Now, this does not imply incomparability 
on the level of stories told as to how two people arrive at the same belief; 
our language may well enforce a particular way of telling stories and de-
scribing the telling of stories. However, in an examination of what caused 
the two beliefs, the incomparability is mandatory at the point where the 
beliefs are manifest, given the way in which outputs are constructed ac-
cording to the geometrical picture of brain processing advocated. This is 
again, an expression of the maxim that the way things seem need not be of 
any use in determining the ways things are. We can have a common basis, 
in the invariants in the environment, but construct our beliefs founded on 
this basis in ways that are inscrutable to comparisons. This is not to say 
that we do not construct in the same way. It is likely, being of the same 
species, that we do, so even the causes are indeed the same. However, this 
16(Davidson 1985) p. 184 
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is not enough. The manner in which the causes combine to manifest in 
beliefs is sufficient to block any comparability. This demonstrates clearly 
the first reason why a stratified account of cognition might fail: because it 
cannot deal with the interface between the supposedly independent levels 
of explanation. 
Now taking Fodor's problem; his is not so much the connection of the 
levels in his explanation but rather that which he takes as the basis of 
evidence. This is thought to be the patterns which are manifest in our lan-
guage and thought. The systematicity requirement is exactly this - that 
such patterns are important to any attempted explanation and thus are a 
mandatory feature of such. This, as we have seen is a mistake as it tries 
to perform a priori what must be undertaken a posteriori by research into 
the contributing factors to the manifest patterns. So, there are two m ain 
problems with stratified views in Cognitive Science, the relations between 
the strata and the basis for postulating the strata. This merely reinforces 
the pragmatism crushed by the advance of formal AI and cognitive psychol-
ogy; our theoretical models are basically ways of arranging what we take 
to be data. We can be wrong in two ways; in our arrangement of the data 
(McDowell) or what we take to be data (Fodor et al). I explain th is further 
as it is the essential distilled conclusion of this entire work. 
There is an assumption built into most theories of semantics, language 
and thought. There are two components involved in this assumption; firstly 
that there are parts involved in creating our manifest outputs and there 
are also ways of combining parts. This is indeed what is suggested by 
Quine and is necessary if one is to be an empiricist of any minimal sort. 
This is indeed also Davidson's "third dogma"; it is a different expression 
of the scheme and content dualism and, in removing it, one does indeed 
remove the last prop of empiricism. However, I think that this particular 
assumption of modern semantics shared even by its sometimes stalwart 
opponent Quine, can withstand Davidson's attack. He attempts to deny the 
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idea of a conceptual scheme, of a way of combining parts as opposed to the 
parts themselves, by maintaining that the idea cannot be made sense of, 
even with the idea of a "theory-neutral reality" to help17. Davidson's error, 
quite surprisingly mirrors one of the central misunderstandings involved 
in formal semantics. He supposes that a certain conceptual scheme, a way 
of combining parts, is intimately related to a certain language. 
"We may accept the doctrine that associates having a lan-
guage with having a conceptual scheme. The relation may be 
supposed to be this: where conceptual schemes differ, so do lan-
guages."18 
Indeed, the latter might be the case but that certainly does not mean that 
one can justify one's conclusions in a picture that talks about conceptual 
schemes by talking about language. This, Davidson does as his arguments 
against the notion of a scheme are based on an analysis of translation prob-
lems. The ubiquity of informational dependencies enshrined in the medi-
ation of the brain imply that languages and conceptual schemes may well 
differ together, so to speak, but the reason is because they both depend on 
the same fundamental informational dependencies underlying our whole 
cognition. Different conceptual schemes would, therefore mean the neces-
sity of intertranslatable languages. Davidson goes on to attack this latter 
point as he thinks the two components, language and conceptual structure, 
are equivalent. However, they are not. Conceptual schemes are complex 
ways of combining the parts that, in the Quinean idiom, impinge on us. 
These parts, thinks Davidson, are thus independent and allow for a com-
mon basis, contradicting the requirement of non-translatability and thus 
contradicting the idea of a conceptual scheme. The crucial step in the ar-
gument is the notion of a "common basis" which does not allow conceptual 
congruity, contrary to what Davidson thinks, if the manner in which the 
17 (Davidson 1985) p. 195 
18(Davidson 1985) p. 184 
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basis is processed to give the manifest features of language and thought 
is necessarily inscrutable to language. This is exactly that which I have 
argued. Manifest language is not a good guide to the "common basis" and 
thus is a bad thing to rely on in attempts to prove anything about such a 
basis. So, conceptual schemes stand, regardless of the status of language 
and thus empiricism stands also. This is in agreement with the assump-
tions of a tensorial picture of brain processing as this requires a division 
between invariants and the geometry governing their interrelations. We 
are indeed now suggesting a "real"/"ideal" distinction but it is important to 
realise that the "real" here is basically a very different thing to the rich on-
tologies of the naive realist. So, after all of this, we are bound to say what 
the implications for the future of Cognitive Science are. This is dependent 
on what we take to be our data and thus what we take as our ontology. 
Cognitive Science requires a stand on realism. Without it, we have no idea 
what we are basing our theories on, we have no idea exactly what there is 
to cognise about and thus we cannot design models to relate cognition to 
anything. Again, to overcome the two fundamental problems of stratified 
reification, we need to know what there is and how this relates to humans. 
The latter obviously depends on the former. 
As promised at the end of Chapter 7, a note is in order regarding the 
possibility of adding extra levels to a stratified account in an attempt to 
fix the problem of interrelation of levels. The thought seems to be that 
one might render different levels of explanation more plausibly connected 
if there is an intermediate level connecting them. The "distance" from one 
to the other is thus a combination of two, more easily connected distances. 
Jackendoff's strategy is like this, as is the work of many of those who desire 
a "cognitive" element such as Gardenfors and Lakoff. This cognitive level 
of representation is meant to provide a sort of buffer between the world 
and the brain which can explain the relation of the two without having to 
worry about how to reduce one to the other or interrelate very different 
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vocabularies. A reasonable idea but one which falls foul of the consider-
ation that any "level of representation" meant to play a necessary role in 
our cognition cannot employ concepts that are both manifest in our output 
and thought to be causal. This should be obvious from the preceding argu-
ment. Now, since a cognitive level of representation is thought to be a more 
careful examination of exactly which output patterns we manifest are of 
relevance, such theories are in no better position that full-blooded formal-
ist systems. Maybe they do not take the world for granted but they still 
take manifest patterns as evidence which is a more fundamental mistake 
and which subsumes the former. 
8.3 Realism 
Realism is often feared because of that which it gives us for free. We are 
given rich sets of existing things and the ontologies are often very liberal. 
Post-Kant, we are concerned about the sort of things that might populate 
our ontology and this leads some to argue that the ground of empiricism, 
which seems to require some sort of basic ontology, is missing. This is, I 
think often based on a rather limited notion of the possibilities of empiri-
cism. It is generally thought that the main meat of a theory of mind and 
language must rest in the basic parts that we are able to sense and thus 
build into our more formidable "mental" structures and phenomena. Lit-
tle attention is given to the way in which we might combine, process and 
interrelate the basics of out inputs in order to achieve the ordered output 
we see. Thus, for example, does Davidson deride the idea of the "scheme" 
involved in this task. We might, for example balance the load carried by 
the actual basic ontology of a theory with that carried by the manner in 
which the basics are combined in order to produce the output we perceive. 
The emphasis is different in such a theory but it is still empiricism, David-
son's third dogma and all. The usual realist tactic is too simple, driven by 
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the consideration that it is easier and more intuitive to put the structure 
into the world as it can be more easily mapped onto the structure of our 
manifest outputs; we feel more comfortable in understanding the relation 
between input and output. However, as we have seen, this will not do. 
Fir stly because the outputs do not wear their causes on their sleeves and 
secondly because putting structure into the world ignores the necessary 
Kantian lesson. The empirical brain sciences are instructive in demon-
strating that the manner of processing in the brain can provide us with 
a quite startling insight into the possibilities of combining information to 
produce manifestations completely unexpected and unintuitive compared 
with our usual manner of constructing explanations within formal systems. 
Since we know we have brains in our heads but we do not know we have 
formal systems in there, any conflict should probably err on the side of the 
neuroscience. 
There is something which I will call the "principle of seman tic indis-
t inguishability" (POSI) which makes ontology in the neuroscientific age a 
thorny area. An account of this will serve also as a summary of the model 
I propose for viewing semantics within Cognitive Science. Ifwe agree that, 
as I h ave repeatedly urged, our inputs are opaque to the patterns in our 
outputs, then we have no reason to suppose that our language and though t 
give any guide at all to ontology. Ifit so happened that it did, we would have 
to suppose that the brain does little to information reaching it through per-
ceptual receptors. This is simply not the case. So, what does the brain take 
as input? Quine and Davidson have argued at length, as have many, about 
that which we should take as the basis of a theory of meaning. David-
son prefers a distal theory which starts with the causes of intersubjective 
perception. Quine prefers a more proximal theory where we start with an 
impingement on our receptive surfaces19. This is just a question regarding 
19 Although, later, Quine has moved towards a more distal theory, he remains convinced 
that it must be as proximal as possible. This is not really an issue relevant to our discus-
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one of the fundamental points of trouble in semantic theory I have identi-
fied: the basis of the levels in an explanation. If we take seriously the idea 
that the brain is an information processor, we must realise that it can be 
of no consequence to processing strategy whether input information has a 
certain "content" or not. The brain cannot determine whether certain im-
pressions come from a dog, a bus or the feeling of the presence of abstract 
beauty - information is not like that. "Content" is something we abstract 
out from our outputs; our talk, our beliefs and the like. From the point of 
view of inputs, information is all the same. In terms of meaning, all inputs 
are indistinguishable. This is the principle referred to above. Now, if our 
ontology divided things into the "real" things: dogs, cats etc. and, say, the 
"abstract" things: truth, justice etc., then we might be fooled into thinking 
that the brain might, through evolution become sensitive to the difference 
and thus we might employ a formal theory with this difference built-in. 
However, the clues to our ontology are from our output only and we know 
that our perceptions are "output" too; the output of active processing in the 
brain and perceptual systems. This is an echo of the empiricist doctrine 
stressed by Quine that our evidence for ontology is exhausted by our sen-
sory receptions while our sensory r eceptions are not "simple" and do not 
"give" us anything untainted. 
" . . . to represent cognition as a discernment of regularities in 
an unadulterated stream of experience. Better to conceive of the 
stream itself as polluted, at each succeeding point of it's course, 
by every prior cognition."20 
This means that there is no way from an examination of the "stream of 
experience" to determine what the basis of a theory of meaning is. This is 
exactly why Quine himself took the naturalist turn and asked: 
"But why all this creative reconstruction, all this make-believe? 
sion but the factors involved can be found in (Quine 1990). 
20(Quine 1953) 
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... Why not just see how this construction [of knowledge] really 
proceeds? Why not settle for psychology?"21 
Quine's idea was to look at the way we really do construct our manifest 
patterns of language and thought since this is the only possibility in the 
situation we find ourselves in. I would argue that it is not quite natu-
ralistic enough to "settle for psychology" these days since modern cognitive 
psychology is so dependent on models using formal systems that it becomes 
subject to the criticisms of the usefulness of such systems as have already 
been made above. At the time Quine was writing, this was not as preva-
lent: formal linguistics and psychology have grown since, mainly as a re-
sult of Chomsky. We should now "settle for neuroscience". Ifwe do this, we 
see th at we must obey the dictates of the Principle of Semantic Indistin-
guishability. Information is not differentiated by its content as "content" is 
a notion only applicable at the level of our manifest outputs. Information 
is not differentiated at all. Thus it is meaningless to talk of different sorts 
of inputs and all we are left with as an ontology is the blanket term "in-
formation". The brain takes this information and extracts certain aspects, 
noting the invariant features. Invariant features will be highly abstract re-
lations between information and will not correspond to words or concepts 
as these sorts of things are manifest patterns in our output. This is the 
foundation of the mistake in most putative explanations of semantics and 
that which Quine sees in a priori epistemology; that the elements involved 
in the basis of our perceptions - the very basis of empiricism - need not 
correspond to any concepts or words that manifest as a result. This is why 
I question "settling for psychology" since the dominant cognitive paradigm 
today tends to classify supposedly "basic" things, as does Lakoff, in terms 
of concepts only applicable at a level these basics are meant to contribute 
towards. 
The invariant features that the human brain picks out in the envi-
21 (Quine 1969) 
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ronment are then processed through networks embodying very different 
geometries. They might be motor-spaces as described by the work of Pel-
lionisz and Llinas, or they might be "semantic spaces" roughly described 
by, say, the Churchlands. The invariant relations will however, on a tenso-
rial model, be preserved through changes in representational space. Our 
output consists in combining the abstract information involved in a man-
ner such that our outputs can be constructed, regardless of the complexity 
of the spaces involved. This, as mentioned, must necessarily be a con-
travariant combination. Once the output is manifest however, there is no 
way in knowing what the components were unless one knows the way in 
which the information was combined. This is, in my view, not an issue 
for Cognitive Science and semantics but one for neuroscience. Thus, this 
renders the possibility of an explanation of the workings of human seman-
tics and language impossible from within an a priori discipline or indeed, 
since Chomsky has taken misguided pains to extend the notion of evidence 
to try to circumvent the particular problem of being seen as a priori (see 
above), a discipline not concerned with the actual neural embodiment of 
processes. The POSI means that semantic "content" cannot play a role in 
any of this and thus it is causally impotent. This means a collapse of strat-
ified views dependent on levels of explanation and representation with sui 
generis characteristics. There is no independent "Realm of Reasons" or 
level of compositional propositional content simply because there is no way 
that this could be causally efficacious without being part of our input and 
this is not possible since these supposedly higher levels of explanation are 
completely dependent on concepts derived from our output. If one's theory 
is based on phenomena manifest in the output of a system and one does no 
empirical work in addressing how the outputs are generated, then there 
is no guarantee - in fact quite the opposite in the present case due to the 
technical consideration of abstract geometry - that a resultant theory has 
anything to do with the causal factors playing a role in what one is attempt-
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ing to explain. Put another way, if explanation requires us to understand 
causes, then a formalist picture requires that we know how things at their 
advocated sui generis level of explanation come to have their causal pow-
ers. It is maintained, for example, that believing propositions causes us to 
act. We cannot account for this suggested causal power by associating such 
features with causally efficacious elements in the Realm of Law since this 
would mean the brain does nothing between input and output; if properties 
are passed through untouched from input to output, then we contradict the 
obviously true statement that the brain does something to inputs to mani-
fest our outputs. This much Kant made us suspicious of and now, through 
modern research in neuroscience and biology, we are certain of it. 
So, what of realism? It is the post-Kantian dream that we might factor 
out the contribution of our categories in order to perceive the noumenal 
world. This is obviously impossible in the sense in which Kant expressed 
the problem since the very conditions of perception would thereby be re-
moved and thus to talk of"perceiving the noumenal" is nonsense. With this 
idealism being couched in the modern neuroscientific idiom, things may be 
different however. If the patterns imposed on our outputs are the result 
of specifiable networks embodied in the brain, then the possibility arises 
that we might isolate the contribution of certain sorts of regularities, as in 
the case of the example of lateral inhibition mentioned in Chapter 6. If it 
turned out, as a matter of evolutionary contingency, that the operation of 
different networks were isolatable, then we might be able to experimen-
tally remove some of the "conditions of sensible appearances" without af-
fecting others. This might allow us to get an idea of what happens to our 
inputs on their way to becoming outputs. Neuroscience is full of such ex-
amples already but it is still not clear exactly what overall patterns are 
emerging (see (Milner & Rugg 1992) for an overview and many examples). 
It may transpire that the operation of different embodied networks in the 
brain are not cleanly separable and thus the case is as Kant describes it; 
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the contribution of our categories of perception operates either all at once 
or not at all. If the former, we cannot assume anything from our outputs. 
If the latter, we cannot be really said to be "perceiving" anything. This 
is the essence of the position held by what Churchland calls the "boggled 
skeptics"22 who believe that the brain does indeed contain all of the clues 
necessary for a correct view of ontology and semantics but who think that 
the brain is too complex for brains to be able to fathom. Thus, there would 
be a definite answer to the question of whether the brain modifies our sen-
sory input in a particular way but the complexity of this is so great that we 
could never determine it. This is however a matter for the history of neuro-
science to answer at a later date and not something Cognitive Science can 
attack in an a priori manner in its work in natural language semantics or 
linguistics. 
8.4 The POSI and its Implications 
So, my views regarding the status of the different supposed levels of expla-
nation in Cognitive Science can be summarised in the Principle of Semantic 
In dis tinguishabili ty: 
The contribution of the environment to our cognition is epis-
temologically opaque. This is empirically supported. Given this, 
the output of our cognitive apparatus can be as much a part 
of the environment as that which we are more u sed to calling 
"real". Therefore, "content" is a concept only applicable to pat-
terns of our cognitive output and is therefore useless in an inves-
tigation of the causal factors contributing to cognition. a fortiori, 
it is useless to posit a level of explanation characterised by the 
notion of "semantic content". This, however, is common to all of 
the formal, propositional based accounts commonly proposed in 
Cognitive Science. 
22(Churchland 1986b) p. 315 
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The question is: how does this principle manifest itself in the brain? 
The onus is on me to present some more concrete picture of how this works 
in terms of the neuroscience discussed. One thing must be clear firstly. I 
am not obliged to give semantic accounts of the usual models, fragments 
or examples since these are, I have argued, misplaced not in their execu-
tion but rather their whole conception. They are attempts to learn about 
causes from undecomposable effects and this is therefore an impossible 
task. My task is rather to describe the way in which we contribute to the 
environment: the way in which the output of our cognition - the categorical 
judgements - is constantly absorbed into the fabric of "reality" such that it 
becomes an indistinguishable part of our inputs. 
One hears about certain experiences that have changed people's lives 
forever. A certain experience changes, as it were, the parameters by which 
the world is measured - it changed the criteria for future cognition and 
perception. I think that these experiences occur daily and are the reason 
why out cognitive life is so inscrutable. There are, I think, two forms of this 
experience. The first is of a major experience that changes one's life. This 
is like a large change of view, occurring over a short space of time and is a 
relatively rare event. The other type of this event is due to ubiquity. The 
constant occurrence of a perception will, over time, tend to alter one's view, 
particularly if this perception is so ubiquitous as to appear not worthy of 
conscious attention. 23 This sort of constant, repetitive and small-scale en-
vironmental invariant has the same effect, at a much slower speed, as the 
what we might term "Eureka!" experiences mentioned earlier. However, 
the effect is the same: the criteria for our cognition and perception are al-
tered. In a sense, this effect is simply an aspect of our ability to learn from 
the environment. Let us digress a moment into this area in order to make 
23This is, I think, exactly how advertising works. Billboards, television advertisements, 
radio advertising etc. are so much part of the furniture of life that they melt into the 
background because of their ubiquity and are no less effective for that. 
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some observations that bear directly on the POSI. 
Humans are able to learn indirectly. That is, they can learn from books, 
from videos, from tapes or from being told what to do. They can even learn 
by thinking about how to do something. This is, I think , related to the 
POSI. If POSI were not true, this adaptability in learning would be impos-
sible since the source of information would matter far more. The reason 
that we can learn from sources so different from direct experience is be-
cause, I argue, the POSI ensures that, as far as much of cognition goes, 
books, videos etc. are direct experience. Epistemologically, we fool our-
selves into an extended notion of reality. I say "as far as much cognition 
goes" as we famously cannot learn physical skills very well from books 
etc. Well, like most evolutionary effects, POSI is not designed to be all-
encompassing and perfect. Indeed, it is not designed at all and simply 
serves as the most useful cognitive architecture so far. Indeed, this sort of 
integrated learning ability means we often try to learn things in only one 
way e.g. from books, which, as every carpenter or computer consultant or 
will tell you is nonsense. 
So, in terms of the abstract geometrical picture I have urged, what 
is responsible for the POSI? That is, what elements of this theory are re-
sponsible for the constant embedding of our continuing cognition in the 
environment in such in inscrutable way? The issue is one of malleability: 
the axes of any abstract space that activates upon stimulation from the 
environment must not be rigid. They must be able to change in response 
to experience and thus to change the significance of similar experience in 
the future. Thus, we must not see the axes of the spaces as being so differ-
ent from the tensors that they define. If we allow such malleability in the 
very structure of our cognition then there is the following consequence: the 
reason our cognition is so stable under normal conditions is because the 
conditions are normal. We are capable of quite radical conceptual changes 
and experiences but we seldom have such not because the brain is so sta-
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ble but because our experiences are usually so narrow and repetitive. Thus, 
our conception of reality is such due to the intimate relationship between 
our cognitive structure and "the world". This is the bottom line: our ex-
perience determines how we take our future experience by altering the 
structure which makes sense of our experience. In terms of a tensorial the-
ory, the metric tensor for the particular space would need to be modified by 
every impression coming from what we take epistemologically as "empir-
ical reality"'. This could be accomplished by a constant tensor product of 
impression "inputs" with the tensor representing the metric for the space. 
(By convention, matrices are double overlined, vectors single overlined). 
Metrics are established by relations of covariant and contravariant expres-
sions of the same physical vector (see, for example, (Wrede 1972) p. 82). 
That is, by a relation ofvi to Vj . This is very important as it corroborates the 
idea that on this model, it is natural to expect that the metric is dynamic 
since part of my whole premise is that cognitive inputs are continuously 
effected by previous cognitive outputs and by the state of the metric. It is 
the former effect that accounts for notions of "content" and the latter that 
accounts for the perceptually and cognitively prior categories that shape 
our thought. Normally, the metric is seen as a stable part of a system, re-
lating different vectorial expressions of invariants. However, I am urging 
that the metric is constantly changing in response to the activation that 
passes through it. That is, given that we determine the metric tensor by 
relating different expressions of the same invariant, we must accept that 
what is taken as an "invariant" is determined by the metric itself. This is 
the most important part of the geometrical picture I advocate and thus I 
shall state it explicitly. 
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We should be careful not to force prosaic interpretations onto the no-
tion of a metric. A metric is often said to define the notion of "distance" in 
a geometrical space. Now, we are used to this corresponding to our usual 
notion of "distance" for Euclidean spaces but this is simply a special case 
where, for one, the axes are orthogonal. In more complex spaces, "distance" 
can be a highly abstract property indicating some relationship between el-
ements in the space. Also, different metrics give different ways of mea-
suring it. Our usual notion is something like "the shortest route between 
two things". Well, it depends what is meant by "shortest". There are, for 
example, "city-block metrics" that define distance in terms of routes taken 
only on combinations of paths parallel to the axes of the space. So, the 
notion of metric is a very general notion and this should not be forgotten. 
The usual mathematical treatment of tensor relationships supposes that 
we have an invariant, physical state of affairs that can be represented by 
different vectors. That is, the same event can be multiply represented in 
different spaces of different dimensions etc. This much is obvious as far as 
it goes since, for example, a ball being caught is represented in motor space 
and visual space on quite different criteria. The whole of the tensorial pic-
ture of cerebellar activity presented so far starts from this. However, in the 
case of human cognition, we must accept that the notion of "the same" is 
unavoidably one that is determined by our current conceptual apparatus. 
On this picture, crucial to an understanding of this apparatus is the no-
tion of the metrics which govern their activity. Therefore the metrics are 
responsible for the generation of the metrics. The dynamics of the system 
becomes apparent when we consider the embodiment of a tensorial picture 
in human cognition where our outputs are opaquely taken as inputs too. 
This is exactly the POSI. 
A metric tensor is required in order for the notion of"distance" to have 
any meaning. Einstein famously made very cryptic remarks about the met-
ric underlying everything in his model because "distance" between things, 
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however abstract, is such an essential part of our way of understanding 
things, any picture of a geometrical nature therefore must note the im-
portance of the metric. The geometrical interpretation of tensor analysis 
has it that a tensor with contravariant indices is represented in the usual 
way by the parallelogram rule we are familiar with from vectors. It is easy 
to associate a notion of "distance" or "magnitude" with vectors when they 
are represented this way. However, a tensor with covariant indices in an 
n dimensional space is usually represented by an n - 1 dimensional plane 
and thus there is no way to define "magnitude'' or "distance" for them. It 
simply has no meaning and thus the metric, which allows the lowering and 
raising of indices as noted earlier, essentially allows the reinterpretation of 
covariants as contravariants. In fact, this was the essence of the Pellion-
isz and Llinas model discussed in Chapter 5. However, as we note below, 
since most tensors are "mixed", that is to say they have both covarian t 
and contravariant indices, a metric is essential if "magnitude" is to have a 
meaning. It is clear that indeed it must if we are to be able to, at least, co-
ordinate our motor responses and so it seems to be required as an integral 
part of our cognitive makeup. 
8.5 Why tensors are the right way to think about 
cognition 
Consider the problems discussed previously with the usual geometrical ap-
proaches to cognition. It was argued that the criticisms levelled by oppo-
nents such as Fodor and Lepore were justified because the advocates of 
a geometrical picture h ad conceded too much to the methodological stan-
dards of their opponents. As a result, their models were too simplistic 
and designed with adherence to established criteria of understandability 
(which underpin the very theories they seek to displace) in mind. The no-
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tion of concepts as points in conceptual spaces is not a happy one as it begs 
an a priori specification of the components of such a point which is exactly 
the same as a decomposition or meaning postulate. Thus such geometrical 
theories are no different from traditional approaches. All that has hap-
pened is a transliteration of terms, not the genesis of a new theory. Now, 
if we are to take say, concepts as tensors, we see immediately that this ap-
proach is quite different24• The components of a tensor are not values along 
axes but rather are functions whose values are the components of vectors. 
So, a tensor in this respect is a highly abstract entity composed of all of 
the sets of functions defined on vector components for all reference frames. 
A tensor is a set of cardinality c of sets of functions that describe trans-
formations into c reference frames. Now this brings to mind the notion 
of metaphor. Metaphors are enabled by concepts playing similar roles in 
different situations. What we have lacked in investigating metaphors is a 
suitable notion of "similar". Concepts as tensors gives an obvious benefit in 
that their nature is of some abstract object that manifests as ways of oper-
ating on objects in any given space in the same way. Here, we have a notion 
of "same" we can really flesh out since it is mathematically defined by the 
invariants of a system. Of course, that is not to say that we can state this 
in ordinary language for a given concept: to do this would be to go against 
everything I have argued so far. The complexity of the spaces involved may 
mean we can never so this for any given example; this is an empirical mat-
ter and not for philosophers or Cognitive Scientists to make a priori models 
of Indeed, this model makes our attempts to "define" concepts much harder 
since they are much more abstract things than we would, according to tra-
ditional methodology, like. What we might hope for is a classification of 
24We now discuss the t ensor concept in full generality whereas before, we have con-
sidered it in the same sense as Einstein i.e. tensors as being analogous to vectors tha t 
transform according to certain restrictions. This is really a convenience of discussion and 
I revert to the more modern treatment largely due to Weyl in order to bring out the ab-
stract nature of the concept. The simplification is due to the fact that vectors can be 
conveniently considered as tensors ofrank one. See (Sokolnikoff 1951) 
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concepts according to their tensorial rank and covariant/contraviant index. 
That is, their level of abstractness and how they treat their arguments. I 
venture to speculate on this in the spirit of constructive exposition and not 
in any manner that should be taken as suggesting an a priori model. 
Consider the covariant law (this is only given for tensors of rank one 
e.g. vectors, for clarity): 
ox°' 
Bi = -:r--:-Ao: 
uyi 
This means that the tensor A - which is a set of functions that t r ans-
form coordinates in one reference frame - is the same object represented 
by the set of functions B in another reference frame and the relation is one 
governed by the partial differential where the new coordinates yi are the 
divisor (hence "covariance"). This is a certain type of transformation which 
we may well fruitfully correlate with a certain type of conceptual shift: that 
of a metaphor whose concept relates its arguments in the same way in its 
metaphorical sense (i.e. the transformation covaries the argument roles). 
"Big hearted" may be said to be of this type since the literal use of "big" 
covaries intuitively with its sense in the metaphor. "Small minded", "big 
headed", "hugely interesting'', "tiny mind" etc. are all of this type too, from 
which we might conclude that metaphors and analogies to do with physical 
size are all governed by concepts that are covariant tensors since they map 
into their metaphorical uses in an obvious way that covaries with their 
"literal" usage. Consider the contravariant law: 
This says the same as the covariant law but here, the old coordinates 
are the divisor in the partial differential that governs the transformation 
and thus "contravariant". We would expect metaphors and conceptual 
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shifts based on sarcasm to follow this pattern. For example "He was as 
brave as a mouse" has an obvious opposite shift of meaning. In our terms, 
the transformation of"brave" into this usage is contravariant. Now, it is ob-
vious that this is simplistic in the sense that we cannot hope to include all 
conceptual nuances into these two polar opposites. Tensor theory has the 
notion of a "mixed" tensor however, where some components transform co-
variantly and some contravariantly. In fact, the covariant and contravari-
ant laws are just special cases where all components transform the same 
way. Mixed tensors are usually employed to treat real problems since they 
allow an arbitrarily complex relation. The transformation law in its full 
generality for mixed tensors is: 
This shows that the transformation law is for tensors of covariant rank 
r and contravariant rank s. The contravariant and covariant laws ex-
pressed earlier fall out as special cases (when expressed in full generality 
for tensors of any rank) when the contravariant or covariant rank is O re-
spectively. Thus, this can be seen as an extremely powerful way of express-
ing transformations of concepts of any mixture of covariance/contravariance. 
That is, certain things about a conceptual change might result in some as-
pects of the concept being covariant and some contravariant. Phrases like 
"as safe as can be expected" seem to fall under this umbrella as they covary 
with the literal positive connotations of "safe" but contravary with them 
due to the qualifier. The notion of rank allows us to have concepts of arbi-
trary degrees of abstractness. That is, we can have concepts that deal with 
transformations of concepts etc. This is necessary to be able to account 
for meta-conceptual schemes. For example, "conceptually shaky" seems to 
be a covariant concept about concepts. i.e we might say it is a rank two 
covariant tensor. 
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I do not want to advocate a detailed catalogue of conceptual types at 
all. That would according to my criteria set out previously, be little more 
than an intellectual game. What I have wished to do is to suggest how 
the notion of a tensor does justice to some of our intuitions. The serious 
obstacles to normal theorising that I have insisted upon throughout are of 
paramount importance still. 
Another thing of importance that this geometrical picture shows is that 
the metric - that which our cognition relies upon for its speed and relations 
of ideas according to this model - is a dynamic and evolving determinant 
of our minds. Since, on the picture we outlined in Chapter 5, the metric is 
r esponsible for creating contravariant execution vectors (behaviour ) from 
covariant input vectors and thus this malleability in the metrics for our 
cognitive spaces will result in changing behavioural patterns. Naturally, 
how we see things influences how we act. The strength of the experience 
would correspond to the quantitative strength of the input tensors and this 
serves to model the notion of importance of impression. Many small but 
repeated impressions would alter the metric by successive product. Large 
impressions would alter it swiftly because their strength - their vectorial 
magnitude - would cause a larger alteration in the metric. Of course, it is 
implied by my view that what constituted a "small"' or "large"' impression 
or input would depend on the state of the cognitive agent. Now, it is natural 
to question this malleability of our cognitive apparatus when put in such 
an extreme form. There are surely, it might be said, certain limits to mal-
leability. This is certainly the case and is what, I think, defines important 
cognitive difference, for example, between species. Kant's program was to 
identify the fundamental categories that cannot be bypassed by anything 
we would want to call "cognition". This is indeed a real limit and we must 
therefore accept a scale of categories ranging from the very malleable to 
the almost mandat ory. For example, for the human species; 
Hard categories time, space, causality 
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Firm categories religion , moral belief 
Soft categorie s tastes, manners 
As examples, these suggest the types of things that might appear at 
different places on a continuum of malleable categories. We even might 
not want to take the notion of "hard-coded" categories such as space and 
time too literally in the face of, say, drug-related experiences in which time 
and space are sometimes reported as having changed qualities. What is 
clear however, is that this sort of malleability is much less common and 
much more serious in its implications for the whole of cognition. That there 
is a scale of malleability seems to me to be beyond doubt; that it can be 
accounted for in terms of an abstract geometrical theory seems to be very 
important. 
8.6 Connections With Meta-Systems Transition The-
ory 
It is necessary here to consider a theory developed by Valentin Turchin 
called "Meta-Systems Transition Theory" (MST)25 . This notion is similar 
in spirit to the POSI and it would be well to compare and contrast the 
two ideas in order to contribute to an understanding of my position. I 
think MST is an ideal discussion point since it encompasses many modern 
views which, whilst not really falling into the traditional symbolic formalist 
camp, still holds to some notion of nomologically imperative "levels of ex-
planation". Thus, this discussion is crucial in setting my ideas off against 
the central problems that I have mentioned in Cognitive Science. MST 
is the idea that, as a naturally occurring phenomenon, there is a process 
whereby an organisation of multiple subsystems occurs, leading to a con-
25(Turchin 1977) 
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trolling subsystem taking over and creating more order. The controlling 
system is then a meta-system and the move from the initial state to the 
next, more organised state is the transition. Turchin26 uses this notion to 
account for the whole of evolution in that simple systems are integrated by 
the emergence of controlling systems which further enable the multiplica-
tion of the subsystems since their very organisation makes their multipli-
cation now more useful to the organism. An example is the appearance of 
movement: 
"The first metasystem transition we discern in the history of 
animals is the appearance of movement. The integrated sub-
systems are the parts of the cell that ensure metabolism and 
reproduction. The position of these parts in space is random 
and uncontrolled until, at a certain time, there appear organs 
that connect separate parts of the cell and put them into mo-
tion: cell membranes, cilia, flagella. A metasystem transition 
occurs which may be defined by the formula: control of position 
= movement". 27 
Turchin builds up the history of evolution as a history of such transi-
tions, even going so far as to include language: 
"Language emerges when the phenomena of reality are en-
coded in linguistic objects. But after its origin language itself 
becomes a phenomenon of reality. Linguistic objects become very 
important elements of social activity and are included in human 
life like tools and household accessories. And just as the human 
being creates new tools for the manufacture and refinement of 
other tools so he creates new linguistic objects to describe the 
reality which already contains linguistic objects. A metasystem 
transition within the system of language occurs. Because the 
new linguistic objects are in their turn elements of reality and 
may become objects of encoding, the metasytem transition may 
be repeated an unlimited number of times. Like other cybernetic 
systems we have considered in this book, language, is a part of 
the developing universe and is developing itself. And like other 
systems, language-and together with it thinking-is undergoing 
26Ibid Chap. 3 
27lbid, Chap 3 
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qualitative changes through metasystem transitions of varying 
scale, that is to say, transitions which encompass more or less 
important subsystems of the language system."28 
It will be apparent that this bears similarities to the POSI in that it 
allows the outputs of our perceptions of the world to be, literally, a part 
of the world. However, there is an assumption built into this theory that 
does not carry over well into the cognitive domain. This is the idea that 
such a transition is a unique event that monotonically establishes a sys-
tem as the controlling system for some set of subsystems. If this were the 
case, then the structure of cognition would be a static tree of systems, re-
lated in established ways. It is clear from what has come before that this 
is not an adequate picture and that we must take seriously the dynamic 
aspect of cognition. Thus, in terms of the notion of a metric defined on 
the abstract spaces of our cognition, we said that this must change con-
stantly in order to account for the way in which our cognition changes and 
alters the world. In terms of MST then, we must allow that the transitions 
are constantly happening and that they may reverse themselves and in-
stantiate completely different control structures for the same subsystems. 
Meta-System Transitions may also occur where elements of a controlled 
subsystem might become the controlling system. For example, one day we 
might believe that marketing is simply pandering to people's already exist-
ing tastes, the next day we might realise that the tastes are often caused 
by the marketing. The reversal of causation in beliefs is a good example in 
general of a transition where an organising principle is actually underde-
termined and so can sway with different evidence. In fact, it is the crux of 
the matter that MST theory underestimates the amount of underdetermi-
nation for any particular belief Given this, there will be many transitions, 
often cancelling each other out. In plain terms, this is simply the fact that 
our cognition is controlled by different principles at different times. Some-
28Ibid, Chap. 7 
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times one idea governs our thought, sometimes another and this tends to 
change rapidly as is obvious to all in cases where we are preoccupied with 
a thought that colours the rest of our thoughts. This is very volatile and 
the governing thought passes away as the meta-systemic governor, chang-
ing places often to be governed itself It may well be useful to describe 
evolution as a certain static path of Meta-Systems Transitions and in one 
sense, since it actually took only one path, it is. This is not adequate as 
a model for ongoing cognition though as the very point with this is that, 
every moment, it takes different paths, backtracks, changes direction and 
often performs radical u-turns. 
More recent proponents of MST are coming to this sort of view I feel. 
For example, C. Henry's paper at a recent MST conference29 says: 
"Biological structures determine cognitive strategies. Mean-
ing, truth, and observat ional accuracy are embodied in a com-
plex branching system that performs, in part, through decon-
structing objects and phenomena into particular characteristics 
and then reassembles these parts into an often different whole." 
Strikingly, this echoes the tensorial model I have explored in its insis-
tence of deconstruction and reconstruction of the same data. This is clearly 
a more dynamic approach to MST than Turchin originally expressed. 
So, to summarise. Formal systems based on symbolic, logical notions 
are like sailor's classification of patterns of waves. This is a classification 
that helps them do things. It does not explain where the patterns come 
from. Sailors may sensitively correlate wave patterns with wind and tem-
perature. This still does not explain how the patterns arise - it is pragmatic 
knowledge. Pragmatic knowledge may become filigreed with spare time 
left over from surviving and may appear to be too complex and clever to be 
mere pragmatic knowledge. But filigreed pragmatic knowledge is still, at 
heart, pragmatic and is for doing things. In the case of filigreed pragmatic 
29(Heylighen & Aerts 1996) 
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knowledge, it is simply no longer clear anymore what it is that it is for do-
ing. The real explanations of things seldom enter into our ways of doing 
things. The real explanations are too detailed and complex. Hence we have 
what Churchland calls "folk Psychology" which cannot, contrary to what 
Churchland thinks30 , be replaced by a more rigorous physicalist vocabu-
lary since folk language is essentially a pragmatic language that allows us 
to do things. There is simply no reason why the language of explaining 
things is of any use in doing things. In fact, an implication of my position 
is that the language of explanation cannot be a language of action, of doing, 
of pragmatics. This is because it cannot even be a language of static models 
and of formalisms whose central thrust is the desire to render an explana-
tion as canonically "understandable" by some, unfortunately explanatorily 
irrelevant, historical criteria. We must simply take this strong medicine 
and accept that knowing how something works does not help you do it bet-
ter and conversely, knowing how to do something does not mean you know 
how you do it. The mistake that has been made is that this state of affairs 
has led to theorists thinking that there are different "levels" of explana-
tion: those that correspond more closely to what we do and those that are 
closer to how we do it. There is only one "explanation" and that is the ex-
planation of how we do something. How we talk, think and theorise about 
what we do may bear no relation to this and need not effect us once we 
realise the incredible complexity of the transitions of information that take 
place in perception and cognition. Patterns in behaviour may come from 
two sources: the world and the machinery that deals with it. If we cannot 
tell these two apart in experience, as the POSI states, then the patterns 
cannot be used as evidence for theories that take patterns in a realist man-
ner. The upshot of the POSI is that there is an epistemological barrier to 
model-building in Cognitive Science. This barrier, as Kant saw, is uncross-
able. I have argued that this has important implications for methodology 
30See (Churchland 1984) 
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in Cognitive Science. 
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